

# Special Issue on Internal Security



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*'Promoting Good Practices and Standards'*

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**IPJ**

## **The Indian Police Journal**

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## **EDITORIAL**

On the historic occasion of Independence day, all the stakeholders of Internal security, especially the Indian Police deserve to be applauded for their commitment and devotion to provide India with a safe and secure foundation. Despite various odds and obstructions, Indian Police have been unceasingly and eagerly participating in the maintenance of Internal Security and thereby contributing to the process of nation-building.

In this issue of IPJ carrying 12 articles related to Internal Security ranging from its perspective analysis, terrorism to insurgency and left-wing-extremism to causes and effects of radicalisation.

The article India's Internal Security –Challenges and Response deals with global terrorism & its effects in Kashmir Valley. It also talks about separatist movements in North-East and a constant threat posed by left-wing extremism. It suggests ways as to how these threats can be handled.

The article internal Security Challenges: A Perspective Analysis lays great emphasis on sustaining and emerging factors which play a pivotal role in the management of Internal Security. Some of them are unstable, troubled and volatile neighbourhood, urban congestion growing disparities, social dynamics and power shifts, inevitable tech assertions, corruption and underdevelopment and devolution in governance. The article focuses on traditional threats, threats emanating from governance faultlines and emerging paradigms and complexities in security discourse.

The write-up on Research, Training & Technology strongly focuses on the difference in the policing system which has been seen in the last 50 years and emphasises the need to transform police to meet contemporary challenges. The research, Training and scientific investigation of crime requires more meticulous attention and BPR&D's version 2.0 can act as a catalyst for bringing about these changes in days to come.

The article on Left-Wing –extremism: Challenge to Internal Security deals with the historical and geographical perspective of left-wing extremism with special reference to Maoism/Naxalism and describes the challenges faced to tackle LWE. It also focuses on the operational strategy of security forces to curb this movement and suggests various confidence-building measures to resolve the problem.

The article on External threats and Internal Dimensions of Indian Security shares deep insights into several Internal threats and major external threats faced by India and its dimension to the Indian security system. This is vital.

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The article on Reforming Intelligence in 5GW stresses the new tactics of fifth-generation warfare in which battlefield forms a real space changed to the cognitive domain by use of technology. It highlights the importance of perception management over traditional battle techniques and places considerable emphasis on modification in traditional intelligence process to meet the requirement of cognitive war by use of technology reinforced weaponry.

I would love to talk of the article on Internal Security: An International outlook, mainly deals with the dimensions of internal security which include armed rebellions, economic security, environmental security and cyber security and also their handling through the creation of specialized agencies in different countries with a special reference to the USA, UK and France.

IPJ carries an article on Money Laundering by LWE- Importance of action under PMLA (Prevention of Money Laundering Act) focuses on the need to choke the illegal funds available with LWE to weaken them and talks of Bihar Model of joint action by STF, SIB and Enforcement Directorate to tackle it. It also talks about the techniques of money laundering by LWE in Bihar and effective uses of PMLA to curb it.

The article on a Perspective overview on Naxalism focuses on an analysis of Naxalism with a special reference to the south of Chhattisgarh, describing their propaganda tools and its influence on tribal society. It emphasizes the need to take a holistic approach to a strong counter strategic policy against security threat alongwith confidence-building measures and fostering trust factor between security forces and the rural population, which is brainwashed by moist ideology.

The article on Internal Security Enemies within us: A Community Policing Perspective focuses on various Internal Security threats to India and how community Policing principles can be applied to address Internal Security. It heavily emphasizes integrating community policing concepts to address the issues related to Internal Security and enhancement of police image to establish absolute trust among people of India.

My editorial would be incomplete without incorporating the nuggets from the article on understanding de-radicalisation and possible interventions; speaking of the author who has prominently displayed the understanding of the concept of de-radicalisation and its application to deal with violent extremism. It also describes the study of SAMARTH: Breaking Barriers Programme in the central prison of Gujarat adopted for de-radicalisation.

Concluding with the article on drones – A perspective on Internal Security focuses on the impact of an unmanned aircraft system or drone on Internal Security. It explores the vulnerability, identifies defence approach and lays greater emphasis on gaining a clear understanding of the drone technology for effective use.

**Santosh Mehra**  
(Editor-in Chief)

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# India's Internal Security : Challenges and Response

Prakash Singh\*



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Kautilya wrote in the *Arthashastra* that a state could be at risk from four different kinds of threats – internal, external, externally-aided internal and internally-aided external. The internal security scenario of the country has a mix of all the shades of threats visualized by Kautilya.

Terrorists have spread their tentacles all over the country. J&K continues to be in a state of flux with Pakistan continuing to push infiltrators from across the border and refusing to dismantle its infrastructure of terrorism. The separatist movements in the north-east have been generally contained, but the region continues to be in a state of turbulence. The Maoist insurrection appears to be ebbing in Central India, but there are indications of its expansion in the north-east and some southern states. Borders, both land and maritime, present formidable challenges of management.

The major challenges on the internal security front are:

- threat of terrorism, international and domestic;
- separatist movement in J&K aided and abetted by Pakistan;
- insurgent movements in the north-east;
- Left-Wing Extremism; and

- Border Management

A brief review of the aforesaid challenges would be necessary to understand their gravity and examine what changes in the existing policies would be necessary to deal with them.

## Terrorism

International terrorism poses the greatest challenge to the security and stability of the country. The terrorists are opposed to the very idea of India; they want to destroy its icons and its symbols. They have been repeatedly causing explosions in Delhi because it is the political capital of India; they have been repeatedly attacking Mumbai because it is the commercial hub of the country; they have been perpetrating incidents of violence in places like Ayodhya and Varanasi because these are the holiest places of the Hindus; they have been active in Bangalore because it is the IT hub of the country. In other words, they want to destroy India politically, economically and culturally. According to an assessment, India is the third most affected country in the world after Iraq and Afghanistan in the number of attacks perpetrated on its soil, and there are 43 terror groups active in India.

The Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri has called upon the Muslims to “raise the flag of jihad” in the sub-continent. He also announced

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### Author's Intro:

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the formation of a new branch of Al Qaeda, Jamaat Qaidat Al-jihad, to “bring back Islamic rule” in the sub-continent. In a recent recorded video message released on July 9, 2019, Zawahiri said:

“I am of the view that the mujahideen in Kashmir - at this stage at least - should single-mindedly focus on inflicting unrelenting blows on the Indian Army and the government so as to bleed the Indian economy and make India suffer sustained losses in manpower and equipment”

The Al Qaeda, according to a Committee of the UN Security Council, maintains close cooperation with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The emergence of the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in the Middle East and its concept of Caliphate gave a new dimension to the terrorist threat. Ansar-ul-Tawheed (AuT), an ultra-religious off-shoot of the Indian Mujahideen, declared its allegiance to the Islamic State and its self-styled Caliph, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. The Islamic State vowed to expand the organization’s war against India, citing apocalyptic religious prophecies which talk of a global war that will precede the return of the Mahdi, or redeemer, who will rid the world of evil and pave the way for the Day of Judgment. The death of Baghdadi on October 26, 2019 has caused a setback to the Islamic State but, according to Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, the Islamic State is shifting its base from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan and that geographical proximity would mean continued, if not a greater threat, to countries in the region including India. The Home Ministry has been maintaining that the Islamic State has a very limited impact in India, but there are disturbing reports of Indian Muslims being increasingly attracted to the ideology of the Islamic State. Kerala and Tamilnadu have emerged as safe havens for Islamic terrorists operating from South India.

Pakistan is the greatest nursery of terrorists in the world. The former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Jim Mattis, described it as the “most dangerous country” in the world because of the radicalization of its society and the availability of nuclear weapons. The Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Hizbul Mujahideen are the most formidable trans-border terrorist outfits operating from Pakistan and launching attacks on India. This has been acknowledged by US State Department also in its ‘Country Report on Terrorism 2018’. According to Lt. General Subrata Saha, these are like “multi-headed hydra powered by Pakistan, supported by China and funded by some West Asian states”. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, himself admitted, while speaking in Washington on July 24, 2019 that there were still 30,000-40,000 terrorists on its soil who had fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The indigenous terrorist outfits which have been perpetrating incidents now and then are the Indian Mujahideen, Popular Front of India, and The Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). According to the US State Department, Nepal is currently the biggest hub for Indian Mujahideen operators.

There is a well-organized attempt to revive terrorism in the Punjab. According to a report prepared by a parliamentary panel, Sikh youths are being trained at ISI facilities in Pakistan to carry out terror activities in India. Punjab witnessed a series of targeted murders, including that of RSS workers, in 2016 and 2017. Investigation by the NIA revealed that there was a transnational network of conspirators affiliated to the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) and backed by Pakistan’s ISI with linkages running through Dubai, France, UK, Italy and Pakistan. Radical Sikh diaspora in Europe, North America and Canada have formed ‘World Sikh Organization’ and ‘Sikhs for Justice’ to revive the demand for Khalistan. They have launched



a movement called 'Referendum 2020' to demand right of self-determination for the Sikhs by that year. The Chief Minister of Punjab has urged the Government of India to devise a comprehensive strategy to thwart the attempts to revive terrorism in the state. There have been reports in the recent past of Pakistan-based Khalistan Zindabad Force attempting to infiltrate weapons through hexacopter drones. Four such drones had flown sorties to airdrop eighty kilograms of arms and ammunition including AK rifles, pistols and fake currency. The Chief Minister of Punjab described it as "a new and serious dimension on Pakistan's sinister designs in the aftermath of the abrogation of Article 370".

Economic terrorism is yet another dimension of international terrorism. Pakistan has been flooding the country with counterfeit currency with a view to subverting its economy and funding terrorist activities in different parts of the country. According to a study carried out by the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, Rupees 400 crore worth of fake currency notes are in circulation in the country at any given point in time, and Rupees 70 crore worth of FICN are infused into the Indian market every year. Pakistan's High Commissions in Dhaka and Kathmandu are fully involved in these operations. The criminal syndicates of West Asia are also exploited for the purpose.

### **Jammu & Kashmir**

Government of India's policy in J&K has been to secure the borders from cross-border terrorism and to contain militancy; redress genuine grievances of the people within the legal framework; ensure economic development of the area; and integrate the state with the rest of India.

Ever since the advent of militancy in the state in 1990, a total of 14024 civilians and 5273

security forces personnel have lost their lives (till March 31, 2019) in the incidents of violence.

The killing of young Hizbul Mujahideen Commander, Burhan Wani, by the security forces on July 8, 2016 led to prolonged agitation by separatists in the Valley. The popular upsurge was fully exploited by Pakistan. Syed Salahuddin, chief of Hizbul Mujahideen, vowed on September 3, 2016 to block any peaceful political resolution to the Kashmir conflict, and threatened to train more Kashmiri suicide bombers who would turn the Valley into "a graveyard for Indian forces". On September 18, 2016, JeM terrorists attacked an India army post in Uri along the LoC, killing 19 soldiers. The Indian army responded by carrying out a surgical strike inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) in the early hours of September 29, 2016, inflicting heavy casualties and damage to the terror launch pads in the region. A German political scientist, Hein Kiessling, has stated in his book *The ISI of Pakistan* that Pakistan's ISI will continue its proxy war against India regardless of any change in its leadership because it needs an enemy and the ISI defines it as India's "control over Kashmir."

It would be seen that incidents of terrorist violence touched a peak during 2018. It was the bloodiest year in so far as the number of terrorist incidents and the casualties of both security forces and the terrorists were the highest in the last five years. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may lead to further escalation of violence in the Valley. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the Lashkar-e-Toiba chief, has already threatened that the Taliban shall enter Jammu & Kashmir.

According to a statement made by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Lok Sabha on January 8, 2019, about 300 terrorists were active in the State. Cease-fire violations on the Line of Control (LoC) witnessed a quantum jump in

2018. The figures, in fact, doubled compared to that of the previous year. There were 2,140 incidents of cease-fire violations in 2018; 14 BSF personnel lost their lives and 53 sustained injuries in these incidents. This year (2019), there have been 2,500 incidents of ceasefire violations by Pakistan already till November 15.

Meanwhile, there have been disturbing reports of Kashmiri youth in large numbers joining the ranks of militants. During 2018, there were reports of 191 local youth joining various militant outfits in the State as against 126 in 2017. These recruits mostly hailed from the restive southern Kashmir districts of Pulwama, Shopian, Kulgam and Anantnag, which have become a breeding ground for militants. According to P. Stobdan, Pakistan has been consciously, since 2016, trying to “indigenise the movement”.

On February 14, 2019, in a devastating terrorist onslaught, 40 CRPF personnel were killed in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack by a militant in the Lethpora area on Srinagar-Jammu national highway in Pulwama district. The Jaish-e-Mohammad, which is backed by the Pak ISI and operates from Pakistani soil, claimed responsibility for the attack. This was the highest fatality suffered by security forces in the State ever since the beginning of terrorism in 1988. The incident caused deep resentment across the country. The Government of India, for once, crossed the

*lakshmanrekha* of nuclear blackmail and, on February 26, 2019, the Indian Air Force fighter jets hit a major JeM training camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province deep inside Pakistan territory. The Ministry of External Affairs described it as a “non-military pre-emptive strike” with a view to preventing the terrorist outfit from planning another attack. The MEA claimed that the camp headed by Maulana Yousuf Azhar, brother-in-law of Masood Azhar, had been decimated. A large number of terrorists are believed to have been eliminated.

In a bold initiative, the Government of India abrogated Article 370 of the Constitution on August 5, 2019, thereby effectively ending the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. The state was further bifurcated to create two separate union territories – Jammu and Kashmir with a legislature and Ladakh without a legislature. It implied that the Constitution of India shall now apply in full force across J&K and Ladakh, and that J&K legislature will henceforth not have any discretionary powers to decide who are the permanent residents of the territory or provide them with special rights with respect to employment or acquisition of property. Stringent measures were taken against separatist elements and, to prevent any activities prejudicial to the security of the state, 5,161 persons were placed under preventive arrest. Most of them were later released, though 609 people are still under detention and these include three former chief

**The figures of terrorist violence during the last five years in J&K  
have been as follows:**

| Year | Incidents | SFs killed | Civilians killed | Terrorists killed |
|------|-----------|------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 2014 | 222       | 47         | 28               | 110               |
| 2015 | 208       | 39         | 17               | 108               |
| 2016 | 322       | 82         | 15               | 150               |
| 2017 | 342       | 80         | 40               | 213               |
| 2018 | 614       | 91         | 39               | 257               |

ministers of the state, namely Farooq Abdullah, Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti. It is going to be a long haul before the situation returns to normal.

### North-East

North-east has been convulsed with separatist and secessionist movements of different hues. The government policy has, broadly speaking, been to:

- assure the tribals that their rights on land would be protected and their social customs and cultural traditions would not be interfered with
- take counter-insurgency measures, wherever necessary
- implement schemes for the economic development of area
- engage the separatist/secessionist groups in political dialogue
- enter into suspension of operations agreements with the insurgent groups

- meet their legitimate aspirations by granting them autonomy or even statehood
- have understanding with neighboring countries (Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh) so that the insurgents do not get any shelter there.

There has been gradual improvement in the security situation. The year 2018 witnessed the lowest number of insurgency incidents and civilian deaths.

Nagaland has been the epicenter of armed insurrection in north-eastern India. The sparks later flew to Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura. Assam also witnessed upheaval due to the large scale influx of foreigners into the State.

Nagaland has been having suspension of operations since 1997. A framework agreement was signed on August 3, 2015 to pave the way for a final settlement. There have been prolonged discussions between the Government of India and the various Naga groups, but the intransigence of the NSCN (IM), which has been insisting on a separate flag and constitution for the state, delayed the final settlement.

**The profile of violence in the region as a whole during the last five years has been as follows:**

| Years | Incidents | Extremist arrested | Extremist killed | Arms recovered/surrendered | SFs killed | Civilians killed | Extremist surrendered | Persons kidnapped |
|-------|-----------|--------------------|------------------|----------------------------|------------|------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| 2014  | 824       | 1934               | 181              | 1255                       | 20         | 212              | 965                   | 369               |
| 2015  | 574       | 1900               | 149              | 897                        | 46         | 46               | 143                   | 267               |
| 2016  | 484       | 1202               | 87               | 698                        | 17         | 48               | 267                   | 168               |
| 2017  | 308       | 995                | 57               | 432                        | 12         | 37               | 130                   | 102               |
| 2018  | 252       | 804                | 34               | 478                        | 14         | 23               | 161                   | 117               |

According to latest reports, the contentious issues have since been resolved and details of the final agreement are likely to be announced in the near future.

Manipur has about 15 militant groups operating in the Valley and the Hill districts. Three of these – People’s Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) - have combined to form a Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF). There is another body called CorCom (Coordination Committee) of six Valley-based militant outfits to bring unity among revolutionary groups to free Manipur from India’s “colonial regime”. According to MHA, Manipur witnessed most insurgency related violence in 2018 across the northeast region. A total of 127 violent incidents were reported in Manipur in 2018 as against a total of 252 for the entire northeast

In Tripura, the activities of National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), the two main rebel outfits, have been contained.

In Assam, the sharpness of ULFA has been blunted, thanks to Bangladesh’s cooperation. Leaders of the insurgent outfit have shown willingness to negotiate with the Government of India and abandoned their insistence on recognition of ‘sovereignty’ as pre condition for talks. Paresh Baruah, commander of the armed wing of ULFA is, however, opposed to any talks with the Government of India until the ‘core issues’ of sovereignty and independence of Assam are also discussed. Baruah has about 150 armed cadres with him and is believed to be camping in Yunnan province of China.

A number of Islamist extremist groups are also active in Assam. These include Muslim United Tiger Force of Assam (MTFA) and Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA).

The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, which offers citizenship to Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis and Jains who have sought refuge in India due to religious persecution in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, has caused misgivings among certain sections of people in the region, and there have been violent protests.

### **Left- Wing Extremism**

Left-wing extremism was once described as the biggest internal security threat to the country. According to the US State Department, Maoists are the fourth most deadly terror organization in the world after Islamic State, Taliban and Al Shabaab.

The salient features of the movement today are:

- Spread over a large geographical area
- Potential for violence
- Expansion in north-east
- Nexus with other extremist groups

*Geographical Spread:* The movement which started from a small village in 1967 spread over a vast swathe of the country during the last over 50 years. Presently, according to MHA Annual Report 2018-19, LWE violence in 2018 was reported from 60 districts spread across 8 states as compared to 76 districts spread over 13 states in 2013. The arc of violence has been gradually restricted with only 30 districts accounting for 89% of the total LWE violence.

*Potential for Violence:* The CPI (Maoist) is the most potent among the various LWE outfits in the country and was responsible for 88% of the total violent incidents and resultant deaths. There has been a considerable depletion in the strength of the Maoist outfits during the last two years, but they still have considerable potential for violence. According to MHA, 3749 persons have been killed in 10,660 incidents of Maoist

violence since 2010. The armed wing of the Maoists - the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) –has sophisticated weapons and is estimated to be about 5,000 strong; besides the *jan militia* armed with simple weapons provides logistical support to the PLGA.

*Expansion in North-East:* The Maoists are spreading their tentacles in the north-east and there are reports of their trying to forge links with the insurgent outfits active in the region. As noted by a parliamentary panel, “the foray of Maoist into sensitive north-eastern States is fraught with serious strategic implications, since it has potential trans-border possibilities of connection, activities or interaction”. The panel went on to say that “the presence of LWE in north-eastern parts of the country can derail the socio-economic developmental projects of the Central and State Governments.”

*Nexus:* The Maoists' nexus with the other extremist organizations has added to the complexity of the problem. The People's War cadres earlier received training in the handling of weapons and IEDs from ex-LTTE members. Besides, they have some kind of *entente cordiale* with the NSCN (IM). Some batches of Naxals received arms training from the ULFA. The Communist Party of India (Maoist) has also fraternal relations with the Communist Party of Nepal. The ISI has been trying to reach out to the Maoists.

Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are the worst Maoist-affected states in the country. During 2018, Chhattisgarh had a total of 392 incidents of Maoist violence in which 153 people were killed while Jharkhand had 205 incidents in which 43 lives were lost. The other badly affected states were Bihar, Odisha and Maharashtra. Bihar is in bad shape because the political leadership is unwilling to confront the problem head on. In Odisha, the administration is gradually coming to grips with the problem. In

Maharashtra, Gadchiroli is the only district badly affected, but there are reports of Maoists trying to spread their influence in what they describe as the 'Golden Corridor' stretching from Pune to Ahmedabad. The Maoists have also established themselves at the tri-junction of Kerala, Tamilnadu and Karnataka.

The Government of India has adopted an integrated and holistic approach dealing with the problem. There is a 'National Policy and Action Plan' with a multi-pronged strategy which seeks to strengthen security, accelerate development and ensure the rights and entitlements of local communities.

The Maoists have, in recent years, suffered considerable attrition in their top leadership. Out of the 16-member politburo, two have been killed while another seven are in custody; and out of the 39-member central committee, eighteen have been neutralized with five killed and thirteen in custody. According to MHA's latest annual report, there has been a significant decline in LWE violence as well as its geographical spread in the last five years. There has been an overall 26.7% reduction in violent incidents (1136 to 833) and 39.5% reduction (397 to 240) in LWE related deaths since the end of 2013. Besides, over 3100 Maoists have surrendered till November 15 this year since 2016. The Maoists are in some kind of a tactical retreat. The Home Minister of India recently claimed that the movement was on its last legs.

The socio-economic dimensions of the problem nevertheless cause concern. Substantial grants are released by government for the development of affected areas from time to time, but the unfortunate experience is that the benefits of the schemes do not reach the poorest segments of population due to bureaucratic corruption. It is said that we have moved from British Raj to the Billionaire Raj. We have the highest number of billionaires after US, China and Germany.

There are disturbing reports of economic inequality in the country. According to Credit Suisse, India's wealth has "trended upward strongly" since the turn of the millennium. The wealth per Indian adult, it estimates, is now over \$14,000, but nearly 80% of the country has a net worth below \$10,000. In Global Hunger Index, India has been ranked 102 out of 117 countries; it is the lowest ranked South Asian country. In Human Development Index, India is at number 129 out of 189 countries. These statistics are certainly not flattering. Unequal distribution of wealth has the potential to fuel discontent among the lowest strata of society. Besides, the tribals, who constitute the backbone of the movement, continue to be disaffected. Two factors – land alienation and displacement – have mainly contributed to their disillusionment with the establishment. They are also unhappy with the implementation of the Forest Rights Act.

### Border Management

India has international borders with seven different countries:

|             |   |                     |
|-------------|---|---------------------|
| China       | - | 3,488kms.           |
| Pakistan    | - | 3,323kms.           |
| Bangladesh  | - | 4,096.7kms.         |
| Myanmar     | - | 1,643 kms.          |
| Nepal       | - | 1,751 kms.          |
| Bhutan      | - | 699 kms.            |
| Afghanistan | - | <u>106 kms.</u>     |
|             |   | <b>15,106.7kms.</b> |

The deployment of forces along the borders is on the principle of 'one border, one border guarding force'. The Border Security Force guards Pakistan and Bangladesh borders, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police takes care of the China border, Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) patrols the Nepal and Bhutan borders, and Assam Rifles

is entrusted with the security of Myanmar border.

Besides, there is a coastline of 5,422 kms; there are also two island territories on our eastern and western flanks accounting for a coastline of 2,094 kms. The Indian Navy is responsible for overall maritime security; it is assisted by the Coast Guard and Maritime Police of the states.

Securing the borders poses formidable problems.

### Tackling the Threats: Response

The internal security challenges are formidable. The state police are unfortunately in a shambles and in urgent need of reforms. The National Police Commission submitted eight comprehensive reports between 1979 and 1981, covering the entire gamut of police working. However, for political reasons, its recommendations were generally ignored. In 1996, public interest litigation, *Prakash Singh vs Union of India*, was filed in the Supreme Court for police reforms. The Supreme Court gave a landmark judgement on September 22, 2006 to insulate the police from extraneous pressures, but the state governments have been dragging their feet in implementing the judicial directions.

### Developing the Capabilities of the State Police

It is necessary that the capabilities of the state police and the central armed police forces are substantially augmented to deal with the multi-dimensional challenges confronting the country.

#### i. Manpower

The police-population ratio in India, according to BPRD *Data on Police Organization* (as on January 1, 2018), was 192.95 policemen per lac of population. There were, however, 21.84% vacancies. It is absolutely essential that the vacancies are not only filled up but steps also taken to increase the sanctioned strength so as

to bring us closer to recognized international standards.

ii. Infrastructure:

The shortfalls at the State level in respect of (a) transport, (b) communications, and (c) forensics need to be made up. The police should have a good fleet of vehicles to meet their requirements. Communication facilities also need to be upgraded. There are unfortunately 278 police stations today which have no wireless or mobile connectivity while 362 police stations which have no vehicles. Forensics is an important area in investigation, but most of the states have inadequate facilities for that.

iii. Housing

The National Police Commission recommended that family accommodation should be provided to all the gazetted and non-gazetted officers. According to information available with BPR&D, as on January 1, 2018, the percentage satisfaction level for gazetted officers was only 33.69%, upper subordinates 53.57% and lower subordinates 33.07 %. This is not a happy situation. Housing has a direct impact on the welfare and morale of police personnel. In several districts, policemen live in miserable sub-human conditions.

iv. Training

Training remains a neglected area and calls for comprehensive improvement. The training academies in most of the states have very poor infrastructure in terms of buildings, equipment, literature and facilities. What is worse, the most unwanted police officers are dumped in these institutions. Bereft of any motivation, they are not able to inspire or inculcate high values among the trainees. As recommended by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, the deputation to training institutions must be made more attractive in terms of facilities and

allowances so that the best talent is drawn as instructors.

v. Modernization

The Government of India had, as a follow-up to the recommendation of the 14<sup>th</sup> Finance Commission, de-linked eight centrally sponsored schemes from its support as the states' share of the central tax had been increased from 32 per cent to 42 per cent. These schemes included modernization of police forces. The arrangement did not work because the state governments generally did not invest in the police. Government of India therefore, in September 2017, approved a Rs.25,000 crore internal security scheme to strengthen the law and order apparatus, modernize the state police forces and improve their capacity to combat terrorism.

vi. CCTNS / NATGRID

The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems aims to network all police stations across the country. It would establish seamless connectivity among the 14,000 police stations and 6,000 supervisory police officers. The CCTNS is a very useful project which would enable the police stations to exchange information on a whole range of subjects related to crime and criminals. The National Intelligence Grid or NATGRID is meant to bolster India's counter-terrorism capabilities. The project entails combining 21 sensitive databases relating to domains such as banks, credit cards, cellphone usage, immigration records, motor vehicle registration, and income tax records into a single database for access by authorized officers from central agencies like the IB, RAW, CBI, DRI, and ED. It is essentially a data transfer tool that would give investigators a 360 degree profile of a suspect. NATGRID would enable police and the Intelligence Bureau to keep tabs on persons with suspicious backgrounds.

### Central Armed Police Forces

India has formidable central armed police forces. These are: Assam Rifles, Border Security Force (BSF), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), National Security Guard (NSG), Railway Protection Force (RPF) and Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB). Their combined strength is 10.05 lacs.

The forces have problems of infrastructure and weaponry which need to be addressed. Government should also ensure that there is no open-ended expansion of these forces and that whatever augmentation takes place is in the state police forces so that they are progressively less dependent on the CAPFs.

### Intelligence

The Intelligence Bureau has large numbers of vacancies. These must be filled up. Besides, intelligence operations must be aggressive and capable of frustrating enemies' sinister plans. At the state level, there is considerable scope for improving intelligence operations. There are huge gaps in covering the plans and activities of extremist organizations, insurgent outfits and the Maoists. The National Counter-Terrorism Centre should be put in place after such modifications as may be necessary.

### Summing Up

The internal security scenario is quite challenging. To tackle the various problems

effectively, we must have a comprehensive Internal Security Doctrine so that officers in the field are clear about the objectives and the methods to be adopted to achieve those. The legal framework would also need to be strengthened. These measures must however be accompanied by radical reforms in police so as to strengthen the law enforcement machinery at the grassroots level. The Supreme Court's directions must be implemented in letter and spirit. A professional police accountable to the people of the country and placing the highest importance on upholding the Rule of Law will provide the essential foundation for a progressive, modern India. The capabilities of the state police would also need substantial augmentation and modernization in terms of manpower, infrastructure and other resources. The Central Armed Police Forces must grow more teeth. The intelligence organizations would need to improve their penetration. There are no short-cuts to tackling the challenges. We shall have to comprehensively revamp the entire internal security architecture.

(4879 words)

*(The writer, a recipient of Padmashri, was Director General of Border Security Force, Director General of Police, UP and DGP Assam. Presently, he is Chairman, Indian Police Foundation)*



# Internal Security Challenges: A Perspective Analysis

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India is on the cusp of major transformation and today it is a country of mounting international importance with the fastest-growing trillion-dollar economy in the world and the fifth-largest overall with a nominal GDP of \$2.94 trillion.<sup>1</sup> India has become the fifth-largest economy in 2019, overtaking the United Kingdom and France<sup>2</sup>. The goal of the government is to achieve USD 4.0 Trillion economy when we celebrate the platinum jubilee of our independence in 2022. As she rises to prominence in an increasingly interdependent and globalizing world, consequently appreciating the interests, challenges and principles structuring India's internal security has never been so important in present times. Besides, Global and regional security environment has deteriorated in the last two decades and India cannot be immune to it.

Kautilya in Arthashastra places threats to a State into four categories<sup>3</sup>. The most serious one arises from internal originators and internal abettors and is like the "fear from a lurking snake". Second to this is the purely external threat, both originated and abetted by foreigners. Third comes the internally originated but externally abetted threat, followed by the externally originated, internally abetted threat. India's present Internal Security threat

perceptions are a mixture of all four shades of above mentioned threats.

The wide ranging internal security challenges are even more important than the external challenges because they directly impact its internal stability. Further, fuelling much of Internal Security conflicts are a range of regressive ideologies that challenge and undermine democratic and constitutional value even as they secure increasing access to a wide range of increasingly lethal and disruptive technologies. Primitive and medieval mindsets are combining progressively with unprecedented technological power to create conditions of savagery<sup>4</sup>.

India's immense linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity has been its strength as well as its vulnerability for all ages<sup>5</sup>. Multiculturalism is a state of mind in India, and it is in perfect sync with the democratic spirit of mutual accommodation and cooperation. India's 'unity in diversity' has sometimes been internally challenged and it's a credit to our system that we accommodate all these diverse identities in a democratic framework of governance.

Over the years, the challenges to our Internal Security have grown manifold and assumed alarming proportions and these threats continue

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#### Author's Intro:

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to have a massive bearing on national development and consequently providing internal stability and coherence has become a major element of National Security remit.

As we continue to face well defined threats and challenges in both the traditional and nontraditional realms of security, it is obvious that the country needs to overcome these huge challenges on its way to achieve its legitimate aspirations of becoming a major power of regional and global stature. These internal challenges are serious and one cannot be complacent about dealing with them. Violence is inherent about these challenges and it will have economic consequences.

## **PART 1**

### **Sustaining and Emerging Factors**

In the following paragraphs, an effort has been made to infer some of the sustaining and emerging factors that would play a significant role in management of internal security in contemporary times.

#### **1.1 Unstable, troubled, volatile neighborhood with trust deficit:**

Geography has placed India in a troubled neighborhood in particular with Pakistan and China with whom it has fought wars. Indian subcontinent is always in the midst of turbulent times. Several of India's insecurities emerge from the persistent volatility in its neighborhood<sup>6</sup>. Due to historical connections, the developments in the extended neighborhood in the West, East and North West have security implications for India. Non-state actors in the subcontinent play a destabilizing role and are adept at waging asymmetric war and their reach is often beyond the grasp of governments. The role of China in fomenting the North Eastern insurgencies in the hey days and Pakistan giving an external dimension to the Punjab and J&K terrorism is well known. Besides other nations in the

subcontinent are prone to insidious and sleight of hand influences by China and Pakistan. Pakistan and China have further deepened their strategic and economic ties by CPEC which passes through Gilgit- Balistan in POK. Continuing boundary disputes are proving difficult to resolve and situation may aggravate with Pakistan plunging into domestic crises and becoming ungovernable due to pervasive domination by fundamentalist elements. Experts believe that heavily militarized arch of conflict is likelihood and it will force considerable expenditure on securing the border with neighboring states.<sup>7</sup> In addition, India can no longer remain insulated from developments taking place in its immediate strategic neighborhood extending from the Gulf of Aden to the Malaccan Straits<sup>8</sup>. The alternating geo-politics would definitely impact upon internal security calculations. A regular, close monitoring of the scenario around subcontinental neighborhood is very essential as their developments can trigger disturbances in our internal security eco system.

#### **1.2 Impact of Demographic Variables:**

Absolute increases in population are the first and most urgent source of anxiety. The sheer burden of population growth will have direct and potentially dire consequences hurling regions against the inflexibility of their natural endowments. Security experts generally opine that Demographic factors remain as a critical variable within the complex dynamic that generates violence. By 2020, India's population is projected to approach 1, 300,000,000 (1.3 billion)<sup>9</sup> and this is almost a 300% increase from 1975 and will be equivalent to 4 United States or 10 Japans. Unlike 'graying' of the developed world, a 'youth bulge' is expected. Nearly two-thirds of Indians are under 35, half are under 25. By 2020, India will be the youngest country in the world, with a median age of 29 years, compared with a median age of 37 years in China

at that point<sup>10</sup>. According to the National Policy for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship more than 54 per cent of India's population is below 25 years of age and 62 per cent of India's population is aged between 15 and 59 years. This demographic dividend is expected to last for the next 25 years. Historically dramatic youth bulge has been globally associated with increasing conflict<sup>11</sup> and if the energies of the youth are not channeled into positive occupations they will turn towards criminality, disruption and violence<sup>12</sup>. India's demographic dividend could potentially make India the biggest consumer market and the biggest labor force in the world. The rate of population growth in the North is projected to be higher than in the South and there will be increased migration within India in search of economic opportunities, particularly from rural to urban areas.

### 1.3 Urban congestions<sup>13</sup>:

Studies indicate that India is urbanizing at a fast pace and it is expected that by 2050, close to 50 per cent of India's population would be residing in urban areas<sup>14</sup> requiring the availability of sustainable infrastructure and services for a better quality of life. Urban congestion will cause business, middle class families and even government offices to move out to new self-contained suburban centers. The urban traffic is tipped to increase by 4 times and become highly congested despite improved smart city concepts and rural roads and highways. Some implications of these trends are a greatly increased population density particularly in the cities, a greater population of juveniles/young adults, a galloping demand for employment and assertiveness by youth who will form an increasing proportion of the electorate. NITI Ayog has released report 'Composite Water Management Index' in June 2018 and stated that 21 cities (including Delhi, Mumbai, and Bangalore) in India would run out of groundwater by 2020<sup>15</sup>.

### 1.4 Protecting Vulnerable Groups<sup>16</sup>:

As per Census 2011 India had 10.38 crore senior citizens (60 years and above). Of this, 3.8 crore were above the age of 80 years. The share of the elderly in the population increased from 5.6 per cent in 1961 to 8.6 per cent in 2011. It is expected to increase to 20 per cent of the population by 2050. Doubling of the population above 60 years old people will require security measures. High incidence of poverty and low educational attainment are the two major challenges faced by weaker sections in India. Other challenges include high levels of malnutrition and limited opportunities for meaningful economic engagement. While legal enforcement will contain the demand for child labor to an extent, poor households will continue supplying child labor and sex workers. Children's rights based approach with more attention to girl children, focus on child/ juvenile abuse, trafficking, rescue and rehabilitation will gain momentum. The community will expect the security forces to own the responsibility of safeguarding these vulnerable sections.

### 1.5 Growing Disparities:

Former UNSG Kofi Annan once proclaimed, **"No one in this world can be comfortable or safe when so many people are suffering and deprived"**<sup>17</sup>. Linkages between development and spread of extremism are an inevitable phenomenon. The opening up of the economy has already stimulated growth in unprecedented levels. India's economic growth is expected to "strongly rebound" to 6-6.5 per cent in 2020-21 from 5 per cent estimated in the current fiscal<sup>18</sup>. But few concerns exist. India's richest 1 per cent hold more than four-times the wealth held by 953 million people who make up for the bottom 70 per cent of the country's population. Oxfam said the combined total wealth of 63 Indian billionaires is higher than the total Union Budget of India for the fiscal

year 2018-19 which was at Rs 24,42,200 crore.<sup>18</sup> India is no stranger to income inequality, but the gap has to be narrowed sooner. India's growth and development trajectory is expected to continue and elimination of extreme poverty in the decade is within reach. Experts opine that despite over all national growth, regional disparities remain visible and these factors may aggravate sub-national, linguistic and communal differences fostering ethnicity and communalism. Rapid social, economic, technological and political development would also generate unprecedented turbulence. Analysts believe that conflicts due to displacement of peasants, tribal and slum dwellers will be difficult to settle down and rehabilitation will continue to be a hotly contested issue, more along mega projects like hydroelectricity, dams, irrigation projects, leased mining projects, industries and special economic zones which has already given the Maoists readymade tool to broad-base their movement. If income inequalities continue to widen, and job opportunities fail to keep pace with the mounting numbers of educated unemployable youth, there will be an increasing number of recruits to ideologies that propagate forcible redistribution of wealth.

### **1.6 Agro Sector and its impact<sup>19</sup>:**

The rural economy represents the foundational basis of the overall Indian economy. According to experts, the impact of globalization will add to the pressures on the traditional economy and agricultural work force will decline while the share of the services sector, contributing 65% of the GDP by 2020 will increase proportionately. According to the World Bank estimates, half of the Indian population would be urban by the year 2050. It is estimated that percentage of agricultural workers in total work force would drop to 25.7 per cent by 2050 from 58.2 per cent in 2001<sup>20</sup>. The mismatch between the contribution of agriculture to national income and

share in employment has remained large and has widened. The existing yield levels of a majority of crops remain much lower than the world average. The predominant causes are low irrigation, use of low quality seeds, low adoption of improved technology, and knowledge deficit about improved agricultural practices. Close to 53 per cent of cropped area is water stressed. Rainwater management practices and services are resource starved. Indian farmers are adapting to farm mechanization at a faster rate in comparison to the recent past. It is further predicted that transition of India from agriculture (monsoon) economy to service sector based economy might witness tremendous public dissent in the form of long drawn agitations at times becoming violent where the police will be in the frontline to face public ire. Various protest marches and strikes by farmers in different parts of the country is an eye opener. Despite a multi pronged approach to improving the income and social security of farmers, experts opine that glaring gaps continue to grow between the haves in the modern India and the have nots in traditional Bharat and this will trigger more distress.

### **1.7 Social dynamics, Power Shifts<sup>21</sup>:**

The remarkable re-engineering of Indian society in which the power centers had begun a shift to 'backward' communities that did not have a political voice will be consolidated in the coming years. We witness a welcome scenario of women playing a greater role in social and political forums and younger generation more assertive in its claim to leadership. As highlighted in the Economic Survey 2018, a number of indicators that reflect the position of women in Indian society have moved in the right direction. Out of 17 indicators pertaining to women's agency, attitudes and outcomes, 14 have improved over time. On seven of them, the improvement is at least on a par with countries at similar levels of development as India. However even today, Indian society

continues to remain infested with hierarchical stratification retaining its caste and religious identities as also the masculine character. Caste and religious system even now operate more within the communities, mostly seen in faith-based practices, rituals, religious festivals etc. Though, presently, electoral politics continues to depend on caste-religion bondage many analysts believe that in the coming days, India would witness new equilibriums on what once appeared to be unchallenged assumptions in Indian politics, like the way it happened with the advent of regional caste-based parties in the post-Mandal era. The anger against any sort of sense of entitlement is only going to grow as a more volatile, politically aware younger generation disrupts settled notions of social order. Such a scenario will mandate needful customization with policing structures and strategies.

### 1.8 Inevitable Tech Assertion:

India continues to retain its claim as IT superpower and new dimensions are being added to biotechnology, medical sciences and other emerging fields of technology, widening the field of India's international competitiveness and generating a large number of employment opportunities for the educated youth.<sup>22</sup> Cell phones, computers and the Internet have become household and e-Governance a necessity, streamlining procedures and response time. It has become an integral part of our lives. Many believe that in a few decades these changes would impact the masses striving to break the poverty cycle. Security experts believe that the framework of management of Internal Security has to be redefined and recalibrated in the midst of this technological assertion. It is also important for security forces to assess how far they have reached in adopting latest technology for enhancing its delivery. Huge digital transformation is in store for security forces in their work strategies. Today, technology seems to be advancing at an ever-

accelerating pace, as seen through the propagation of mobile and wireless technology, high-powered computing, visual and audio technology, advanced analytics, and other technological advancements and agencies involved in internal security need to build the knowledge base of why and how, select, implement, and integrate new technology, how that technology is to be used; and whether new technology improves policing in a meaningful way for both the agency and the community<sup>23</sup>.

### 1.9 Cost of Terror:

The total cost of last terror can never be quantified. All terrorist attacks will have a huge impact on long-term economic growth. Study report confirms that terrorism has disrupted the agriculture technology in the long-term in Punjab. According to estimates prepared by ASSOCHAM, the loss accrued due to 60 hours of terror spread over four days during Mumbai 26/11 attacks resulted in a loss of roughly Rs 4,000 crore<sup>24</sup>. Another report by the Asia Economic Institute Study calculated that the overall loss to Indian economy in the wake of the Mumbai terror attacks was about \$100 billion arising from the closure of crucial institutions, such as the stock exchanges, commodities sector, money markets, trade and business and commercial establishments<sup>25</sup>. Further, it was estimated that FDI was hit by an estimated \$20 billion. According to Institute for Economy and Peace, violence cost the country 80.1 trillion Indian Rupees or 9% of its GDP in 2017. According to a report "**Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the impact of terrorism**" released by the Institute for Economics & Peace, in 2019,<sup>26</sup> South Asia region was highly impacted by the acts of terrorism. Afghanistan (rank 1), Pakistan (rank 5), and India (rank 7) made into top 10 countries highly affected with the acts of terrorism. Such acts of terror and violence have great economic social, political and international repercussions.

They also fracture society on communal and religious lines.

### **1.10 Corruption and Under development:**

India is the 80 least corrupt nation out of 180 countries, according to the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International<sup>27</sup>. Corruption affects millions of people and is deeply linked to inequality and underdevelopment. No country has been able to completely eliminate corruption, but studies show that the level of corruption in countries with emerging market economies is much higher than what it is in developed countries and it definitely slows development. Corruption remains rife in the India's political landscape. In 2012, criminal cases were pending against 31% of members of parliament<sup>28</sup> and the legislative assembly. The Supreme Court was informed in December 2018 that there were 4,122 criminal cases pending some for over three decades against the sitting and former members of Parliament and legislative assemblies. Campaign spending has a fostering reliance on "black money." Many experts also point to Indian voters' complex relationship with corruption. Research from a wide range of states finds that political candidates often promote their criminality as an indication of their ability to defend the interests of their communities. As India moves toward a modern/major economy in the coming years, this will be a major challenge for future policing since 'political instability, corruption and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing.

### **1.11 Devolution in Governance<sup>29</sup>:**

Decentralization and devolution of power to local bodies, including financial devolution and responsibilities, will enhance direct participation of people in setting grassroots priorities and one of those would be policing issues. Structural reform in policing needs to take into account this new landscape of local governance.. The

growing influence of NGO, corporate world or the media is indication of the new paradigms in governance. The demand for separate states will continue and it also indicates the inevitability of further dispersion of governance to give local communities a greater say in running their own affairs. The armed forces needs to understand this new political reality, which has major implications for the structure of the service, the way it is held to account and the way it will interact with other public services in the future.

It will be relevant to mention here about the gist of a report submitted to the planning commission under the heading India Vision 2020<sup>30</sup> which pointed out key factors that would influence the security environment in coming days.

- The twin revolution of rising expectations and information and communication will continue.
- The fundamental ideological conflict between India and Pakistan is unlikely to be resolved without a major socio political change in Pakistan
- Territorial disputes with neighbors that have defied resolution may not lend themselves to an early solution.
- Religious extremism and radical politics will continue to have an adverse impact on core values
- Rising dependence on energy imports will make us increasingly vulnerable , economically as well as diplomatically
- Public opinion both domestic and international and the media will become increasingly important forces in international affairs
- The international order is likely to evolve into a polycentric configuration with its centre of gravity shifting increasingly to Asia which will include seven out of the ten largest economies and six out of the eight nuclear weapon states.

- The increasing economic and military strength of China may pose a serious challenge to India's security unless adequate measures are taken.

## PART 2

### Traditional Threats

#### 2.1 Cross border Jihadi Terrorism and its variants in JK:

Since 1989, the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) backed, sponsored, supported by Pakistan's ISI has been the most important issue in India's internal security scenario. The proxy war has already claimed enormous lives. As per MHA Annual Report 2019, since the advent of militancy in J&K in 1990, 14024 Civilians and 5273 Security Force (SF) personnel have lost their lives (up to 31.03.2019)<sup>31</sup>. According to data compiled by Institute of Conflict Management, so far 23,779 terrorists have been neutralised in JK (data up to 19 Nov 2019)<sup>32</sup>. Terrorism in Kashmir has acquired new contours in recent years and it continues to evolve and it is also not necessary that they would be in step with prevailing public sentiments. Grave risks continue to loom large in the future. The ongoing militancy in the State of Jammu and Kashmir is also intrinsically linked with infiltration of terrorists<sup>33</sup> from across the border both from the "International Border" as well as the "Line of Control" in J&K. The continuing ability of Islamists in Pakistan to carve out autonomous capacities and regions free of their dependence on the state's covert agencies will have a definite impact on the situation in Kashmir and continue to make it fragile. The proposed pull out of US troops from Afghanistan calls for serious introspection. India needs to weigh its options carefully. Foresight to analyze and assessing how the situation in Afghanistan will evolve, and then preparing the Indian approach accordingly is essential.<sup>34</sup> The abrogation of Article 370 did not face serious

protests in the valley as it was expected. More measures like local development have to be taken to remove chronic mistrust so as to progressively alter the fundamentals of the basic conflict in the state. Nevertheless, Pakistan would continue to internationalize the Kashmir issue vigorously. Radicalization drive has increased and in such vulnerability the local recruitment of the youth might continue unless social and political engagement with the youth is taken to the next level. Terror organizations will continue to attract young boys to undertake suicidal terrorist attacks because of their vulnerability to easy indoctrination. A fresh look at reversing the ongoing process of radicalization is the need of the hour. Eternal attention must be paid and continuous measures need to be taken on neutralizing sense of alienation in the Kashmir valley.

#### 2.2 Chronic ethno-centric insurgencies in North East:

The NER accounts for 3.78 per cent of India's population and covers 7.98 per cent of its total geographical area. Its contribution to national GDP is 2.5 per cent<sup>35</sup>. The North Eastern Region has seen/ faced a multitude of prolonged separatist and secessionist insurgencies. Besides strategic importance, the region is home to hundreds of ethnic tribes speaking numerous dialects. The North East holds an important position from a strategic point of view as these states share their borders with other countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and China. The terrain, the state of Socio-economic development and historical factors such as language/ethnicity, tribal rivalry, migration and a widespread feeling of exploitation and alienation have resulted in a fragile security situation in the North Eastern States. While the NER has all the ingredients needed to become prosperous, it could not achieve the expected level of economic growth mainly due to inadequate road, rail and air connectivity. A lot of its resources remain untapped. This has

resulted in violence and diverse demands by various Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs). Insurgent groups in North East although up in arms against the state do not have unified or common demands. The security situation in the North Eastern States has improved substantially since 2013. According to MHA Annual Report in 2018<sup>36</sup> insurgency related violence declined by 48% in Meghalaya, 40% in Arunachal Pradesh, 16% in Assam and 24% in Manipur compared to 2017. But there has been an increase in insurgency incidents in Nagaland in 2018. According to open source data, so far, 21635 people have lost their lives in NE insurgency since 1992 and this includes 2767 security force personnel (data by Institute of Conflict Management up to June 2019)<sup>37</sup>. The local politics is still extremely fragile and this makes the situation extremely fluid and unpredictable. The survival of these insurgent groups in various states of Northeast especially, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya with their current or marginally augmented strengths, the defense of their 'spheres of influence' and 'dominance' against sporadic security Force onslaughts and internecine strife and the 'management' of the networks of extortion have become ends in themselves. The migration spill over from Bangladesh has complicated the matters further more causing high resentment particularly in Assam. The insurgencies have recorded tremendous declines in recent times. The peace process initiated by GoI will win the heart and mind of general mass but we need to face the bitter truth of unfolding problems while implementing some of the legislations in this region. With the violence declining, the current environment is ideal for bringing to a close the multitude of insurgencies which have plagued the region. So far 39 armed groups have signed SoOs with GOI for varied periods of time, the resultant peace process needs to be accelerated so as to realize an enduring settlement<sup>38</sup>. Amidst a conducive

environment for talks, and with insurgency in the state at an all-time low, an early conclusion to the Naga peace process will have a domino effect on other insurgencies. Regrettably, final resolution and settlement still remains elusive and the possibility of the entire process getting derailed and a spillover into escalating violence remains a disturbing reality<sup>39</sup>.

### 2.3 Maoist Left wing Extremism:

Maoist Left wing extremism is essentially a problem of Governance and the real antidote will be development, justice and equality. The Planning Commission of India report of 2008 declares modernization and discrimination of rural population as plausible reasons that prove advantageous for the growth of Maoist support base in its strongholds. Underdevelopment and economic inequality are learnt to be the reasons for mobilization of people to join the Maoist movement. The Maoists have adopted a strategy of building their influence in remote areas where the presence of the State machinery is weak and access is difficult. Presently, the geographical spread of LWE violence has also been shrinking considerably. Last five years have seen a significant decline in LWE violence as well as the geographical spread of LWE. The declining trend in LWE violence continued in 2018 as well. According to MHA sources<sup>40</sup> there has been an overall 26.7% reduction in violent incidents (1136 to 833) and 39.5% reduction (397 to 240) in LWE related deaths since end-2013. In comparison to 2017, the year 2018 saw a decline of 8.3% (908 to 833) in incidents of violence and the number of deaths by 8.7% (263 to 240). The casualties to Security Forces declined by 10.7% (75 to 67) and the number of LWE cadres eliminated went up by 65.4% (136 to 225). Owing to continuous efforts of security forces, the Maoists presently have been passing through their toughest time since inception though they still possess residual capacities to disrupt normalcy. A drastic decrease in



recruitment and operational consolidation by Security Forces has forced them to rethink their violence based ideology. Urban penetration could prove to be a serious issue in the coming days especially in slum areas of large cities with the patronage of the left leaning intellectuals. Given the trajectory of the Naxal movement, it is always going to be a battle of patience and wits which demands a balance of self preservation and initiatives. The Maoists presently are choosing to maintain a tactical silence, avoiding face-offs with the SFs, even as they revamp their strategies. Despite all odds and deficits, the LWE menace has been progressively contained, and there is visible improvement in the ground situation. Nonetheless, several challenges remain to be, and both the State and Central Governments need to ensure that capacities are augmented so that the remaining stretches of territory afflicted by Maoist violence can be brought back to normalcy.

#### **2.4 Growth of hinterland terrorism:**

Since 1993 and post 26/11, the specter of urban hinterland terrorism<sup>41</sup> has continued to haunt major Indian cities. Urban centers when targeted have an immediate impact in the form of the diversion of tourist flows and the economic imperatives of such attacks are obvious. It is clear that national security in the age of urban terrorism cannot be limited to protecting national boundaries. The ISI has its own agenda of producing 'bleeding wars' in various parts of the nation with multiple region specific strategies<sup>42</sup>. Its role in 'mentoring' terrorist organizations and using underworld linkages has already proved very costly. The last two decades have been marked by the presence of ISI sponsored terrorism in India's hinterland which was earlier confined to JK and Punjab. The groups involved raising funds from different sources ranging from state sponsorship to fake currencies, extortion, crime, smuggling, money from drugs and contraband, donations, charities

as well as the globalised network for raising and moving funds across the globe. The growing detection and neutralization of sleeper cells and their involvement in subversive activities indicate the type of a serious threat that the network is going to pose in the coming days. There appears to be a sequential, well planned, well motivated growth of terrorism in hinterland. Honey trapping strategy by ISI to elicit sensitive information will continue to be a big problem in future as well and directives of MHA to NIA to probe these cases are an indicator in this regard<sup>43</sup>. There are indubitable external linkages in areas of funding, training and more importantly ideational motivation and everyday technology is put to dangerous use. Terrorist acts have been taking place all over India without any specific reason in recent decades. This faceless terror today has become a major challenge for the state to tackle as it strikes the very root of our secular fabric and economic progress. It is evident that the terrorists have concentrated their targets on India political capital, financial capital, IT and scientific hubs, Airports, Metro Rail systems, religious places and places of tourist importance. Terrorists are provided training, infrastructure and weapons in Pakistan and then infiltrated through various borders. Given the unpredictability of the attacks in urban centers in a vast country like India there is a need to strengthen informal mechanisms like citizens vigilance groups to expand human intelligence gathering in urban areas. Another dimension of urban terrorism will be its serious societal implications often triggering communal conflagrations.

#### **2.5 Border Management and security challenges:**

Border management is a complex proposition. India has 15,106.7 km of land border<sup>44</sup> and a coastline of 7,516.6 km including island territories. India shares land borders with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh,

Myanmar, Afghanistan (through POK) and maritime borders with the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. Securing the country's borders against interests hostile to the country and putting in place systems that are able to interdict such elements is vital to internal security. Protecting and defending such large and varied and porous borders is a difficult and complex exercise even in normal times. The transgressor is always on the lookout for soft gaps on land, along the coast or if need be from the air. Managing borders is also difficult for several reasons. Over the past few decades, the concept of border management has assumed salience in the security discourse.<sup>45</sup> It is true that India's border areas are under developed and border populations feel a sense of neglect and hence vulnerable to illegal activities like smuggling, trafficking and infiltration. Illegal migration from Bangladesh remains a major issue. Similarly Coastal security poses different kinds of challenges. Mumbai Attacks in 2008 is a glaring example. Weaknesses in border management result in weaknesses in security. Porous borders, uncoordinated approaches, over stretched border guarding forces, terror- criminal nexus have been utilized by the enemies for keeping up terrorist activities in India.

## **2.6 Communal – Caste - Ethnic Clashes:**

Independence for India came with some inherited problems. The division of India into two nations on the basis of religion resulted in large scale unforeseen violence and served as a catalyst for the menace of communalism which is visible again and again in various riots thereafter<sup>36</sup>. A cursory review of history since 1947 suggests that religion has often been a source of strife and of some of the most persistent atrocities by man against man. The communal/ caste/ethnic consciousness have become so assertive that the disharmony is threatening to unfold new season of militancy

and it has become a bone of contention in the struggle for power. The main battleground is slowly shifting to cities particularly in the heart of India and the terrorist objectives would be to deepen the communal divide and trigger a backlash for which significant support would emerge from fundamentalist groups operating in Pakistan. According to NCRB data<sup>46</sup> on rioting (which includes not only communal riots but also other riots due to land/property disputes, caste conflict, political reasons, sectarian issues, student protests etc.) total number of riot victims in India increased by 22 per cent in 2017 even though the number of rioting incidents saw a decrease of 5 per cent in comparison to the previous year. Recent years have seen a growth of religious chauvinistic organizations with hostile attitudes. India's caste system is perhaps the world's longest surviving social hierarchy. Indian society doesn't seem to have moved on from caste-based oppression and violence. The NCRB data for 2015 and 2016 showed that the number of crimes reported against Dalits had risen from 38,670 to 40,801. Caste-conflicts/ ethnic clashes would also prevail as the hold of traditionally dominant castes is being challenged by upwardly mobile castes and upward curve of ethnic assertion by in terms of its territorial supremacy. It is unfortunate that even issues of social cohesion and religious amity are deliberated upon only under political considerations. Communal harmony is the lifeline India must protect at all cost. This is the national need.

## **2.7 Menace of Organized Crimes and Gangs and its Nexus with Terrorism:**

Traditional organized crimes include illicit liquor trade, betting, gambling, kidnapping, extortion, prostitution rackets, blackmailing, robbery, sand mafia, mining mafia, contract killing etc. Nontraditional organized crime includes money laundering, tax evasion rogue banking, pumping fake Indian currency notes, hawala transfer,

human trafficking, arms/ drugs smuggling etc. These have already become the crimes in the world of tomorrow. Recent years<sup>47</sup> have witnessed an increased convergence between organized crime and terrorism with greater linkages to trans-national organized crime<sup>49</sup> groups. While terrorists invariably have political objectives, criminal syndicates do not. Once established, a criminal network of drug traffickers and smugglers will continue to flourish and systematically corrupt the administrative machinery at various levels. Organized crime groups and terrorists often operate on the same network structures and have developed a symbiotic relationship in Kashmir, North East. Besides, sporadic incidents in other parts of India like the Mumbai blasts for instance have exposed the connection between terrorism and organized crime and this is distinct from the traditional linkage flourishing between organized crime syndicates and local criminals. Terrorism these days exists along with varying levels of organized criminal activity. These gangs seek to exploit weaknesses in the governance of expanding metropolitan areas, and shall try to control the rackets that accompany urban growth and globalization. Money laundering<sup>50</sup> is said to denote two to five per cent of global GDP, between \$800 billion and \$2 trillion per year. Fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the financial infrastructure has developed into a perpetually operating global system in which “megabyte money” (i.e. money in the form of symbols on computer screens) can move anywhere in the world with speed and ease. Oxfam, an international aid agency<sup>51</sup> has estimated that developing nations lose \$50 billion each year in taxes due to financial malpractices. The globalization and digitization of international finance will make it even easier to dispose and move illegal funds. E-commerce will lead to exponential increases in e-crimes including credit card and e-banking frauds. The scale of its

existing negative impact in India can be assessed by the varying estimates on ‘black’ economy<sup>52</sup>. The National Institute for Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) — one of the three institutes whose findings are part of the report — concluded that **between 1997 and 2009 the flow of illicit money out of the country was between 0.2 per cent and 7.4 per cent of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**. The National Council Applied Economic Research (NCAER) — concluded that the total amount of illicit wealth, or **black money**, accumulated **outside India between the years of 1980 and 2010** was in the range of **\$384 billion (approximately Rs 27 lakh crore at today’s exchange rate) to \$490 billion**. National Institute of Financial Management (NIFM) — estimated that the total **outflow of black money between 1990 and 2008** was **Rs 9,41,837 crore, or \$217 billion**. **India is always vulnerable to Narco trafficking as it is wedged between Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle. Narco trade is a major source of revenue for terrorists and organized crime networks particularly groups with Tran’s state reach<sup>53</sup>. With a flourishing market economy, it is likely that organized crime will take deeper root in India. Unless the criminal – terrorist-political nexus is disrupted and destroyed, terrorism, lawlessness and violence will continue to flourish<sup>54</sup>.**

## 2.8 Cyber Security Challenges:

**“Alertness towards cyber security concerns should become a way of life”- PM Narendra Modi at the Global Conference on Cyber Space, 2017<sup>55</sup>.** With India carving a niche for itself in the IT sector, dependence on technology is also increasing. Cyberspace comprises IT networks, computer resources, and all the fixed and mobile devices connected to the global Internet. With Indians using the internet for all their needs, ranging from shopping to banking,

studying to storing data, cyber crimes have also increased in proportion to usage. Cyber security is an ever growing national security challenge which is universal for several reasons. Protection of critical infrastructure operations has emerged as a major challenge. This is because trillions of dollars<sup>56</sup> move through the networks every day involving a broad range of activities, including e-commerce, e-governance, travel, hospitality, health care, and general communications. Electricity distribution, water distribution, and several other utility services are based on ICT infrastructures. India is currently witnessing an explosion in the use of digital technologies for governance, commerce, entertainment, education, and defense and for a host of other purposes. As per NCRB latest data India recorded<sup>57</sup> 21,796 cyber crimes in 2017 an increase of 77% from 2016. Cybercrime accounted for less than a percentage (0.43%) or 21,796 of a total of 50 lakh cognizable crimes in India. As per the report, During 2017, 56% of cyber-crime cases registered were for the motive of fraud (12,213 out of 21,796 cases) followed by sexual exploitation with 6.7% (1,460 cases) and causing disrepute with 4.6% (1,002 cases). There were 13 registered cases related to cyber terrorism across the country. Most cases were recorded under ATM fraud followed by online banking fraud. Over 500 women and children were victims of cyber stalking and bullying. 311 cases were registered under cyber blackmailing and threatening while 170 instances of dissemination of fake news over social media were reported. Less than 1% were committed to inciting hate against the country. It is in the cyber domain<sup>58</sup> that this fragmentation of massive destructive power down to the individual is most visible. The sheer magnitude of this threat is presently little understood outside a small group of experts and futurists. It would automatically manifest as a chief component of technology enabled crimes in different hues, including hacking and damage of networks,

identity theft, misappropriation, stalking, cyber pornography, and even cyber terrorism. India can hardly remain complacent. Snowden revelations<sup>59</sup> have shown that Cyber space could become the theatre of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Critical areas like defense installations, vital institutions, critical infrastructure, sensitive documents, communication networks, railway traffic control, financial services etc need to be protected from cyber attacks. These facilities if incapacitated or destroyed would cause a debilitating impact on national security, governance, economy and social well being of a nation. Cyber space has also become a crucial tool for terrorist communication, propaganda, recruitment, mobilization and dissemination of information including bomb making and other training manuals. It is clear that the ability to resist, react and manage such attacks requires an effective combination of technology processes and managerial procedures Capacities and capabilities of law enforcement agencies will need to be enhanced. Appropriate regulatory approaches are required and investment is also required in creating cyber security apparatus so as to keep up with emerging trends.

## 2.9 Warfare in Information:

It is pertinent to highlight that there is no common understanding of the term “Information Warfare”<sup>60</sup>. Based on current understanding and the future scope of progression in the field of Information Technology, a more holistic definition of information warfare could read as “actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national interests and strategy by affecting an adversary’s information and information systems while leveraging and protecting own information and information systems”. The main aim of information warfare<sup>61</sup> is targeting the human mind of the enemy/adversary (military and civil) by denying, degrading, delaying, disrupting, or manipulating the flow (quantity and quality) of information to

it. In fact, the potential of information as a medium for war and not only an agent of war will be felt by the end of this decade and beyond, when the world's major systems will be connected by computers and communications, enhancing their vulnerability. The underlying issue is that the information revolution has given birth to the genie of information warfare, which besides other things, shows all signs of making us change the way we think about war, peace, and security.

### PART 3

#### **Threats Emanating from Governance Faultlines**

Security is an indivisible concept<sup>62</sup>. The emphasis on human security is the latest trend in the security discourse. The line between traditional and nontraditional security issues is blurring as the latter has already started having a bearing on the former. Internal security issues have been treated more in the nature of law and order prism but the discourse is shifting rapidly and the current debate is beginning to recognize the impact of these factors on internal security. Fight for fast diminishing resources would continue to be a source of conflict. For instance, a region which has poor governance or which suffers from internal fault lines can fall prey to the machinations of other countries/ groups. There is also resistance to the idea that developmental issues should be seen through the prism of security because this simplifies the responses to a complex problem of development to a security problem. We cannot ignore these threats anymore.

In 2004, the UNSG high level panel on **Threats, Challenges and Change in their report of 2004 titled, 'A more secure world: our shared responsibility'**<sup>63</sup> identified 6 clusters of threats and challenges; **war between states; violence within states including civil wars; large scale human**

**rights abuses and genocide; poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; nuclear radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism and transnational organized crimes;** These security threats and challenges went beyond the traditional concept of security. It is evident that nontraditional security issues are assuming greater salience for India and their scope is also widening. Climate change, food, water, energy, health and ecological issues have an effect on internal security. The internal dimensions emerging out of such nontraditional tenets also includes developmental security concerns namely in relation to poverty, human rights, corruption, pollution as well as growing demographic pressures and social inequalities.

#### **3.1 Unemployment:**

According to various study reports Indian labor force is expected to increase by 32 percent by the end of 2020<sup>64</sup>. Unemployment has been a major challenge since independence. To meet the aspirations of a burgeoning young population, jobs have to be created. Niti Aayog has called for urgent comprehensive modernization of agriculture and allied sectors to create more jobs. By some estimates, the Indian economy will need to generate nearly 70 lakh jobs annually to absorb the net addition to the workforce. Taking into account the shift of labour force from low productivity employment, 80-90 lakhs new jobs will be needed in the coming years.<sup>65</sup> This would definitely increase the strain on already scarce resources in urban areas as more and more people move into urban areas in search of employment opportunities. High levels of unemployment can result in increase of crime rate and could also fuel social unrest across the country.

#### **3.2 Environmental Threats:**

The propinquity and fidelity of the air we breathe, the water we drink and the land on which we

walk tend to make us take their uninterrupted availability for granted. Air pollution, poor management of waste, growing water scarcity, falling groundwater tables, water pollution, preservation and quality of forests, biodiversity loss, and land/soil degradation are some of the major environmental issues India faces today. Natural asset scarcity due to degradation or depletion of resources, increased consumption due to over-population, and uneven distribution are said to be the three key facets of ecological threats in the future. According to the WHO<sup>66</sup> India is home to 14 of the world's most polluted cities. Air pollution is a major risk factor for heart disease, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (umbrella term for several progressive lung diseases including emphysema) and lung cancer increases the risks of acute respiratory infections and exacerbates asthma. Few Years ago when the air quality measured in terms of AQI remained severe plus in the NCR, it prompted the Supreme Court<sup>67</sup> to register a suo motu PIL so that it could get the executive authorities to take this up as an emergency issue. The SC even declared that living without pollution is a constitutional right. The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) has identified 302 polluted river stretches on 275 rivers<sup>68</sup>. Niti Aayog says India's forest cover currently is under 22% forest cover against a recommended 33%<sup>69</sup>. Solid waste generation and its treatment is a pressing concern as well. India produces far less waste than developed countries with cities often seemingly drowning in waste<sup>70</sup>. Landfills sometimes catch on fire, causing major health concerns. India is among the top five e-waste producers in the world and the mechanism for monitoring or managing it has to be augmented and strengthened. The resultant stress is both a cause and effect of political tension and conflict. An awareness of the linkage between the environment and security is, thus, an important facet of security planning in the long term.

### 3.3 Water as a source of conflict:

Water has become a source of conflict between states and has already caused political and social instability. Groups have warned of a looming water crisis in India, whether it is falling groundwater levels or contaminated river ways and water bodies, or Himalayan springs drying up<sup>71</sup> Water disputes have become the sites of political mobilization in our multi-party democratic setting. Political parties often ride on the emotive associations and notions of identity to animate and escalate disputes. The disputes offer opportunities for grandstanding, and engaging in vote bank politics. This nexus between water and politics often subverts and sabotages the resolution. Water resources are facing pressure due to population explosion, urbanization, rising demand for water from the agriculture, energy, and industry sectors, pollution, inefficient use, poor management and poor institutional mechanism. Several regions experience water scarcity due to the uneven distribution of water resources over space and time. Studies indicate that India in 2020 will possess 16% of the world's population but will have only 4% of its water resources which could result in severe crisis situation.<sup>72</sup> A variety of dispute/conflicts has already erupted ranging from inter-state dispute to "water-riots." Major tensions between states on water issues recur repeatedly and there are frequent instances of law and order breakdown. It must be borne in mind that if India gets water stressed, its economic growth will be affected.

### 3.4 Challenges of Disaster Management and Relief:

India is the 7th largest country by area, the 2nd most populous country by population and the most populous democracy in the world<sup>73</sup>. Natural disasters are a nonmilitary threat to national security. With deep diversity of hills, plains and terrains coupled with varying agro-climatic and

hydro-meteorological biosphere, India is naturally vulnerable to a large variety of disasters. The commonly experienced natural hazards include flood, cyclone, drought, earthquakes, cloud burst, heat wave, landslide, mudslide and avalanche, forest fire, coast line erosion and inundation, tsunami, lightning, etc. Besides, like any other country around the globe, India is also vulnerable to new and emerging disasters such as Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear emergencies. Terrorism and stampede also add a new dimension to manmade disasters. Disaster risks in India are further compounded by increasing vulnerabilities consequential to demographic transition and socio-economic conditions, rapid urbanization including human habitation within high-risk zones, environmental degradation, climate change, epidemics and pandemics caused by human migration and animal trade. Disasters always impact India's economy, its population and national endeavors for sustainable development. Management of disasters either man-made or natural is the key to stable internal security. Effective handling of post disaster scenario the also calls for expertise and experience and the police need to be in the state of enhanced preparedness to tackle such threats. Quick response can save lives, protect property and lessen disruptions caused by crises. This calls for a total and effective response which must subsume the coordinated response of the entire governmental system.

### 3.5 Complexities in Urban Policing:

Given the rising importance of cities as potential economic, cultural centers of gravity, armed conflicts would take place in urban settings. unregulated cities provide a breeding ground for all illegal activities. Consequent to likely technical advancement, Urban policing will experience a rapid increase in tempo and periodic intensity and is anticipated to impact 03 major areas namely information weapons system and

cognitive scheme. the future battle field will also be fought in a dense terrain. it has huge implications. The increasing population pressure on scarce urban land has given rise to a breed of criminals known as the land mafia.<sup>74</sup> The land and sand mafias have all the trappings of the drug mafia with their turfs, rivalries, transactions and power zones. Floating population is one the characteristics of the cities. But in a society where floating population is high, collection of evidence becomes almost impossible. Urban areas are now witnessing the crimes of affluence committed by the well-off or those aspiring to be so. The huge gathering of people for celebrations, demonstrations, protests and commercial activities also create problems of traffic management. The planning for any major developmental activity including development of new colonies, necessitates perspectives from security forces. Another important aspect of urban policing is also the need to recognize the sensibilities of people who are more aware of their rights and sensitive to atrocities, injustice and inequities prevalent in society. People no longer want to tolerate the high-handedness, apathy, or indifference of the executive. **In 1975 there were only 12 metropolitan cities (over 1 million populations).<sup>74</sup> Today, in addition to 6 mega cities (4 million plus) there are 40 metropolitan cities. This number can be expected to double by 2025. In urban areas, the increasing use of personal vehicular transport leads to road congestion, longer journey times and higher levels of air and noise pollution. Vehicle ownership has already outpaced available roads in India's cities, leading to gridlock conditions on a daily basis. Projects like the Golden Quadrilateral Highway project will certainly spur commerce, and will also amplify traffic volume. Remedial security measures have to be planned to tackle this emerging phenomenon.**

### 3.6 Energy Security challenges:

India's energy mix<sup>75</sup> is dominated by coal with a 49.6 per cent share, followed by oil (28 per cent), biomass (11.6 per cent), gas (7.3 per cent), renewable and clean energy (2.2 per cent) and nuclear energy (1.2 per cent). India is the world's third largest energy consumer. Energy security is an inseparable component of national security. We are already witnessing some of the efforts to ensure control or guarantees of supplies of energy resources in the shape of geopolitical adventures and mischief involving the exploitation of the politics of religious and ethnic identity in recent decades. India will find its interests challenged in both Central and West Asia by Pakistan's exploitation of Islamism. The geopolitics of energy is highly complicated and has an impact on the international and internal security environment. Unless alternate energy sources (hydrogen, nuclear, solar and wind energy) become profitably vogue, oil dependent India will remain increasingly vulnerable, both economically and diplomatically<sup>76</sup>. Conflict in the key energy producing states (e.g. Assam) followed by a major terrorist action could lead to a disruption in energy supplies, affecting economic stability.

### 3.7 Climate Change and its impact:

No country can remain immune to climate change because of its global reach.<sup>77</sup> The mean sea level rise, the melting of the polar ice sheets and the Arctic sea rise, the severity of floods and droughts, the reduction in agro productivity, destruction of marine life and increased frequency of extreme weather events are some of the impacts of the global rise of temperature. Each of these phenomena impacts and disrupts some critical human activity. India is particularly vulnerable and many recent examples can be given to show how extreme events have impacted security. The government had to use the armed forces and disaster management forces extensively to deal with immediate crises.

In the event of climate induced migrations, large sections of neighboring populations could also migrate here and thus leading to crisis though it is difficult to spell out at this juncture as little response, save for limited intellectual discussions and speculative media reports, is seen from the people who could be affected from the ill-effects of global warming.

## PART 4

### Emerging Paradigms and Complexities in Security Discourse

#### 4.1 Intel Challenges and complexities:

The role of intelligence in safeguarding National Security cannot be overestimated. No intelligence organization can remain static in the face of growing technological complexity, geopolitical uncertainty, the changing nature of terrorism, and increasing media intrusion.<sup>78</sup> The Mumbai attacks of 2008 and Pathankot airbase attack of 2016 exposed key intelligence vulnerabilities. Intelligence agencies form easy targets for blame as they cannot defend themselves. On the flip side, their successes largely fly under the radar when it comes to the larger public. The challenges before intelligence agencies are many and this is a battle which is fought on a daily basis away from the public gaze. In the dynamic and complex security environment foreign enemy intelligence agencies use social media as a tool to recruit, communicate and train their members, spread propaganda and radicalization to a great extent. In such situation, it becomes extremely difficult to monitor every single social media account. Intelligence has an important role in thwarting proxy wars, cross border terrorism, criminal terrorist nexus, and numerous insurgencies. In cyber space, countries are using armies of hackers for cyber attacks. On social media, troll armies are used to attack opponents. Rival agencies have become smarter. Counter terrorism, radicalization and cyber attacks remain major



concerns for intelligence agencies. For an effective internal security, the intelligence capacities and capabilities have to be exponentially augmented with relentless focus.

#### **4.2 Concept of Hybrid war:**

A new type of war that would become increasingly common in future will be a “Hybrid of Irregular Warfare and the Conventional Warfare” – Genl George Casey. There is no definitional clarity over what exactly hybrid warfare is. Nowadays hybrid warfare<sup>79</sup> refers to the use of irregular tactics by a state actor through deniable proxies and soldiers in unmarked uniforms to wage an offensive campaign against a target state. There has been a remarkable rise in sub conventional conflicts which include sabotage, subversive confrontation and armed violence. Cyber space adds yet another dimension to it. This has led to the emergence of the concept of hybrid warfare, a phrase coined by Former US Army Chief George W Casey<sup>80</sup>. Hybrid warfare involves threats to nations’ political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructural vulnerabilities. It usually involves non state actors indulging in subversive roles supported by sponsoring states in order to give the latter some plausible deniability. Hybrid warfare exploits the ambiguity of the fog of war to remain below obvious detection and response thresholds. The political economic fallout of such a war includes demographic and social tensions leading to serious internal security and governance issues. With cities emerging as nerve centers of economic growth and given the rising threat of hybrid conflicts which includes threats ranging from new forms of terrorism like lone wolf attacks to cyber terrorism, the use of armed force in urban settings with a large civilian population is likely to increase. The emerging internal security environment is fundamentally different from what it was a couple of decades ago. There are national and transnational players

who are on the lookout for exploiting the fault lines in the internal and external security structure of a nation. Asymmetric means and hybrid threats can destabilize a nation not in years, but in months and weeks. Even so the need for an aggressive response to future terrorist attacks must include contingencies of intervention within a hybrid warfare framework.

#### **4.3 Social Media, New Complexities:**

Social media - its reach, impact and potential in a globalised world is no longer contested. Cyber space today allows both governments and non state actors to extend their power in the social media domain at a scale and complexity which was thought impossible earlier. Social media is a technological life force which not only unites, inspires, informs, educates, and delights, but also has the power to maim. Social media reach and popularity has rapidly increased due to sharp rise in the number of internet and cell phone users. People get access to faster information and knowledge. According to the Internet Trends 2017 report, 27 per cent of India’s population (355 million users) uses the internet and this represents exponential growth compared to the 4 per cent penetration in 2009<sup>81</sup>. The 2011 Arab Spring and 2011 London riots are controversial, yet powerful examples of how social media is impacting matters of national security. The social media and cyber war has made the situation more complex and challenging, by providing the means for the integration of state and non-state actors for common objectives. The negative usage of social media includes riots, misinformation, false opinion building, inciting communal violence etc. Social media platforms have become a weapon of choice for nation state actors in defining mass narrative on an issue. It is also being used to change audience behavior and views. History shows that terrorist outfits<sup>82</sup> like Al-Qaeda, ISIS and otherwise, have long used the Internet to spread propaganda about their ideology and attacks, distribute training

guides, and recruit others. They host forums where they discuss how to create bombs, post videos to YouTube demonizing their enemies, and ingratiate themselves with possible recruits by chatting with them over Twitter, Face book etc. The active support to some of the extremist movements by inimical forces through social media is further complicating the overall security environment. These threats are ultimately resulting in physical, cultural and structural violence that allows no space for dialogue and reconciliation. The struggle primarily is for control over resources, spread of ideologies and creation of ethno-religious transnational states.

#### **4.4 Drones/Unarmed Aerial Vehicle:**

The use of UAV/Drones has increased exponentially over the last decade for a range of applications. UAV represents one of the biggest shifts in warfare. UAVs can be of security threats in areas such as terrorist attacks, illegal surveillance and reconnaissance, smuggling, electronic snooping, and mid-air collisions<sup>83</sup>. Drones are much sought after by terror groups because of the proportion results and of being cheaper. A data estimation study conducted recently state that over 6 lakh unregulated drones<sup>84</sup> of various sizes and capacities, are present in the country and anyone of them can be used for launching a nefarious act by disruptive elements. The availability of cheap quad copters and hex copters-mini helicopter-like drones, which can land and take off vertically-like is a threat to stay. The GPS-fitted UAVs can be used just as easily to deliver an explosive payload. Recent incidents like the lethal, swarm drone attacks<sup>85</sup> on Saudi Arabia's largest petroleum company and arms dropping by UAVs in Punjab from across the India-Pakistan border are an indicator. Exploitation of airspace with weapons was the privilege of the state and its militaries so far but non state actors have bridged the advantage by using low end commercially available technology.

#### **4.5 Threats from Super Terrorism:**

Super terrorism in this perspective can be defined as projected future use of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons by terrorist groups. There is an increasing realization that the world is increasingly imperiled by a new era of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists have converted aircrafts, buses or other means which are commonly available to cause heavy casualties without having to go through the rigorous process<sup>86</sup> of acquisition of technological capabilities as envisaged for the use of NBC weapons. A leakage of nuclear technologies from Pakistan to a number of rogue states has already been exposed. Every terror group is in a race to get this 'glamour stuff' and security forces are always on the hook to prevent them from getting it. The WMD Prevention Commission noted that 'terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon as bio weapons have the capability to kill many more people than a nuclear attack. Notwithstanding, the recent COVID 19 threat has redefined security paradigms and the concept of security has become more inclusive and holistic. Though unsubstantiated, Dr Francis Boyle<sup>87</sup> the creator of Bio Weapons Act claims that COVID 19 is an offensive biological warfare weapon with DNA-genetic engineering'. The ability of our public health systems to deal with pandemics needs to be enhanced. Security has become more indivisible and it is either security for all or none at all. Anything that weakens a nation weakens its security. Anything that adversely affects individuals on a grand scale is a security challenge. Many public health experts have opined that a Tsunami like community transmission<sup>88</sup> across the world can have catastrophic effects besides economic consequences. In such a scenario, major structural changes will be required in the security domain and its correlation with internal security.

#### **4.6 Threat from China: Balance of Payment to Balance of Power:**

The famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu<sup>89</sup> has said, “The supreme art of war is to subdue your enemy without fighting.” We are already witnessing struggle between major nations in the field of trade, capital market, and finance. The next war will be fought with both bonds and bombs. China as sertive policies are already impacting India. The growing Chinese footprint in the subcontinent and even Maldives is well documented. **The Standing Committee on Commerce (Chair: Naresh Gujral) submitted its report on ‘Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry’<sup>90</sup>** on July 26, 2018. In the report, it mentioned that bilateral trade between India and China has increased from USD 38 billion in 2007-08 to USD 89.6 billion in 2017-18. While imports from China increased by USD 50 billion, exports increased by USD 2.5 billion during the same period. This has widened India’s trade deficit. Trade with China constitutes more than 40% of India’s total trade deficit. The impact<sup>72</sup> of Chinese goods on Indian industry is in the realm of anti dumping duty, illegal imports and smuggling, impact on micro, small and medium enterprises, pharmaceutical, Solar, Textile, Firecracker, and Bicycle Industries is well documented. China has adopted both defensive techniques like devaluation of Yuan and disguised offensive techniques like signing trade agreements and mammoth scale One Belt One Road initiative. Devalued Yuan makes import from China cheaper and it causes flooding of cheaper Chinese goods into Indian market thereby hurting the domestic manufacturers and crippling Indian economy and seriously exacerbating the existing problems. High Anti –dumping duties imposed by India during military standoff in Doklam Area escalated the fight in economic battlefield also. Experts believe that with trade deficit reaching up to 60 billion USD, in favor of China, the

dragon is using this imbalance as a tool of arm twisting. Security analysts believe that with the One Belt One Road initiative, China is trying to ensure geo-strategic economic communications encirclement through creating a series of ports where they have their military presence. This not only gives them access to various ports in a Indian Ocean, it also overcomes their Malacca dilemma. OBOR vision document<sup>73</sup> talks of overall development in Eurasia but it can push countries into a debt trap. Access to Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukpyu and Sittwe ports will provide a tremendous strategic advantage to China against India in its traditional backyard in a long-term perspective. This will have bearing on internal security dynamics sooner than later. These are likely, albeit covertly contested by established powers fuelling wider destabilization with an inevitable impact on the South Asian region and indirect impact of India’s external and internal security environment. Analysts believe that in any future conflict, India will be confronted with a two front situation. Coping internal security issues with such mounting regional-security challenges will be an onerous task.

#### **4.7 Menace of Growing Radicalization:**

The phenomenon of radicalization has notoriously impacted the Indian society in the recent past and there is an imminent need to tackle this challenge. Social media has become the new tool for not only indoctrination but also recruitment of locals into terror outfits, creating in Kashmir “the new breed of militants- young, educated and tech-savvy”.<sup>91</sup> The phenomenon of radicalization has today spread to newer avenues in the country, particularly to the states of West and South India. However, the process of radicalization that prevails in Jammu and Kashmir, apart from few similarities, is different from the kind of radicalization that has dawned upon the states of Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil

Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Telangana and Gujarat. Both the cases have witnessed well-orchestrated online radicalization. Internet and social media has been widely used for propagating extremist ideologies and radicalizing the vulnerable minds into becoming terrorists. With the rise of Islamic State (IS) in 2014 in the Middle East, several cases of Indian operatives and sympathizers of IS came to light. An instance of growing radicalization in South Indian states<sup>92</sup> can be seen in a spate of raids and arrests made in the region immediately after the Easter bomb attacks on 21 April 2019, in Sri Lanka. Radicalization remains significant threat to India's internal security and needs to be tackled with robust preventive and curative policies. Though communities by and large have resisted continuous efforts at radicalization but due to criminal and political exploitation, fringe elements within the communities remain vulnerable to mobilization, recruitment and radicalization by hostile anti India forces that have been always looking to wage a proxy sub conventional war against India.

### **Concluding Remarks:**

Internal Security in the coming days would become increasingly important as without peace and order, the desired national development would be nearly impossible to achieve. Our own internal difficulties will persist and will require increasing attention to the maintenance of internal order and the evolution of a range of instrumentalities that discourage neighbors from engaging in mischief on Indian soil. The emerging modes of conflict and the contours of internal security clearly indicate that greater challenges are in store for the security forces in the coming years and this calls for preparedness on the part of the forces to equip themselves with tackling such threats. Internal security can no longer be viewed within the prism of defense of the territorial space and it will also have to include the contemporary and emerging ideological,

ethnic, economic, environmental challenges to the Nation. Polity, economy, environment and information are networked and interlinked to pose a web of existential threat to the Nation. India cannot afford to be defensive and reactive in its response to internal and external threats. Thus there is a need to forecast/anticipate, prepare, pre-empt and build capabilities to deal with threats that are both predictable and unpredictable.

Management of Internal security require continuous revision of a comprehensive strategy in which different stakeholders like the government political parties, security agencies, civil society, media etc would have an important role to play. We are presently engaged in a protracted, attritional struggle and hence it is crucial to make continuous reality based assessments of evolving risks and define clearly the internal security apparatus, capabilities and resources that we need for adequate and effective response<sup>93</sup>. Conversely we must ask, review and examine whether the huge range of internal security tools that we possess institutionally, legally, militarily, economically and diplomatically are sufficient to meet the overload of internal security threats that she faces.

Legal framework needs a constant review and so should be the process criminal justice by which a terrorist can be tried and convicted without any delay when the memory is fresh in the minds of the people. Constitutional and legal safeguards for tribal and marginalized population should be thoroughly enforced to bring them into national mainstream. Legal and judicial reforms are urgently needed to address the massive pendency and capacity issues in Indian courts, which impede access to justice. Several archaic and defunct laws<sup>94</sup> have already been repealed and many others are in the process of being weeded out. A part of police reform is intrinsically linked to legal/judicial reforms, which would result in efficient criminal justice dispensation.

An internal security doctrine integrating key elements like political scenario, socio economic aspects, governance, security forces, centre state coordination, intelligence, border management, cyber security etc needs to be conceptualized. India's responses and capacity to tackle various internal security challenges can be further strengthened with refining institutional mechanism for implementation of effective and coordinated counter terrorism efforts, initiatives and policies. While preparing such doctrine, our extraordinary experience of counter terrorism success in Punjab, Tripura, Andhra Pradesh, Mizoram etc must also be studied. Those experiences must be sufficiently distilled and transferred to present and emerging theatres of conflict. This again calls for creating institutional memory and learning by all concerned.

**Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at the Guwahati Conference<sup>95</sup> of the Directors General of Police in November 2014, discussed the concept of SMART Police:** a police force that is sensitive, mobile, alert, reliable and tech-savvy. The recently announced umbrella scheme on Modernization of Police Forces to strengthen law and order and modernize the police is a welcome stimulus. After accounting for vacant positions, there are only 137 police personnel per 100,000 citizens (17.3 lakh in all). The UN recommends 222 police personnel per 100,000 citizens<sup>96</sup>.

Clausewitz<sup>97</sup> noted that there is no such thing as a strategy of permanent defence. In such a scenario of myriad and complex level of challenges, it calls for an elaborate restructuring of security apparatus wherever required and also mandate a relook at our priorities and dedication of substantial resources to remain in vogue with emerging security dynamics. Police/law and order is a state subject, falling under List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. In a federal set-up like ours, this makes a policy reform a rather sticky issue. Police reform until

recently had been stuck due to various reasons. Key priorities would be improvement in capacity and infrastructure of police forces, revisiting the constitution of police forces in the country through legislative/ administrative changes, and technological scaling-up. A review of the police governance framework, the legal set-up, the issues ailing the police force –all call from making police reforms<sup>98</sup> one of the greatest priorities for the country.

Any assessment within the context of contemporary developments would need to recognize that patriotic culture is the core. It is also necessary to inculcate respect for the rule of law among citizens. The process should start at the school level and can be effected by mandatorily introducing innovative programmes<sup>99</sup> with well thought out content and activities. The outcome of the current circumstances and transformations will depend on whether Indian society has become technologically, economically and administratively competent or continue to exist relying on divisive issues for political mobilization and management. India just cannot afford vested interests and unscrupulous elements to ruin its march ahead on the path of progress and development and it must work seriously on strategies to prepare young men and women of character, commitment and courage to create a cohesive nation.

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# Research, Training & Technology-Levers to Transform Policing in India

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## Abstract

The world in 2020 is vastly different from what it was in 1970. Policing systems have to adapt to changes in social and economic conditions, particularly technological advances. In India policing urgently needs to be transformed to meet contemporary challenges. In the past 50 years, the role of the Centre in policing has greatly increased with CAPFs having a strength of 1 million, and emergence of agencies like NIA. There are increasing demands that policing be included in the Concurrent list of the Constitution. Yet, Research, Training and Scientific Investigation of crime that are critical determinants of the capability of state's police is already on the Union list. And all three areas need much more attention and investment to achieve the minimum. And BPR&D version 2.0 can act as a catalyst to bring about these changes.

## Key words

Policing is contextual –Entry 65 of the Union list in Article 240 of the Indian Constitution include, Research, Training, Scientific Crime Investigation–partnerships between police practitioners and scientists – application of appropriate technology – effort should be for scientific evidence to be accepted by courts as substantive evidence not just expert ‘opinion’ –National Police Mission should consider template of National health Mission –National Foundation for Police Research & Innovation – 10 days refresher training for all police officers by 2030 –to achieve the vision of a USD 5 trillion economy, transformation of policing a necessary condition.

1970: India was 20 years a sovereign democratic republic. Its population was 550 million, and per capita income USD 110. A 3% rate of GDP growth was derisively dismissed by Western economists as the ‘Hindu’ rate of growth. The foundation for India’s impressive technological and scientific developments had been laid with ISRO joining post-Independence institutions like BARC and the IITs. A separate Department of Science & Technology was on the anvil. The economy was a mixed model, with emphasis on controls and centralized planning.

There were less than 2 million motor vehicles of all types.

Communism was perceived by the West as the major threat to world peace. The Cold War between the USA and USSR was mirrored in ground-level conflicts in locations as diverse as Vietnam and South America. Even the PFLP in the Middle-East that took militancy to a new level with the simultaneous hijacking of 4 planes, was a pawn in the new ‘great game’ between the two superpowers, with the whole world as

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## Author's Intro:

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an arena. 'Spring Thunder', the Maoist-inspired Naxalite militancy had swept across eastern India, while in the North-East region, the then Lushai Hills, Tripura and Manipur joined the recently created state of Nagaland in dealing with ethnic militant movements.

State policing remained the bulwark of internal security in India, with a strength of over 500,000. 1 million cognizable cases were registered annually. The CRPF had grown to 60 battalions from 3-4 at Independence. Border-guarding-forces like BSF and ITBP were recently raised under MHA as the first line of defence for the 15,000 Km of international frontiers. The SSB was still a specialized force that focused on mobilizing border populations on the Sino-Indian border, and supported the newly formed external intelligence agency, R&AW. CISF had just been established to protect vital installations and critical industrial units in the public sector. Acknowledging the need for contemporary policing to identify skills, support research, and develop training, as also to evaluate modern weapons and equipment, the Bureau of Police Research and Development was established in August 1970.

2020: 50 years later, India's population is 1,400 million with a huge youth bulge. Per capita income is USD 2100, below-poverty-line population has declined from 55% to 22%, though income inequality has significantly widened and glaring regional disparities remain. Liberalization of state controls has resulted in a sustained surge in the economy. Annual GDP growth rate has continued at impressive levels, currently estimated at approx. 5% despite a challenging global and domestic environment. The share of an earlier predominant rural economy has declined, with expanding urbanization leading to almost 50 metropolitan cities and heightened rural-urban migration. The services sector now contributes more than 50% to the country's GDP, mainly from urban areas.

Literacy has increased from 34% to 74%. Infant mortality is down to 30 per 1000 live births as against 140 in the 1970s, while life expectancy has increased to 59 years from 47. India is an established nuclear power, a leader in areas like satellite technology and IT, with successful unmanned missions to Mars and the Moon. The country has seen a communications and mobility revolution, with the number of motor vehicles now 200 million and mobile phone penetration among the highest in the world.

The world itself has been transformed beyond recognition. Radical Islam is seen as the greatest threat to world peace especially after the 9/11 attack on the twin towers in New York; China is emerging as the predominant economic power, even beyond the region. In science and technology, the frontiers are being pushed outward in fields like AI, robotics and the IOT; quantum computing or inter-galactic exploration are no longer sci-fi fantasies.

Policing challenges in India have changed too. Conflict areas have shifted to J&K and Central India. The "proxy war" carried out by Pakistan-based non-state actors has continued for almost 4 decades; attacks like that of 26/11 in Mumbai has led to an even greater allocation of resources to counter-terrorism and a trend towards militarization of the police. Parts of the NE continue to be under the Disturbed Areas Act and the peace dialogue in Nagaland has continued for over 2 decades. Militant violence is now low in this region, but fault lines remain, erupting from time to time as seen in mass protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act. The shift in policing toward a greater central role is reflected in the strength of CAPFs that have grown to a massive 1 million, with the CRPF alone comprising almost 250 battalions, and emergence of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) that has jurisdiction in defined categories of crime, independent of the states. VIP security has taken on a life of its own and the most visible

police presence is often gun-toting security personnel providing personal protection to individuals and lining routes. At the same time, the expanding private security industry in India with a strength of 7 million, underlies the desperate need to improve everyday area security for the ordinary citizen. 5 million IPC cases are registered annually, yet there is a widespread belief that non-registration is the norm, not just because of citizen surveys, but the fact that this crime rate is abnormally low when compared to other countries, given our population size. More than 150,000 fatalities are caused annually by traffic accidents (crashes), highlighting the challenges of managing a mushrooming volume of traffic with almost 250 million registered vehicles. Though state police forces now have 1.5 million personnel, the number of them as, competencies required of a modern civil police and strength at police stations has not kept pace with the growing population, new forms of crime, and capability to address the multiplier-effect of social media in spreading public order tensions at unprecedented speed and scale.

Yet despite this hugely complex scenario, less than 0.1% of GDP is spent on policing by the States and Centre together, as compared to 1.5-2 % on defence and 3.5% on education. The police-population ratio is deficient by accepted global benchmarks, the number of cases failing to secure conviction in the courts is an indicator of falling professional skills, though this is aggravated by an often weak prosecution and the prolonged time taken for trials. At times this results in custodial torture and fake 'encounters' as a misguided effort often under pressure to achieve results. At the same time the police are grappling with building up skills needed to investigate emerging criminal activities in areas of new technologies such as the cyber/digital domain, as also increasingly complex white-collar crime, inter-state and international crime linkages that are a fall-out of expanding

economic and commercial development, including globalization. Women's safety and human trafficking are now focus areas. Capabilities to address public order situations are repeatedly criticized, with excessive and uncontrolled force by the police alleged in dealing with protests.

*Policing is Contextual* Policing must adapt to the needs of different societies under changing conditions in different times. The introductory paragraphs above reflected how different the India of today is from what it was in 1970, in a world that itself is transformed. However the unchanged constant remains the primary role of a modern state: to ensure safety of life to every citizen, protect legitimate property rights and offer equal and speedy access to justice. Criminal justice systems worldwide have evolved in response to social and economic changes of the past 150 years. The Peelian system in the UK had emerged as a response to challenges of law enforcement in an enlarged London after the industrial revolution. The various waves of reforms in the US from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century onwards were a response to changing social mores and technological developments, aimed at containing crime trends that accompanied the surge in economic growth and urbanization post World War 1. More recently in the US, the President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing, the National Policing Board in the UK chaired by the Prime Minister and the earlier National Police Improvement Agency, are efforts to realign the police to contemporary challenges. The importance of policing to the progress of a country and well-being of its people is underscored by direct engagement of the highest-levels of national leadership with these initiatives.

Different Committees and Commissions set up in India since the 1970s have made recommendations to reform the police to meet contemporary needs. Most recently the 2<sup>nd</sup> ARC

made 51 recommendations, and the Supreme Court issued 7 Directives. Both aimed at insulating the police from extra-legal influence, improving specialist capacity, applying appropriate technology and introducing greater accountability for abuse of authority. NITI Aayog is looking at changes required in policing as an essential component of efforts toward economic progress. These are the first steps in the journey ahead to transform policing in the country.

*Research, Training, Technology.* There are multiple areas of policing and management of police departments that need to be addressed. In this commemorative issue published in BPR&D's 50<sup>th</sup> year, let us look at areas like research, training, technology applications etc that are its mandate.

Establishing BPR&D in 1970 was recognition of the need in modern policing for systematic research. Today, there is an on-going debate as to whether public order and policing, currently a subject under the State list of India's Constitution should be brought onto the Concurrent list and a category of 'federal' crimes considered. This assumes that the Centre with greater resources and possibly less political interference at the operational level, can ensure greater police professionalism. Yet, does this overlook the fact that capacity building of police forces in the states in terms of "training of police officers, promotion of research, and creating scientific capacity for detection and investigation of crimes" is already on the Union list (Entry 65)?

Let us consider these separately.

*Training.* Central Detective Training Schools were set up for different regions and more recently, a Central Academy for Police Training for state DySPs. Many short-term courses are organized on different aspects of policing for different ranks and training in other required skills are arranged in military training institutions,

by specialist trainers from abroad and also conducted by foreign police agencies. An e-learning portal, e-Ustaad has also been launched. Yet, the BPR&D's own review acknowledges that available training courses can annually train only an insignificant proportion of the country's police personnel. Equally important, is the need to ensure that state training institutions have the right curriculum, the needed training resources and that competencies that are the objective of training actually make a difference in achieving desired policing outcomes. Given the massive dimensions of this requirement, to depend solely on the Centre's training facilities is unlikely to be enough. The 'Training Scheme' approved by the Central Government is intended "to identify the gaps between desired and actual policing performance and to make appropriate training interventions for bridging these gaps". To achieve this, better-resourced state training institutions will have to act as multipliers to develop the huge number of competent instructors needed down to the district level. Accrediting suitable universities to provide the academic component of training, and empanelling specialist institutions to address desired behavioural/attitude changes could also be considered. The Police Universities that have come up in several states could be supported to develop the rigorous conceptual framework that modern professions demand and combine teaching with working with practitioners on real policing problems.

Sampling methods can help assess specific training needs in different states, particularly in conflict areas or where there are indicators of inadequate professional skills such as low conviction rates or high levels of complaints against abuse of authority such as excessive use of force. Moreover, proven innovations in andragogy, such as hybrid programmes of distance-learning with contact sessions can be customized for selected states. Pilot projects using AR/VR technology and even gaming, can

demonstrate the potential to use experiential learning via digital platforms to transform training outcomes especially for the younger generation. Where training resources such as qualified instructors are not available for certain subjects or skills, centrally-funded schemes can be considered to attract needed talent, or suitable instructors can be deputed for a fixed tenure till this deficit can be made up in a particular state, similar to central funding of India Reserve battalions. The e-learning portal can house a National Police Library holding case-studies in a simple format, organized into critical areas in a way that field police officers or supervisors can easily refer to.

*Research* BPR&D supports a wide array of research on subjects related to policing. The website lists proposals approved for research annually, and also proposals not approved. Almost 300 research studies have been funded and findings published by BPR&D. Ongoing research projects range from 'Illegal Migrants in Assam', 'community confidence—building-measures', 'effectiveness of CCTV' and 'police action in violent mob situations', to 'use of forensics tools in rape cases'. Research findings are available in a National Police Research Repository. Conventionally, the quality of research in the academic world is measured by 'impact factor', reflected by the number of citations in, reputed journals. This may not be an appropriate metric for BPR&D-funded research that needs to go beyond academics and into the policing practice. It would therefore be useful to know if how much of this BPR&D-supported body of research was evidence-based, how often this was accessed or used at policy levels upto Select Committees of legislatures, whether research findings improved operational management of crime or police administration, or provided guidelines for policing roles. Since budgets for research are limited, it is imperative to evaluate the utility of the research effort to practitioners or in improving

policing systems. The trend worldwide is toward partnering with universities to find evidence-based good policing practices, similar to fields like medicine where the 19<sup>th</sup> century saw integration of hospitals with universities. Examples are a research centre in the University of London, 'Policing Challenges faced by global cities' and Scottish Institute for Policing Research that is a collaboration between the Scottish Police Research and 14 universities in Scotland.

In the United States, concepts like Problem-Oriented-Policing, Hot-Spots, COMPSTAT, predictive analytics using meta-analysis of data, had evolved through partnerships between police practitioners and academic scientists. These innovations designed and evaluated using scientific methods and subject to peer-group review, have had a major impact on optimal deployment of limited resources and more effective delivery of identified policing services. For example, criminologists have found that a few areas in cities account for a disproportionate share of crime. In cities across the US, 50% of the occurrence of crime was concentrated in a very limited number of city segments (3-4%). Imagine how findings like this could impact on a more effective deployment of policing resources!

Technology can be a force multiplier that leverages limited resources, makes processes more efficient and ensures less-lethal outcomes when using force, while ensuring safety for individual police officers. Evaluating existing equipment, identifying needs that can be met with technology solutions and acting as a bridge between industry and requirements of police departments are roles that BPR&D does play and can take on more pro-actively even providing consultancy to state police departments. It can help with a needs- assessment of both 'hard' technology like CCTV, less-lethal devices for riot control, BR vests, mobile data centres, vehicles designed for specific policing roles, and

'soft' technology applications like threat/risk assessment tools, profiling that help identify sub-groups of offenders, geographical areas, and help focus limited resources on high risk people, times and places. Similarly, criminal data for crime-mapping and analysis, facial-recognition software or AI-supported monitoring equipment if designed well, can be a great support in effectively deploying limited resources. There are a few on-going initiatives that have been taken up in partnership with industry. An annual Exhibition already provides a platform for available technology applications for internal security and policing. However much more can be done in assisting state police forces to identify and evaluate technologies that can increase capabilities for delivery of policing services.

IIT Mumbai has set up National Centre of Excellence in Technology for Internal Security (NCETIS) funded with Rs 100 crores by Department of Electronics & Information Technology of the government of India. Its terms of reference are to explore technology applications to improve intelligence gathering, crime detection and law enforcement and better technology for forensic investigation. Similarly, a National Police Technology Development Centre (NPTDC), IIT Delhi and a National Police Information Technology Centre (NPITC), Bengaluru have been announced. Similar initiatives by other ministries like Department of Biotechnology or Science & Technology in expert institutes like Indian Institute of Science to set up Centres or Chairs can systematically explore the role of science in policing at levels ranging from the optimal way to provide policing services to local communities from rural areas to mega-cities, to evidence-based briefing papers for policy-makers at the highest levels. Moreover, in order to achieve synergy between practitioners and scientists, perhaps a Standing Committee on Science & Technology in Policing could be set up to review,

coordinate and provide direction to these separate efforts

Despite the increasing use of technology, Human Resources remains the foundation of policing systems worldwide, though applications are being explored to reduce use of manpower such as BOTs and even a few tentative experiments with Robocop's. After cuts in manpower in past years, the UK has recently announced a programme fund recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers. The US in the 90s announced a similar initiative to support local law-enforcement to hire an additional 100,000 officers. In India, human resources are likely to continue to remain the largest line item in police budgets in the foreseeable future, hence efforts to improve policing will need to focus on improving capacity and capabilities of manpower. There has been some research on manpower requirements in areas like optimal coverage and staffing of rural police stations. The charter of Micro Mission 1 focused on areas like the police-population ratio, career progression, leadership, performance evaluation, attitudinal changes and welfare. These are macro issues that are constraints in managing and urgently need to be studied – scientifically and by domain experts even if non-police. Other issues such as appropriate leadership and formations suitable for required roles in CAPFs, competency and staffing requirements in state police forces to follow up on recommendations for separation of law-and-order and investigation made by both 2<sup>nd</sup> ARC and the SC Directives of 2006, using big-data and machine learning to identify the complex reasons for cases repeatedly failing in the judicial process, or better methods, whether tactics or less-lethal equipment for mob-dispersal. Funding of pilots or evaluation of existing initiatives that use criminal data systems to support analysis for predictive policing, or threat/risk assessment instruments or profiling are examples of 'soft' technology applications that could be developed.

*Scientific capacity for crime investigation*

Forensics science is acknowledged worldwide today as indispensable in the scientific investigation of most categories or criminal offences. Countries like the United States have over 400 forensics laboratories. In India, existing CFSLs and regional and mobile labs in the states affirm the build-up of forensics capacity that evolved out of the Scientific Policy Resolution of 1958. Yet even after 6 decades, only a small proportion (5-6%), of registered cases use forensics during investigation. Even then almost 700,000 samples remain pending for examination each year. Some states like Andhra Pradesh/Telangana, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab, Mizoram and Odisha send a significant proportion of forensics samples for examination. Other states like UP, Bengal, Bihar, do not. Crime scene preservation, proper packaging of exhibits for dispatch to FSLs to prevent 'contamination', and ensuring appropriate chain of custody are processes that need to be addressed. Cost-effective solutions are needed so that forensic evidence in India can aspire to the authority that it commands in the judicial system of developed countries. And schemes to centrally fund this in the states as required can be considered similar to SRE (security-related-expenditure) in disturbed areas. Any error or negligence while collecting or preserving a sample can lead to contamination even in state-of-art scientific evidence like DNA samples. Another constraint is that under the Evidence Act, a forensic report is admissible as the "belief" of an expert. Courts continue to rely heavily on non-scientific evidence. A major effort backed by scientific research is needed to initiate changes so that scientific evidence is admissible as 'substantive' evidence and not just an "opinion".

*BPR&D Version 2.0* What should be the BPR&D version 2.0, not in the next 50 but the next 10 years? How can it assist India in moving toward achieving the goals set out in SDG 16 of

the United Nations "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"? Should its primary mission be seen as providing technical support to the Government of India to fulfil its Constitutional role as defined in Entry 65 of the Seventh Schedule (Union List) of Article 246 in the Constitution of India? That is "a) the training of police officers;b) the promotion of special studies or research;

c) scientific or technical assistance in the investigation or detection of crime."

There is a National Police Mission (NPM) within BPR&D, and a Modernization of Police Forces (MPF) fund under MHA that currently amounts to Rs 3000 crores per year. Yet, has the overall impact of both these schemes met expectations of acting as catalysts for transforming policing? Though the 8 Micro-Missions under NPM do cover recommendations of earlier Commissions/committees, perhaps explicitly deriving these from the 51 recommendations of the 2<sup>nd</sup> ARC or the SC Directives of 2006 would have provided continuity of the police reform process. Also, the Micro Missions would need to provide compelling evidence-based narrative and clear guidelines to lead to an organic scaling up, linking these desired changes with MPF proposals. The major proportion of MPF is now spent by CAPFs which is contrary to the original objective of upgrading capabilities of state police forces. Few states can spend even the limited allocations under the MPF, not just because of a cumbersome procurement process and, delay in release of funds in any FY, but a restrictive framework focused mainly on infrastructure, mobility and equipment. Modernization is a process of change, from older ideas, attitudes, methods and technology to the more recent. Better communications, sophisticated weapons and more vehicles are necessary, may not be

sufficient. Moreover, many states may need assistance with framing proposals to access funds available under this scheme and could be helped by a 3<sup>rd</sup> party review, yet there is no provision for specialist consultancy as is permitted under similar GOI development schemes of other Ministries.

What can help generate the tempo needed to achieve real change at ground level? Consider 3 major aspects: training, research, policing practice. Take the health sector. The National Health Mission was designed to work toward providing access to equitable healthcare responsive to local community's needs, and taking account of the inter-sectoral interface needed to address wider social determinants. Preventive health care, strengthening infrastructure, improving service delivery and promoting village level auxiliary health workers like ASHAs were stated goals. A central technical support unit, National Health Systems Resource Centre was set up to assist states in formulating plans to achieve defined and measurable outcomes in areas like infant mortality and maternal mortality rates.

Adapting this template for the policing ecosystem, can we acknowledge an unstated national policing policy as 'strengthening policing systems in the states while taking account of diverse conditions across India, and also ensuring the necessary interface between policing and other domains needed to achieve desired outcomes in criminal justice'? The National Police Mission could then be framed to support projects that assess HR requirements and infrastructure needs in different areas, exploring schemes to provide central funding for additional officers with specialist skills such as investigation of crime against women, cyber/white-collar crime or fatal MV crashes, induction of women police or procurement under MPF, strengthening decentralized planning capacity, improving delivery of specific policing

services, building up community engagement, creating increased specialist capacity and knowledge hubs. Defined objectives could be worked out in the context of the requirement of different states, whether, zero-error process during investigation, increasing forensics use, building up capacity of field-level officers etc. Metrics such as conviction rate of heinous crimes like rape, and time taken for enquiries like passport verification can act as indicators of effectiveness. A Central Technical Support unit could provide states with help to identify needs scientifically, frame proposals comprehensively, review progress systematically and evaluate outcomes objectively.

Similarly a National Foundation for Research & Innovation could be established and funded with the objective of supporting research not just at conceptual levels e.g. setting standards for different policing roles, but scientifically trying out improved policing practice in the field. Young officers and policemen across India are on their own trying out innovations that are impacting service delivery. With some guidance on process and seed funding, those that are effective can be validated and serve as models to be replicated. Well-funded fellowships can be offered to scientists to conduct research into scientific domains like big data application, criminology, building forensics science capacity in universities, and even areas in organization and management.

Training of field officers is vital to improve both service delivery and attitude. Training modules need to be developed for each state/cluster of states based on local needs-assessments and using case-studies reflecting actual issues faced. Given the huge up scaling of training required to ensure at least 10 days annual refresher training for each police officer by 2030, implementation will need to follow a cascade model and extensively use ICT platforms. Central schemes could fund Key Resource



Persons at the state level with certified skills in identified areas, who can then train Master Trainers so that training can be conducted down to the district level, ensuring delivery to police-station level officers.

India aspires to become a USD \$5 trillion economy by 2025. There are multiple factors that will determine achieving this bold target. A major requirement is improvement in Ease-of-Doing-Business Rankings and Rule-of-law Index. Security is a major factor for big and middle-level investors, while small and micro enterprises can flourish only when there is a sense of safety for the common man. As much as the economy, a robust policing system is the first line of defence of national security when adversaries find “proxy war” supporting non-state actors who target cities and iconic institutions, more effective than conventional war fought on the frontiers. 35,000 police personnel have laid down their lives in the line-of-duty in the past 60 years. As much as it does to its citizens, the country owes to these Brave Hearts a policing system in which policemen and women are trained to deal with identified contemporary challenges, and adequately equipped both to ensure appropriate use of force required, while ensuring officer-safety to the extent possible; a system that delivers services effectively and equitably, with every policeman clear that they are “servants of the law and no one but the law”. Achieving this will require transformation of not just the police but our criminal justice architecture. BPR&D can play its part in addressing the building blocks essential to achieve a more professional and people-friendly police. And for this it needs to be supported with resources far greater than an annual budget Rs 161 crores. Also a review of the organizational structure and competencies needed to upscale the scientific and training capacity so as to fulfil the constitutional responsibility of the Centre. Like the National

Health Mission with an annual budget of Rs. 35,000 crores, it is a national imperative to invest more to transform the police so as to meet the aspirations of a contemporary India. Neglecting to do so could lead to missteps in meeting the nation’s vision of a “tryst with destiny”.

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# Left-Wing Extremism: Challenge to Internal Security

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## 1. Introduction

The term **left-wing extremism** is defined as an ideology of groups who want to bring about political change through violent revolution rather than through established political processes. A number of Left Wing Extremist outfits have been operating in certain remote and poorly connected pockets of the country for a few decades now. The **CPI (Maoist)** Party, is the major Left Wing Extremist outfit responsible for a majority of incidents of violence, killing of civilians and security forces. It has been included in the Schedule of Terrorist Organizations along with all its formations and frontal organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The CPI (Maoist) philosophy of armed insurgency to overthrow, the democratically elected government is unacceptable under the Indian Constitution and the founding principles of any democratic state. The poor and the marginalized sections are bearing the brunt of this violence. At times, even well-meaning liberal intellectuals fall prey to the Maoist propaganda without understanding their true nature and doctrine which glorifies violence and believes in adopting the military line to capture power.

### a) Historical perspective:

According to Maoist sympathisers, the Indian Constitution “ratified colonial policy and made the state custodian of tribal homelands”, turning

tribal populations into squatters on their own land and denied them their traditional rights to forest produce.

Therefore, soon after independence, there were prolonged yet minor communist activities in South India. In present-day Telangana, communism began to manifest, and in July of 1948, a major event known as the Telangana Struggle occurred, in which the lower-classes of approximately 2000 villages of the former Hyderabad State formed a series of communes. Furthermore, in the same year, the far-leftist mentality was solidified within the government structures by the publication of two major communist documents:

- i. The first was the **Andhra Thesis** which expressed “that ‘Indian revolution’ follow the Chinese path of protracted people’s war” and how the “Indian revolution” must be similar to the Chinese people’s war in which the entire population from the rural to agrarian areas of the Nation, should participate; and
- ii. The second document was the **Andhra Letter** which was published in June 1948, and it spoke how Mao Zedong’s concept of New Democracy should be implemented in the revolution.

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Author’s Intro:

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In terms of communists of India, the **Communist Party of India (CPI)** formed in 1920 had its own internal conflict because the CPI had the support from the Soviets and by 1964, the **Communist Party of India (Marxist)** was established as a result of conflicting views of leaders.

The series of conflicts came up in the late 1960s with the continued failure of the government with intent to implement constitutional reforms. This was meant to provide for limited tribal autonomy, which concerns natural resources on their lands e.g. pharmaceutical and mining. This passed 'land ceiling laws', limiting the land to be possessed by landlords and distribution of excess land to landless farmers and labourers as well. In Scheduled Tribe areas, disputes related to the illegal allocation of their land to non-tribals, still common, gave rise to the tribal movements.

The term "**Naxal**" or "**Naxalism**" (representing the majority of LWE extremism and in fact a synonym to LWE now) comes from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, where a section of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) led by **Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal Santhal** initiated an uprising in 1967. Naxalites are considered far-left radical communists, supportive of Mao Zedong's political ideology. Their origin can be traced to the split in 1967 of the **Communist Party of India (Marxist)** following the Naxalbari peasant uprising, leading to the formation of the **Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)** two years later. Initially, the movement had its epicentre in West Bengal. In later years, it spread to underdeveloped areas of rural southern and eastern India, such as Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana through the activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Some Naxalite groups had

become legal organisations participating in parliamentary elections, such as the **Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation** and the **Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti**.

By mid of 1967, the Siliguri Kishan Sabha, of which Jangal Santhal was the president, declared their support for the movement initiated by Kanu Sanyal, and their readiness to adopt armed struggle to redistribute land to the landless. In the very next week, a sharecropper near Naxalbari village was attacked by the landlord's men over a land dispute. When a police team arrived, a group of locals mainly the tribals led by Jangal Santhal staged an ambush, and a police inspector was killed in a hail of arrows. This event encouraged many tribals and locals to join the movement and to start attacking local landlords. The then CPI (M) coalition government in power in West Bengal suppressed this incident after seventy-two days of revolt.

Mao Zedong provided ideological leadership for the Naxalbari movement, advocating that Indian peasants and lower class tribals to overthrow the government of the upper classes by force. From 1965-1966, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) had a major figure by the name of Charu Majumdar who believed in Zedong's "protracted people's war" ideology. A large number of urban elites were also attracted to the ideology, which spread through Charu Majumdar's writings, particularly the 'Historic Eight Documents' which formed the basis of Naxalite ideology. These documents were essays formed from the opinions of communist leaders and theorists such as Mao Zedong, Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Using people's courts, similar to those established by Mao, Naxalites started the trial of opponents and execute them with axes or knives, beat or permanently exile them.

At the time, the leaders of this revolt were the members of the CPI (M), which joined a coalition government in West Bengal. However, this plan of action led to the conflict of interest within the party as Charu Majumdar believed that the CPI(M) was to support a doctrine based on revolution similar to that of the People's Republic of China. Leaders like land minister **Hare Krishna Konar** had been till recently "trumpeting revolutionary rhetoric, suggesting that militant confiscation of land was integral to the party's programme." However, now that they were in power, CPI (M) did not approve of the armed uprising, and all the leaders and a number of Calcutta sympathisers were expelled from the party. This disagreement within the party soon culminated with the Naxalbari uprising by the end of May 1967- the same year, and Majumdar led a group of dissidents to start a revolt in the West Bengal village of Naxalbari.

Subsequently, by November 1967, this group, led by Sushital Ray Chowdhury, organised the **All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR)**. Violent uprisings were organised in several parts of the country. On 22 April 1969 which also marked the birthday of famous leader Lenin, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) i.e. **CPI (ML)** was formed by AICCCR. Practically, all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI (ML). A separate offshoot from the beginning of the communist movement was the **Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)**, which evolved out of the Dakshin Desh group. The MCC later fused with the People's War Group to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in the year 2004. A third offshoot was that of the Andhra revolutionary communists, mainly represented by the **UCCRI (ML)**, following the mass line legacy of T. Nagi Reddy, which broke with the AICCCR at an early stage.

The early 1970s saw the spread of Naxalism to almost every state in India, barring Western

India. During the 1970s, the movement was fragmented into disputing factions due to various selfish interests of leaders. By 1980, it was estimated that around 30-40 Naxalite groups were active, with a combined membership of approximately 30,000.

## 2. The Spread in the States/ Geographical area

### a) Phases:

The Naxalite movement has evolved through three separate phases in India:

- i. The first phase ran from the late 1960s through 1973.
- ii. The second phase occurred from the late 1970s through 1994.
- iii. The third and most significant phase formally began in 2004, reaching a peak of violence from 2005 to 2011 and declining to its present state.

**During the first phase**, the Naxalites remained fragmented and without much training or organization. This wave of Naxalite violence peaked in 1971 when over 3500 acts of class-based attacks were reported and more than 800 people were reported killed. But it quickly succumbed to its own weaknesses due to state counter-insurgency response that featured two waves of activity:

- i. The first wave, from the summer of 1969 through the end of 1971, state-led counter-insurgency campaigns against the rural Naxalite cadres decimated much of those insurgency cadres. West Bengal police, assisted by the CRPF, moved against poorly armed Naxalites with great effect. By 1971, army units deployed into West Bengal joined these police forces. It took the failure of local police to contain Naxalite insurgents for more

than 2 years before the West Bengal deputy chief minister, himself a politician from the CPI-Marxist party requested assistance from the Central Govt for Central forces to assist state security forces. Then in July and August of 1971, a more dangerous component of the Naxalite insurgency in West Bengal's Birbhum District was put down by a joint campaign led by the army known as Operation Steeplechase. Army involvement came after the collapse of an Indian National Congress-led coalition government in West Bengal and the New Delhi declaration of "President's Rule" in West Bengal. This made the Central government responsible for the fight against the Naxalites and enabled Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to divert elements of the Army that assisted local police in decisive counter-insurgency operations. The urban dimension of the first wave of the Naxalite insurgency remained violent throughout 1971 and festered into the next 2 years, even as the rural component succumbed to Operation Steeplechase.

- ii. The second wave started from the election of a new West Bengal Chief Minister of INC in March 1972 which turned the tide on the Naxals. The law and order platform of Chief Minister played out in a much more muscular police role across Kolkata and its surroundings throughout 1972 and 1973. Kolkata police apprehended Naxalite leader Charu Majumdar in July 1972, and he died in custody several weeks later. Naxalite leaders across the city succumbed to increasing police and paramilitary

presence. By 1973, the main cadres of the Naxalites had been eliminated.

**The second phase, 1977–1994:** India's first phase of insurgent violence ended badly for domestic left-wing extremist movement but did not eliminate the conditions inspiring the movement or all of those willing to hold to the Naxalite cause. The movement fractured into more than 30-40 separate small groups. Slowly, over the course of a decade, these groups began to remobilize and consolidate. Particularly, in the state of Andhra Pradesh, a new Naxalite organization called **People's War** emerged. Its leader, **Kondapalli Seetharamaiah**, sought a more efficient structure to boost morale, recruitment, and funding. By 1978, Naxalite peasant revolts had spread to the Karimnagar District of Telangana and Adilabad Districts of Andhra Pradesh. The major grievance was of unpaid wages. Naxalite insurgents kidnapped landlords and forced them to confess to crimes, apologize to villagers, and pay for protection. By the early 1980s, insurgents had established a stronghold and sanctuary in the interlinked North Telangana villages and the Dandakaranya forest areas along with the Andhra Pradesh and Orissa border. In 1985 onwards, they started ambush on police. After a series of disturbing incidents, Andhra Pradesh govt. responded by creating a special task force called the **Greyhounds** to establish control in the seven worst-affected districts. An elite anti-Naxalite commando unit that still exists today, the Greyhounds, were drawn from within the Andhra Pradesh police forces and given special treatment. They were given preferred payment and training better than central or state armed forces.

In 1987, the Naxalite political party (**People's War**) and other Maoist groups in Andhra Pradesh were barred from elections after they had kidnapped government officials and bargained exchange for Naxalite prisoners. Insurgent

attacks increased. Affected states responded by enacting special laws that enabled police to focus on capture, detention, and extra-normal means against Naxalite cadres, fighters and supporters. Andhra Pradesh and Orissa requisitioned additional central forces to augment state security forces. Besides, the augmentation of force, the rival mass organizations were also set up to attract youth away from the Naxalites, rehabilitation programmes were started and refurbished intelligence networks were established. The new counter-insurgency strategy reduced violent incidents, and nearly 9,000 Naxalites surrendered. Consequently, in 1994 the ban on ostensibly moderate Naxalite political parties was lifted. The heatwave of the Naxalite insurgency had been contained. However, the socio-economic conditions underpinning Naxalism remained largely unchanged.

**The third Phase can be termed from 2004–until now:** From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the Naxalite insurgency remained largely out of the public eye, but the movement had not withered away. Taking advantage of rising local support for worsening economic conditions, fragmented Naxalite groups created a united front. The People's War, Party Unity, and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) combined to form the **People's War Group (PWG)**. Naxalism manifested itself in episodic spurts of violence by the PWG, which had its most pronounced presence in Andhra Pradesh. From 1999–2002, local-level violence increased. The PWG accelerated attacks on state government locations in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, and South Bastar areas of Madhya Pradesh, now in Chhattisgarh. By the year 2000, an estimated 3,000 armed Naxalite rebels were reportedly active in these areas. During this time, government agencies took action that accelerated grievances among the poor and misplaced sympathies for left-wing violence.

First, economic growth and development led to local and state government appropriation of land for infrastructure and resource development, displacing many underprivileged people who had no political voice. Second, governments responded to Naxalite violence with acute force.

The merger of the two largest Naxalite factions, the PWG and MCC into the CPI(M) in 2004 fused the Maoist ideology with a cadre of armed groups for the first time. A third and more lethal wave of violence, more sophisticated and more destructive, rapidly spread throughout the affected region. Naxalite leaders expanded control over natural resource-rich areas (for example, coal, gas, precious minerals, and timber). They also collected taxes and extortion money to fund weapons production, including the production of crude but effective **Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**. Estimates from 2004 to 2011 suggest that the Naxalites extracted at least 125-130 crore rupees annually from government offices, contractors, businessmen, and industrialists. They embarked upon more choreographed terror campaigns including the murder of local politicians, overwhelming attacks on local police stations, impressment of child Naxals as Bal-Dalam etc, and a general campaign to scare away outside investors. By the second half of 2005, Naxalites demonstrated a lethality and reach far beyond the capacity of other domestic terrorists and insurgent groups. They destroyed buildings, captured weapons, and killed several local policemen in an attack on a village in Uttar Pradesh. They also attacked the Jehanabad Prison in Bihar, killing many, freeing more than 300 inmates, and abducting about 30 inmates who were the members of an anti-Naxalite group. Total deaths from Naxalite attributed insurgency and terrorism grew to more than 800 in the impacted regions. In 2006 and 2007, this trend expanded further.

In 2006, Naxalite groups launched several high-profile attacks against civilians and security forces, expanding the rural territory under Maoist control and threat of extreme violence. In one such incident, an attack by some 800 armed Naxalites in Chhattisgarh killed 25, injured 80, and 250 people were found missing. In 2006, the then Prime Minister Shri Manmohan Singh grew concerned about the mounting threat posed by Naxalite groups to internal stability and democratic traditions. The Naxalite menace had grown to such an extent that 18 of India's States and 194 of its total districts were affected by Naxalite violence. For the first time, Prime Minister Singh called the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency and associated terrorism **“the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”** In 2007, over 971 Naxalite attacks were recorded in the first seven months and over 1,500 attacks by the end of the year. Left-wing extremists began targeting elected officials including a member of parliament from Jharkhand. By 2010, the Naxalites were active in nine states i.e. West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. This region happened to sit atop tremendous iron ore, coal, and aluminium deposits as well as irrigation and hydroelectric power potentials. There were more than 2,200 incidents of Naxalite violence and almost 1,200 killed in the year 2010 alone across these nine states.

In March 2010, after months of prevarication and confusion, the Central government launched massive operations against Naxals, which was coined as **Operation Green Hunt** by the media. The initiative added an additional estimated 20,000 Central forces mainly from CRPF and also from the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Border Security Forces, and Shashastra Seema Bal. The operation sent central, state, and local police forces into former no-go zones deep in the forests of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra state

to rid them of militants, but these operations struggled. In April 2010, Naxalite insurgents ambushed 80 troops of the Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Chhattisgarh, killing an estimated 76 in the worst attack on Indian security forces since the third phase of the Naxalite insurgency began. In February 2011, Naxalites kidnapped two Indian government officials, demanding a halt to operations.

Despite the major setbacks of 2010–2011, the authorities made headway with Naxalite insurgency now generating international headlines. Better-coordinated joint central-state anti-Naxalite security operations killed a prominent Naxalite military leader, Koteswara Rao (Kishenji), in an operation in November 2011. In 2012, the joint operations in West Bengal and Chhattisgarh began to produce results, with more than 1,800 Naxalite insurgents reported arrested and another 440 surrendered during the year. Acts of extreme violence continued during 2012 and 2013, but the expanse of the insurgency began to abate. Insurgency-related fatalities declined in 2012 and remained below 400 in 2013. West Bengal reported sharp declines in Naxalite presence and activities during 2013, although some observers declared that the decline in those states was offset by a corresponding increase of Naxalite violence in neighbouring states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa.

They killed many Congress leaders, and anti-Naxalite militia Salwa Judum founder, Mahendra Karma in an attack on his convoy while he was campaigning for election in rural Chhattisgarh communities in the year 2013. The government called for a two-pronged approach to dismantling the Naxalite network: sustaining joint and proactive military operations with greater economic development and responsible governance programmes in the areas with strongest Maoist support. The CRPF successfully launched a 5-day interstate

offensive in late December 2013 to dismantle core Maoist groups. It shut down a gun manufacturing factory and recovered numerous weapons and explosives. Remote triggering devices were also found, indicating that the insurgency was using more advanced weaponry. By 2014, fatalities from Naxalite violence dropped below 300 for the first time in more than a decade.

Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh remained most affected by violence, and some Naxalite groups even expanded into southern regions of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Karnataka states. But, a review of the incidents in 2013 of Naxalite impacted areas revealed a significant drop in the overall number of affected districts since 2007 from 165 to 120 overall and an even more significant drop in districts categorized as experiencing severe or moderate amounts of violence from Naxalite activities over the same period from 69 districts in 2007 to just 28 in 2013. Eighty percent of Naxalite violence now afflicted only three states, down from the nine states impacted by serious Naxalite violence in 2010. Now the tide had turned. By the end of 2014, the Naxalite insurgency was down if not out. In 2015, the joint security and economic efforts to counter the remaining Naxalite threat focused on 30 key districts in these 3 most impacted states, enabling more concentrated efforts on legal reforms and development activities. In the years 2016 to 2020 (till now), there have been a few major incidents while an integrated approach to tackling the insurgency is continuing.

**Major incidents of the year 2016-2020 are as below:**

#### 2016

- 24 October 2016: 24 Naxalites were killed by Andhra Pradesh Greyhounds forces in an encounter that took place in the cut-off area of remote Chitrakonda on Andhra-Odisha border.

- In November 2016, three Naxalites were killed near Karulai in an encounter with Kerala police. Naxalite leader Kappu Devaraj from Andhra Pradesh is included in the list of those killed in the incident.
- Late November: In Jharkhand, six Naxalites were killed in a gun battle with Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) commandos. The CRPF recovered 600 bullets of various calibre, about 12 IEDs, an INSAS rifle, an SLR, a carbine and three other guns.

#### 2017

- 24 April 2017: In the 2017 Edelbeda attack, twenty-five CRPF officers were killed in an encounter with 300 Naxals. The encounter with 74 battalion of CRPF was reported from Kala Pathar near Chintagufa in Sukma District of Chhattisgarh.

#### 2018

- March 2018: 2018 Sukma attack - 9 CRPF personnel were killed and two injured after a powerful IED blast that destroyed their mine-protected vehicle in Sukma, Chhattisgarh.
- 22 March 2018: At least 37 Naxalites were killed by police in a four-hour gun battle on the border between Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh.

#### 2019

- 8 March 2019 - 1 Naxal leader was killed in an encounter with the Kerala police at a Wayanad resort.
- 1 May 2019 - 15 commandos of a special force of Maharashtra Police were killed in Maoist attack - Gadchiroli.
- 28 October 2019- Kerala Police's elite commando team "Thunderbolt" gunned down 3 Maoists in an encounter in the Attappadi hills region of Palakkad. One



remaining member of the Maoists group was killed a day later when the police team went to inspect the encounter site, following an attack on the team.

- 23 November 2019 - Naxals opened fire on a patrol van killing an ASI and three home guard Jawans in Latehar, Jharkhand

## 2020

- 21 May 2020 – 17 DRG/STF personnel of Chhattisgarh Police were martyred in an attack by Naxals near Minpa, Dt Sukma, Chhattisgarh.

### b) State-wise affected districts :

The number of districts affected by left-wing extremism stands at **90 only, across 11 states in the year 2019** as compared to 105 in the year 2017 and 106 in the year 2016. While the total number of districts affected were **194 across 18 states in the year 2006**.

The details of presently **affected districts** are given below:

**Jharkhand:** Out of 24 districts, 19 are affected and they are **Bokaro, Chatra, Dhanbad, Dumka, East Singhbhum, Garhwa, Giridih, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Khunti, Koderma, Latehar, Lohardaga, Palamu, Ramgarh, Ranchi, Simdega, Saraikela Kharsawan, West Singhbhum.**

**Bihar:** Out of 38 districts, 16 are affected and they are **Arwal, Aurangabad, Banka, East Champaran, Gaya, Jamui, Jehanabad, Kaimur, Lakhisarai, Munger, Muzaffarpur, Nalanda, Nawada, Rohtas, Vaishali, West Champaran.**

**Chhattisgarh:** Out of 28 districts 14 are affected and they are **Balod, Balrampur, Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Dhamtari, Gariyaband, Kanker, Kondagaon, Mahasamund, Narayanpur, Rajnandgaon, Sukma, Kabirdham.**

**Odisha:** Out of 30 districts 15 are affected and they are **Angul, Bargarh, Bolangir, Boudh, Deogarh, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabrangpur, Nayagarh, Nuapada, Rayagada, Sambalpur, Sundargarh.**

**Kerala:** Out of 14 districts 03 are affected and they are **Malappuram, Palakkad, Wayanad.**

**Andhra Pradesh:** Out of 13 districts 06 are affected and they are **Guntur, Visakhapatnam, East Godavari, Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, West Godavari.**

**Telangana:** Out of 33 districts 08 are affected and they are **Adilabad, Bhadrachalam, Kothagudem, Jayashankar-Bhupalpally, Khammam, Komaram - Bheem, Mancherial, Peddapalle, Warangal Rural.**

**Maharashtra:** Out of 36 districts 03 are affected and they are **Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Gondia.**

**Uttar Pradesh:** Out of 75 districts 03 are affected and they are **Sonbhadra, Mirzapur, Chandauli.**

**West Bengal:** Out of 23 districts 01 is affected and the same is Jhargram.

**Madhya Pradesh:** Out of 55 districts 02 are affected and they are **Balaghat, Mandla**

### c) URBAN Naxalism:

The term Urban Naxalism or Urban Naxals is not clearly defined. The origin of the word can be traced to the book and a few essays written by film-maker and social media opinion-maker Vivek Agnihotri's book, Urban Naxals: The Making of Buddha in a Traffic Jam. The phrase of Urban Naxals is loosely attributed to the people with the Naxalite bent of mind residing in urban areas and working as activists, supporters and protectors of the ideology while the active Naxals battle it out in the jungles and vast swathes of Maoist-dominated areas.

Maoists have an old strategy for looking into urban centres for leadership, organise masses, build a united front and engage in military tasks such as providing personnel, material and infrastructure. This was highlighted even in their 2004 Communist Party of India (Maoist) document titled “Urban Perspective” which elaborates on this strategy with one of the most important focus areas being on gaining leadership from urban areas.

In areas under Maoist domination, the absence of governance becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy since the delivery systems are extinguished through killings and intimidation. This is the first step in the strategy of the Maoists to seek to control the countryside. In the meanwhile, many Frontal Organisations are created to facilitate mass-mobilisation in semi-urban and urban areas through ostensibly democratic means. Most of the Frontal Organisations are led by well-educated intellectuals with a firm belief in the Maoist insurgency doctrine. These ideologues function as masks to cover the violent nature of the CPI (Maoist) ideology. They also form the propaganda/disinformation machinery of the party.

They generally take up issues like ‘displacement of tribals’, ‘corporate exploitation’, ‘human rights violations’ by security forces etc. and often make fantastic claims in this regard which get reported even by the mainstream media. The Frontal organisations also skilfully use state structures and legal processes to further the Maoist agenda and weaken the enforcement regime. The important functions of these organisations include recruitment of ‘professional revolutionaries, raising funds for insurgency, creating urban shelters for underground cadres, providing legal assistance for arrested cadres and mass-mobilisation by agitating over issues of relevance/ convenience. The Frontal organisations aim to provide short-term

democratic subterfuge to cover up the totalitarian and oppressive nature of the Maoist ideology. The CPI (Maoist) also have a strategic game-plan to create a ‘United Front’ with all like-minded insurgent/terrorist outfits in India. It needs to be remembered that many of these outfits supported by external forces are inimical to India and the CPI (Maoist) considers such alliances as strategic assets.

### 3. Challenges to tackle LWE

#### a) Socio-Economic:

The LWE affected districts are among the poorest in the country. Affected areas of States like Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and telangana are either impoverished or have significant **economic inequality** or both. A key characteristic of this region is non-diversified economies that are solely primary sector-based. Agriculture, sometimes supplemented with mining or forestry, is the mainstay of the economy, which is often unable to support rapid increases in population. The region has significant natural resources, including mineral, forestry and potential hydroelectric generation capacity. Odisha, for example, “has 60 percent of India’s bauxite reserves, 25 percent of coal, 28 percent of iron ore, 92 percent of nickel and 28 percent of manganese reserves.”

The area encompassed by these districts has stratified societies, with **caste and feudal divisions**. Much of the area has high indigenous tribal populations (or Adivasis), including Santhal and Gond. Bihar and Jharkhand have both caste and tribal divisions and violence associated with friction between these social groups. Andhra Pradesh’s Telangana region similarly has the deep caste divide with a strict social hierarchical arrangement. Both Chhattisgarh and Odisha also have significant impoverished tribal populations.

Maoist ideology feeds off the actual and perceived **socio-economic deprivation** of tribal and landless classes. The movement derives its strength from popular support of the deprived masses. Development and economic progress will mitigate this, but whether peace will bring development or vice versa is an endless debate. To the military planner, this popular support poses a major challenge in ineffective intelligence and counter-intelligence for the launch of effective Counter-Insurgency(CI) Operations. There are areas where only the writ of the Naxals run and the state machinery is absent.

**b) Lack of Basic Education, Health & Infrastructure:**

Tribal communities are most likely to participate in Naxalism to push back against structural violence by the state, including land theft for purposes of mineral extraction. Impoverished areas with no school, no electricity, running water, roads, communication or healthcare provided by the state may accept social services from Naxalite groups, and give their support to the Naxal cause in return. Some argue that the state's absence allowed for Naxalites to become the legitimate authority in these areas by performing state-like functions, including enacting policies of redistribution and building infrastructure for irrigation. Healthcare initiatives such as malaria vaccination drives and medical units in areas without doctors or hospitals have also been documented. Although Naxalite groups engage in coercion to grow membership, the Adivasi experience of them poverty, when contrasted with the state's economic growth, can create an appeal for Naxal ideology and incentivize tribal communities to join Naxal movements out of "moral solidarity".

**c) Recruitment of Cadres:**

Some sections of society, especially the younger generation, have romantic illusions about the

Maoists, arising out of an incomplete understanding of their ideology. The central theme of Maoist ideology is violence. The Maoist insurgency doctrine glorifies violence as the primary means to overwhelm the existing socio-economic and political structures. The Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), the armed wing of CPI (Maoist), has been created with this purpose in mind. In the first stage of insurgency, the PLGA resorts to guerrilla warfare, this primarily aims at creating a vacuum at the grassroots level of the existing governance structures. This is achieved by killing lower-level government officials, police-personnel of the local police stations, the workers of mainstream political parties and the people's representatives of the Panchayati Raj system. After creating a political and governance vacuum, they coerce the local population into joining the movement. Silent propaganda is also carried out against the purported and real inadequacies of the existing state structure.

**d) Operational challenges:**

A major challenge in combating Maoist insurgency is a one-size-fits-all doctrine. State responses have consisted of pumping into forces for conventional, ground-holding operations in the hope of displacing guerrilla forces; maintaining high force levels over sustained periods and using them to push forward with development and political initiatives to deprive insurgents of their political legitimacy.

The basic objective in such a war-like situation is to conduct operations that lead to the destruction of the enemy's centre of gravity. The strategy of pumping coy-sized security units into the Maoist heartland and attempting to dominate the territory around them is one manifestation of this thinking. The problem is that successful insurgents have no fixed centre of gravity, no bases that conventional forces may overwhelm.

Therefore, forces try to dominate the area by deploying in linear or circular grids. The problem

with such a Counter Insurgency grid is that of operating logistics bases, road opening over long stretches of un-metalled roads and other administrative requirements, which eat heavily into force levels available for offensive Counter-Insurgent operations. Increased force levels in this treacherous terrain have resulted in increased vulnerabilities. Increased force levels rather than having the Maoists on the run have resulted in more convoys to target with IEDs, more patrols to ambush and more bases to raid.

Lack of coordination and synergy of operations and intelligence sharing between the various security agencies is a major impediment to the success of the anti-Naxal operations. Joint Operations Committees at the district level have been set up to achieve better synergy between the state and central police and intelligence agencies, however, the degree of coordination leaves much to be desired.

The CRPF and state police have found it hard to adapt to the changed operational requirements. The Maoist insurgents, on the other hand, have morphed from the country-made weapon-wielding force in their nascent years to a highly trained force with modern weapons and IED operating capability. However, specially trained police forces like the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh have met with remarkable successes. Though the Training of police and CAPFs at Army's Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) and establishment of Special Training Centres like the one at Kanker, Chattisgarh are welcome measures, it must be appreciated that the training capacities are limited vis-à-vis the requirement.

#### e) Denying Finance:

The financial base of the Naxalites is diverse because the organization finances itself from a series of sources. The mining industry is known

to be a profitable financial source for the Naxalites, as they tend to extort about 3% of the profits from each mining company that operates in the areas under Naxal control. In order to continue mining operations, these firms also pay the Naxalites for "protection" services which allow miners to work without having to worry about Naxalite attacks. The organization also funds itself through the drug trade, where it cultivates drugs in areas of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, and Bihar. Drugs such as marijuana and opium are distributed throughout the country by middlemen who work on behalf of the Naxalites. The drug trade is extremely profitable for the movement, as about 40% of Naxal funding comes through the cultivation and distribution of opium. Besides, they also collect a levy from government officers, businessmen, industrialists, contractors etc.

#### 4. Operational Strategy of Police & security Forces

Over the decades, the LWE movement is assessed to have impacted 40 percent of India's territory and 35 percent of its population. In 2019, according to reliable sources, 90 districts in 11 states of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala and West Bengal, were affected by the LWE movement. Based on the intensity of insurgency, 34 of the 90 districts, have been classified as most affected LWE districts. The States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Bihar are considered severely affected. The States of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are considered partially affected. Currently, the lethality of the LWE movement has increased multi-fold, establishing a complex web across all these states. It is estimated that these extremist outfits now have around 9,000-10,000 armed fighters with access to about 6,500 firearms.

Over the years, a paradigm shift has been observed in the tactical capabilities of LWE groups from traditional bow and arrows and country-made firearms of the 1960s, to the Light Machine Guns (LMG), Self-Loading and AK series Rifles, mortars, and rocket launchers in 2019. The extensive use of Landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) against security convoys, police stations, and railways highlight the Maoists' hi-tech weapon capabilities which make LWE a major challenge to the internal security of India. Over the last couple of decades, LWE violence has figured prominently in insurgency and terrorism-related violence. These incidents include intimidation, killings of innocent civilians, abduction, extortion, IED blasts and ambush attacks on the security forces personnel etc. At certain remote locations, it is acknowledged by several government officials that Maoists collect taxes and dispense brutal and instant justice through kangaroo courts called *Jan Adalats*.

One of the principal reasons for the rapid growth of LWE across the country is clever exploitation of the real or perceived socio-economic grievances of the poor and the oppressed, mostly belonging to the tribal population. It must, however, be noted that none of the LWE organisations has done anything to ameliorate the condition of the tribals whose plight it pretends to be fighting against. Rather, the movement has been more of a hindrance to the development initiatives of the state which were designed to address those very issues.

The history of Counter-insurgency operations in India strongly suggests that the state policed responses have always been more effective and successful. Punjab is a classic example in this regard. The reason is that the state police have greater familiarity with the local terrain, the causes, leaders and individuals involved, and have a continuous interface with the population. This helps them to gather credible intelligence

which is critical for targeted operations in the difficult terrains like LWE affected states. It also results in minimal collateral damage and maximum damage to the insurgents. It is therefore of paramount importance for the LWE affected states to shoulder greater responsibility, emerge as the principal counter-insurgency force in the state, and introduce necessary transformation in terms of leadership, well-defined mandate and strengthened capacity to produce enduring results.

The role of CAPFs has always been very supportive and decisive. They have better training, weaponry, tactics, endurance and manpower to extend to state forces. The CAPF personnel have been using satellite phones, monoculars, binoculars, trackers, mapping devices, interceptors etc besides using helicopters, UAVs in anti-Maoist operations for quite some time in Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. A total of 118 Battalions of CAPFs have been deployed in the States. Besides, they have also been given sanction for IRBs and Special IRBs to strengthen the security apparatus. In addition to this, 10 CoBRA battalions have been deployed to handle LWE issues. In the last few years, the Central Govt has assisted the States through various schemes for capacity building. Under the SRE Scheme, reimbursement of security-related expenses, such as ex-gratia payments, transportation, training, honorarium for Special Police Officers (SPO) etc., were borne by the Central Government.

The success of Andhra Pradesh against LWE provides an example for other LWE affected State Governments. A comprehensive approach adopted by this State, commonly described as the "Andhra Model", achieved commendable success in pacifying the affected areas. It transformed Andhra Pradesh from the worst LWE affected State to the least affected one. The basic course of action was guided by vision,

mission orientation, passion, and self-belief, duly backed up with quality training, and capacity and capabilities development, to transform the State's counter-terrorism force, the 'Greyhounds', into a model for others to emulate. However, it is widely agreed that the LWE phenomenon in the currently affected states is well past the stage in which the 'Andhra Model' had worked; it would not work now. It is here that the newly envisaged approach, articulated under *SAMADHAN*, comes in as a positive initiative to deal with the challenge of LWE. The Government would be looking at this new approach to the achievement of good results, as it With its thrust on 'Key Performance Indicators' (KPIs) and 'Key Result Areas' (KRAs), *SAMADHAN* would enable smarter leadership and facilitate the application of 'A' or the *Aggressive Strategy*.

After the incident of Burkapal in Sukma, Chhattisgarh in 2017, in which 25 CRPF personnel got martyred in a gruesome ambush of Naxals, a high-level review was held at Govt level and following 12 points were identified to be worked on. Presently, the police and CAPFs are working as per these guidelines. They are :

- a. Operation '*SAMADHAN*' is the answer to the Naxal problem. The acronym *SAMADHAN* stands for Smart leadership, Aggressive strategy, Motivation and training, Actionable Intelligence, Dashboard Based KPIs (key performance indicators) and KRAs (key result areas), Harnessing technology, the Action plan for each theatre, and No access to financing.
- b. There has to be the use of trackers for weapons and bio-metrics in smart guns.
- c. Unique Identification number (UID) for Gelatin sticks and explosives.
- d. At least one UAV or Mini UAV for each of the Central Armed Police

Forces (CAPF) battalions be deployed in the Maoist hotbed.

- e. More helicopter support for operations. Helicopters to be used to rush in supplies and reinforcement. Increase number of flying hours.
- f. Joint Task Forces for operations along inter-state boundaries to be set up. Better inter-state coordination and intelligence sharing.
- g. 400 fortified police stations to be set up in Naxal belt.
- h. Resumption of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) - specific schemes such as SRE, SIS, IAP/ACA, CIAT schools.
- i. Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) to be reviewed to ensure effective choking of fund flow to LWE groups.
- j. Fast-tracking building infrastructure, with a focus on solar lights, mobile towers with 3G connectivity, and road-rail connectivity.
- k. Indian Army or specialized forces - such as Greyhounds - to train forces to take on Naxals.
- l. Forces should be more proactive and aggressive in own operations, rather than being reactive.

##### 5. Suggested Holistic Approach to containing LWE

The Government of India has adopted a holistic approach to addressing the LWE insurgency. This approach is built around simultaneous implementation of a security agenda, developmental activities and promotion of good governance. The National Policy and Action Plan to address LWE problem, formulated by the MHA in 2014, essentially incorporates four elements - an integrated multi-pronged strategy comprising security-related measures; development-related initiatives, ensuring rights

and entitlement related measures, and management of public perception. Under the plan, the Central Government has been implementing various flagship developmental schemes in coordination with the affected state governments.

The Government of India has also accepted the suggestions of the 14th Finance Commission and enhanced the net proceeds of Union Taxes to the states from 32 percent to 42 percent. Consequently, some schemes which run in LWE affected states have been de-linked from central assistance and transferred to the respective states. It will give the states sufficient flexibility to conceive as well as implement schemes suited to local needs and aspirations. It will strengthen the roots of governance and subsequently bridge the developmental deficit in the remote regions within LWE affected states. This developmental outreach by the Government of India has seen an increasingly large number of LWE cadres shunning the path of violence and returning to the mainstream.

‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’ being state subjects, maintenance of law and order lies primarily in the domain of the state governments. The Central Government closely monitors the situation and supplements and coordinates their efforts in several ways. These initiatives include providing Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA); sanctioning of India Reserve Battalions (IRB); setting up of Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) Schools; modernising and upgrading state police and their intelligence apparatus under the ‘Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces’ (MPF scheme); reimbursing security expenditure under the ‘Security Related Expenditure’ (SRE) Scheme; filling up critical infrastructure gaps under the ‘Scheme for Special Infrastructure’ in LWE affected states; providing helicopters for anti-Naxal operations, providing assistance

in the training of state police through the Ministry of Defence, the Central Police organisations and the Bureau of Police Research and Development; sharing of Intelligence; facilitating inter-state coordination; extending assistance in community policing and civic action programmes etc. The underlying philosophy is to enhance the capacity of the state governments to tackle the Maoist menace in a concerted manner. The concerned division in MHA also monitors the implementation of the Integrated Action Plan for LWE affected districts and various other development and infrastructure initiatives of the Government of India.

**Some of the prominent initiatives are:**

- a. **Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:** Funds are provided for meeting the recurring expenditure relating to insurance, training and operational needs of the security forces, rehabilitation of Left Wing Extremist cadres who surrender under the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the State Government concerned, community policing, security-related infrastructure for village defence committees and publicity material.
- b. **Scheme of Special Infrastructure:** To cater to critical infrastructure gaps, this cannot be covered under the existing schemes. These relate to requirements of mobility for the police/security forces by upgrading existing roads/tracks in inaccessible areas, providing secure camping grounds and helipads at strategic locations in remote and interior areas, measures to enhance security in respect of police stations/outposts located in vulnerable areas etc.
- c. **Fortified Police Stations:** The Central Government has approved a

new scheme to assist the State Governments for construction/strengthening of **400 fortified police stations** @ Rs. 2 crores each in Left Wing Extremism affected districts on 80:20 basis.

- d. **Integrated Action Plan:** The Niti Aayog is implementing the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) for 78 Selected Tribal and Backward Districts for accelerated development. The aim of this initiative is to provide public infrastructure and services in 78 affected / contiguous districts. The nature of major works/projects taken up by the districts under the IAP include the construction of school buildings / school furniture, Anganwadi centres, drinking water facilities, rural roads, panchayats bhawan / community halls, godowns / PDS shops, livelihood activities, skill development/training, minor irrigation works, electric lighting, health centres/facilities, ashram schools, construction of toilets, construction of multi-purpose chabutra, construction of passenger waiting hall, special coaching classes for students, construction of ANM Centres, development of play grounds etc.
- e. **Road Requirement Plan for LWE areas:** The Road Requirement Plan (RRP) Phase-I was approved in February 2009 for improvement of road connectivity in 34 most LWE affected districts in 8 States viz. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. The RRP-I envisages development of 1126 km of National Highways and 4351 km of state roads (total 5477 km), at a cost of rupees 7300 crore.
- f. **LWE Mobile Tower Project:** To improve mobile connectivity in the LWE areas, the government on 20.08.2014 approved installation of mobile towers in LWE affected states and 2335 mobile towers have been installed in Phase-I. Phase-II of the project has been approved by the Government of India, under which 4072 mobile towers, involving an expenditure of rupees 7330 crore, will be installed in LWE affected states.
- g. **Unified Command in the states of Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Jharkhand and Odisha:** Unified command of officers from all stakeholders including security establishment & civil administration has been created and it is carrying out carefully planned anti-LWE measures in respective states.
- h. **The command & control setup in the states of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha** have been re-structured and an IG from CRPF posted in each of these states to work in close coordination with IG (anti-Naxal operations) of the State.
- i. **An Empowered Group of Officers** has been set up at the level of the Central Government to override or modify existing instructions on implementation of various



- development programmes and flagship schemes, having regard to the local needs and conditions in Left Wing Extremism affected areas for accelerated development.
- j. The Left Wing Extremism affected states have been asked to effectively implement the provisions of the **Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996** (PESA) on priority, which categorically assigns rights over minor forest produce to the gram sabhas.
  - k. **Central Scheme for assistance to civilian victims/family of victims of terrorist, communal and naxal violence:** The broad aim of the scheme is to assist families of victims of terrorist, communal and naxal violence.
  - l. **Aspirational District:** The Ministry of Home Affairs has been tasked with the monitoring of aspirational districts programmes in 34 LWE affected districts.
  - m. **Civic Action Programme:** Under this scheme, financial grants are sanctioned to CAPFs to undertake civic action in the affected states. This is a successful scheme which aims to build bridges between the local population and the security forces by extending small help in the areas of education, sports, medicine, vocational training, preparing the youth of the area for government jobs etc.
  - n. **Media Plan:** This Scheme has been approved by the government on 27.09.2017 as a sub-scheme of the Umbrella Scheme Modernization of Police Forces for 03 years i.e. from 2017-18 to 2019-20. The Maoists have been misguiding and luring the innocent tribals/ local population in LWE affected areas by their So-called poor-friendly revolution through petty incentives or by following their coercive strategy. Under the scheme activities like Tribal Youth Exchange programmes organised by NYKS, radio jingles, documentaries, pamphlets etc. are being conducted. 7.41 crore have been released in the current financial year as on 31.12.2019.

## 6. Conclusion

With a holistic approach to focusing on development and security related interventions, the LWE problem can be tackled if implemented in earnest. However, Maoists' belief to keep the population in their areas of influence marginalized to perpetuate their outdated ideology seems more affecting to tackle the process. Consequently, the process of development has been held back by decades in many parts of the country under LWE influence. This needs to be recognised by the civil society and the media to build pressure on the Maoists to eschew violence, join the mainstream and recognise the fact that the socio-economic and political dynamics and aspirations of 21st Century India are far removed from the Maoist world-view.

# External Threats and Internal Dimensions of Indian Security

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With many dramatic changes taking place at the global level, a process of reorientation of the power equation in international politics has started. The two-century-old global dominance of the West is nearing an end. The rise of Asia is imminent. In the post-COVID-19 era, many believe that globalisation will no longer be driven and dominated by Western Powers. This paradigm change may well bring about a more confrontational mode among key actors in many parts of the world.

India being a part of this evolutionary and revolutionary process will be facing many challenges as well as threats. From the security point of view, several internal threats along with two major external threats are currently observable in India. Terrorism in Kashmir, the Maoist violence, discontent in certain parts of Northeast, radicalisation in some segments of Muslim community, right-wing Hindu extremism, the possibility of revival of Khalistan in Punjab are some of the major internal threats. The external threats stem from Pakistan and the Peoples Republic of China.

## Internal Threats

### 1. Terrorism

Security forces have been successful in decapitating the terror leader in the valley in the recent past. Several topmost wanted

commanders of different terror outfits operating in the valley have been eliminated including the self-styled Hizbul Mujahideen commander Riyaz Naikoo. In 2020, 71 terrorists were killed in different gun battles with security forces and as many as 109 OGWs and other associates of terrorists got arrested. This is considered as a huge success given the fact that, in present circumstances, security establishments apart from carrying counter-insurgency operations, are also at the forefront of fight against COVID-19 pandemic.

### The Resistance Front – well trained and better equipped

Despite these successes, new challenges and threats on terror front have also risen. The emergence of a new terror outfit - The Resistance Front (TRF) in Kashmir and subsequent actions carried out by it, causing huge casualties on security forces, has posed a new challenge to security grid. The Keran-sector encounter (06 April, - five Army Special Forces Commandoes martyred), Sopore attack on CRPF (19 April, - three jawans martyred), Handwara encounter (03 May, - 4 soldiers including a Colonel and one police officer martyred), ambush on CRPF party in Handwara (05 May, - 3 CRPF men martyred), attack on a checkpoint in Ganderbal (20 May, - 2 BSF men martyred) attack on police party at Pulwama (21 May) -

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Author's Intro:

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one police personnel martyred, and several other attacks on J&K police and para-military forces across the valley leading to the martyrdom of many personnel besides injuries to others, has rung alarm bells in the security establishments.

### **Aggressive Approach**

The latest modus operandi of a terror outfit like TRF suggests a shift in trend and strategies towards a more aggressive approach against security establishments. The reason for inflicting heavy casualties on security forces can also be attributed to the fact that the terrorists around currently seem to be more trained and motivated. Reports suggest that at least two of the five terrorists killed in Keran encounter were Kashmiri, who had gone to Pakistan on valid travel documents and were on way back to join terror ranks in the valley, after going through the rigorous training programme in Pakistan. Similarly, two local terrorists killed in Ganderbal forests in October 2019, had also gone to Pakistan through legal means and undergone terror training there.

### **Presence of Foreign Mercenaries and recovery of rare weaponry**

Although there has been a decline in local recruitment in terror ranks, however, inputs suggest that in later part of 2019 a large number of foreign terrorists managed to sneak into the valley. Similar reports were received this year also. A total of 154 successful infiltrations took place in 2019 and 2020. These foreign mercenaries are well equipped as well as well trained. The rare weapon recoveries like that of a US-made M-24 sniper rifle in August 2019 in Kupwara and a Pika Machine Gun in April 2020 at Kulgam, has caused a flutter in the security establishment. Further, there has been the use of steel bullets by terrorists as well, capable of piercing bulletproof protection.

### **Investment in Training**

In recent years, several hundred terrorists have been killed in different encounters with security forces. Majority of these terrorists got killed without giving a fight and were unsuccessful in inflicting any serious casualty on security forces. This may be due to the fact that these terrorists were home trained, having the least knowledge of guerrilla war tactics.

However, the recent trends suggest that terror sponsors across the border have started investing in the training of the terrorists and equipping them with the latest weaponry. With continuous cease-fire violation on LoC and approaching summer, it has been reported that several terrorists are being readied for infiltration at different launch pads across the border. This signifies that security forces must brace themselves for a hard time ahead to fight a well-trained, well-equipped and well-motivated terrorist.

## **2. Khalistan And Kashmir**

With the opening of Kartarpur Corridor in November 2019, fears have been raised in different security quarters about the possibility of misuse of the open-access corridor by Pakistan in order to revive Khalistan terrorism in Punjab. The radical Sikh organisations like Sikhs for Justice (SFJ), sponsored by Pakistan Intelligence Agency ISI, are reported to have sped up their activities in recent times. The launch of 'Referendum 2020' by SFJ is a clear indicator in the direction. The organisation has found a sound support base in countries like Canada, Britain and the USA.

The arrest of three Kashmiri terrorists in September 2019, at Kathua, while on the way back from Punjab, with four AK-56 rifles, two AK-47 rifles and a huge cache of ammunition reflected the existence of a terror nexus operation between Punjab and Kashmir. On 26<sup>th</sup>

April 2020, a Kashmiri HM terror operative was nabbed by Punjab Police along with INR 29 Lakh cash, meant for HM commander Riyaz Naikoo. The cash was handed over to him by an unknown person at Amritsar.

There has been a hawala link between Punjab and Kashmir through cross border trade at Wagah and on several occasions, such links were unearthed by security agencies. However, with revived activities of Khalistan forces and signs of nexus between Kashmir and Punjab terror modules, a new challenge for intelligence and security grid, in future lies in reducing the influence of any such networks.

### 3. Indian Muslims Radicalisation

In April 2018, Mohammad Taufeeq, a resident of Telangana was killed in an encounter in South Kashmir's Anantnag district along with two more Islamic State of Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) terrorists. Taufeeq had joined ISJK some months back and was part of a local group headed by Esa Fazili (killed in the same encounter).

Taufeeq was not the first from mainland India to join terror ranks in Kashmir. In 2017, the police arrested one Sandeep Kumar Sharma, for his involvement in ATM robberies and attacks on the Police and Security Forces in Kashmir. Sandeep, a resident of Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh, had been living in Kashmir since 2012. He was working for Lashker-i-Toiba (LeT). Earlier in 2008, two men namely Abdul Raheem and Mohammad Fayaz, both from Kerala, were killed in an encounter in Kupwara's Lolab area. The duo was also part of LeT. Mumbai Police in 1994 arrested a Mumbai based Shahid Azmi for attending terrorist training camps in Kashmir.

In the recent past, India's Muslim minority, although a very small segment of it, has started to heed the siren call of global Jihad. Number of Muslims joined ISIS between 2014 and 2018

in Syria and other parts of the world to fight for the establishment of Islamic Caliphate. The traces of Indian Mujahideen (IM) are still ruminant in some part of Indian State. IM was responsible for the number of terror acts across India between 2001 and 2010.

The recent row over the introduction of Citizens Amendment Act in country and subsequent protests and communal violence in some parts of the country has given rise to the fears of increased radicalisation of Muslim minority across the country. This narrative of marginalization was well exploited and carried further by neighbour country to make them feel discriminated on religious ground. Several cases of lynching across India were reported over beef-consumption in the last couple of years. Likewise, the use of violence against Muslims was also reported on the pretext of cow vigilantism.

There is a general feeling rising among certain segments of the Muslim community that they are being increasingly marginalised because of various forms of routine 'discrimination' that they have confronted in the arenas of employment, education, and housing. There is apprehension that sinister plans are being carried out to reduce Indian Muslim to a second-class citizen of India with hardly any political, religious or social right.

If these issues are left unaddressed, there is every possibility that more members from the community may respond to the call of radical Islam. Such members may be utilised as ready-to-use cannon fodder for terror plans by our neighbour. With revived aggressive terror approach in Kashmir, Pakistan has been of late frequently hinting at the emergence of terrorism in other parts of our country. In such a scenario, motivating Indian Muslims from other parts of the country to join terror ranks in Kashmir will not be too tough for terror outfits. Similarly,

organisations like TRF and HM may be found involved in terror acts outside J&K.

#### **4. Organised Crime**

There is an ongoing debate worldwide among security analysts about how criminal organisations are likely to profit from the ongoing situation when the world is struggling to fight COVID-19. Many believe that the current social unease created in society provides the organised criminal gangs with not only an economic opportunity but also the prospects of gaining social acceptance. According to a situational report by Europol, crimes like fraud, cyber-crime, counterfeit and substandard goods and property crime have been identified as the main areas in which criminal activity has seen an upsurge in times of COVID-19 spread.

On 13th May 2020, Delhi, Customs intercepted a huge amount of PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) kits, masks, raw material, and sanitizers which were being smuggled to China. Similarly, of late, there have been reports of criminal gangs trying to lure gullible people into various financial and cyber scams under the shade of COVID-19 information dissemination.

With American forces nearing an exit from Afghanistan after a peace deal with the Taliban, there is apprehension that the heroin smuggling will witness an upsurge. More than 80% of the heroin produced in Afghanistan comes from territory controlled by the Taliban. Jammu and Kashmir Police have been successful in intercepting and seizing many drug consignments in the recent past. There is no denying fact that the major portion of the proceeds from these drug trafficking goes into terror financing. With the economic slowdown, increased unemployment, social disorder and poverty, organised crime is believed to become the major challenge before security agencies. The increased nexus between organised crime and terrorism needs to be addressed at priority.

Criminal activities like human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, prostitution etc are also likely to see an upsurge.

The organised crime and terrorism, although being labelled as separate activities are complementary in nature. They have fused in terms of their characteristics to such an extent that despite possessing certain differences, it is hard to make a distinction between the two. There is every likelihood that different terror outfits operating in the country may resort to the actions that are the characteristics of organised criminal gangs.

#### **External Threats**

##### **1. China And Pakistan**

The threat that the Peoples Republic of China poses to India both along the Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean is the most compelling external security challenge that the Indian state confronts both presently and in the immediate future. Nonetheless, despite its significantly smaller size and limited conventional capabilities, Pakistan also poses ongoing security challenges to India. These challenges are twofold and inextricably intertwined. Owing to its conventional inferiority vis-à-vis India, the Pakistani military establishment has, for several decades, pursued an asymmetric war strategy against India that relies on terrorist proxies. It has also increasingly relied on its nuclear weapons as an instrument of blackmail because of its relative weakness.

There has been an increasing assertiveness by PRC along the Sino-Indian border. Recent events along the border by the People's Republican Army (PLA) have been done to test Indian readiness and resolve. However, the increased tension between the USA and PRC amid the former blaming China for the spread of COVID-19 has added a degree of sensitivity to such border skirmishes. The latest border controversy

between Nepal and India also needs to be settled at the earliest. The statement in Parliament by PM of Nepal on 20th May 2020 stating that “Indian virus is more lethal and dangerous for Nepal than that of China and Italy”, is beyond a mere political statement.

India is seen as the most trusted ally of the USA in the region. The rising tension between China and the USA will have a bearing on India as well. In case a serious confrontation arises between the two powers – the USA and China, there is the least possibility of a conventional war taking place, owing to the distance between two nations. However, a localised war in a sense cannot be ruled out with two navies getting engaged in waters. In such a situation, the relations between China and India could take an ugly turn. China may see India as an American proxy in the region.

Despite various efforts, India has yet to devise a sound, reliable, and effective conventional strategy to deal with Pakistan’s use of terrorist proxy forces. The statements from Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan continuously raising Kashmir issue at various International fora is a matter of concern. Imran Khan in a series of Tweets have been warning that India may carry a ‘false flag’ operation to defame Pakistan needs to be taken seriously and it indicates that some sinister designs are on in Pak terror factory. India needs to bolster the security of its ports, military installations, and critical infrastructure, and above all, secure its borders with Pakistan. Such a strategy, while hardly fool-proof, could significantly hobble Pakistan’s capacity to inflict costs on India through its reliance on terrorist proxies.

## **2. Pakistan-prc Strategic Nexus**

This alliance, of course, is long-standing. However, in recent years both sides have deemed it useful to strengthen the existing links. These are actually quite wide-ranging and extend

to increased economic and military assistance to Pakistan from the PRC. The logic of this relationship is quite straightforward: Pakistan wants a closer relationship with the PRC, especially in the military sphere, in order to balance Indian power. The PRC, in turn, quite apart from its extant border dispute with India, sees India as the only significant competitor for influence in Asia. Consequently, a close politico-security link with Pakistan helps provoke India’s security concerns.

## **3. Indian Ocean**

Beyond the border dispute, the Sino-Indian rivalry has spilt over into naval competition in the Indian Ocean. China has been expanding its reach into the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval presence in Sittwe in Myanmar and involvement in the construction of a port at Gwadar in Pakistan’s Balochistan province is a matter of concern. Minimising China’s influence in the Indian Ocean will be one of the biggest challenges before the Indian Navy.

## **4. A Fraught future in Afghanistan**

In the past almost two-decade, following the United States’ overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, India has sought to renew its ties with the country. With substantial economic assistance, India has played a vital role in rebuilding the war-torn nation. Under the Taliban, several Pakistan-based terrorist organizations had found a safe haven in Afghanistan. Further, the Taliban was complicit in allowing the hijackers of an Indian Airlines aircraft to flee after it had been taken to Kandahar in December 1999.

With American forces closing a peace deal with Taliban and leaving Afghanistan, there is most likely that Pakistan’s security establishment will give a free rein to its terrorist proxies in the country to attack Indian assets with impunity. Already, many attacks have been carried out by Pakistan based Haqqani network on Indian

workers and diplomatic personnel in Afghanistan.

The recent statement by Taliban reinforcing its intent to engage with India by nudging its readiness to accept Kashmir as India's internal affair is a welcome step. However, the statement needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. The statement released through tweet came from Taliban spokesman based in Doha. However, many analysts view the Doha wing of the Taliban as a political unit, having least control

over Taliban fighters on the ground. The group mostly comprises Taliban leaders handed over by Pakistan to USA post-2001 attack on Afghanistan. As such the Doha leadership is seen less leaning towards Pakistan. However, Pakistan Intelligence Agency ISI is believed to exercise significant influence among Taliban fighters on the ground. Engaging in serious and meaningful talks with the Taliban in order to safeguard its interests in the region will be one of the most challenging diplomatic tasks before India in coming times.

# Reforming Intelligence in 5GW

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“If the end could be achieved by non-military methods, even by methods of intrigue, duplicity, and fraud, I would not advocate an armed conflict.”

-Kautilya

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

-Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

## Abstract

Warfare is evolving, leveraging the advancements in technology. The evolution is characterised by changes in battlefield and tactics. Fifth generation warfare seeks to render the enemy's efforts irrelevant by unrestricted use of kinetic and non-kinetic forces. Battlefield transforms into cognitive and social fields, including the tangible physical domain, to be exploited by a combination of state and non-state actors. These defining transformations call for transformation in the counterintelligence paradigm. Defensive tactics of the cybersecurity model have lost relevance in the evolving warfare scenario. The counterintelligence strategy needs to be based on offensive tactics.

## Keywords

Fifth generation warfare, cyber counterintelligence, cyber threat intelligence.

The strategy of winning a war without kinetic engagement through cognitive manipulation has been advocated by strategists like Kautilya and Sun Tzu. Of Kautilya's four types of Wars, Gudayuddha (Clandestine War) is waged by covert means, including achieving the objective without fighting a battle. In this warfare, leaders (the king and his ministers of target country) and the people unwittingly act as if they were at peace with the hostile country. However, secret agents and spies keep creating divisions among rulers and the masses by spreading propaganda and disinformation.

Cognitive exploitation is the tactics of Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW). Change in the

battlefield from real space to the cognitive domain is made possible by technology backed generational shift in warfare. Each evolutionary change in warfare has resulted in combatants moving away from the battlefield and morphing tactics, with an enhanced lethal force of technology reinforced weaponry. Abbott describes the generations of warfare as follows:

*1GW: Marked by regimental structure and strict discipline. Noted historians Keegan and van Creveld have attributed this to the advent of firearms, which creates a need for more rigorous safety mechanisms. 2GW: In response to 1GW rank-and-file formations, fires (i.e., explosive and kinetic energy*

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delivered by a variety of means, such as artillery) are massed to shatter their cohesion. 3GW: Massed fires are countered by maneuverability. 4GW: Maneuver forces are proved inadequate in the face of an asymmetric adversary who exploits the full breadth of the maneuver space (not only military but also civil) by denying sanctuary to 3GW units. 5GW: Moral and cultural warfare is fought through manipulating perceptions and altering the context by which the world is perceived.<sup>1</sup>

To highlight the importance of perception management over traditional battle techniques, Abbott argues,

“The ability to shape the perception—and therefore the opinions—of a target audience is far more important than the ability to deliver kinetic energy, and will determine the ultimate victor in tomorrow’s wars.”<sup>2</sup>

The battlefield, which was a defined military space in the first three generations of warfare, moved to the backyards of the civil population in 4GW, and it threatens to enter the cognitive space of individuals, thereby entering the living room in the 5GW.

The evolution in warfare compels the re-imagination of Intelligence for preserving national security.

**ELEMENTS OF 5GW**




Fig: Typology of generations of warfare.<sup>3</sup>

Reed's typology of warfare denotes that the 5GW is fought in all domain physical, information, and cognitive with an unrestricted use of kinetic or non-kinetic force, to render the enemy's efforts irrelevant.

The networked supra combination of nation-states, non-state entities, and super-empowered individuals and groups render practitioners of fifth-generation warfare resilient against the defeat mechanisms of annihilation, manoeuvre, or attrition of resources or will.<sup>4</sup> Reed's assessment that by taking this supra combination as processes rather than entities, the strength of the network could be turned into vulnerability that opens the door for intelligence-led assault.

That, "fifth-generation warfare is the outcome of changes that are occurring in the Information Age,"<sup>5</sup> indicates processes in networked supra combination.

### Changes in Information Age

#### I) Expansion of Internet and Social Media

Almost 4.57 billion people were active internet users by April 2020, encompassing 59 percent of the global population.<sup>6</sup> The rate of penetration of the internet has been exceptional. It has grown almost fivefold in 15 years, with touching one billion marks in 2005.

Social networks enable users to connect with friends or people across geographical, political, or economic borders. Approximately 3.81 billion internet users are using social networks, growing at the rate of 9 percent per year, with social media users having membership on 8.6 platforms spending 2.5 hours on average.<sup>7</sup>

With over 2.6 billion monthly active users till the first quarter of 2020, Facebook is the biggest social network worldwide. YouTube is one of the most popular online platforms in the United States, with 27 percent of internet users

accessing it at least once a day. Social network usage by consumers is highly diverse: platforms such as Facebook or Google+ are highly focused on exchanges between friends and family. They are constantly pushing interaction through features like photo or status sharing and social games. Other social networks like Tumblr or Twitter are all about rapid communication and are aptly termed microblogs. Some social networks focus on community; others highlight and display user-generated content.<sup>8</sup>

Due to a constant presence in the lives of their users, social networks have a decidedly strong social impact. Social networks have blurred the line between offline and virtual life, as well as the concept of digital identity and online social interactions.<sup>9</sup> This unification of persona has become handy in perception modulation.

#### ii) Processing Power

Gordan Moore, the co-founder of Intel, had postulated that the number of transistors in an integrated circuit would double every two years. The prophecy had been given a tag of 'law'; it has acquired a sobriquet of "Moore's law" in technological circles. What Moore implied was that the computers would become smaller, and the processing of machines would improve exponentially. While part of Moore's prophecy in terms of doubling rate proved wrong with increasing time reduced to eighteen months from twenty-four, his prediction about processing power was spot-on. Apart from industries, the three billion smartphone users collectively carry enormous processing power.

Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Fakes have been possible with the enhancement of processing capacity. Now it is possible to create fake videos and audios with smartphones too.

"DeepFake is simply the combination of deep learning and a fake video. At the basic level, these "videos" are produced by taking in enough

imagery, be it other footage or only pictures of a target, and then using applied deep learning algorithms to stitch the images together into a believable piece of content. With enough available media, it is possible to create a near-Hollywood quality video of any person saying or doing anything. This ability tailors itself well to disinformation and fake news campaigns and, if paired with social media attack vectors, can exponentially increase the threat that is posed by this type of attack.”<sup>10</sup>

Advancements in information technology have given the capacity to proponents of 5GW to launch the cognitive war through the weaponization of social media.

### **Weaponization of Social Media for Info War**

Social Media has reduced the evolution time of social movements. The gap between the emergence of ferment (flash) and its eruption in mass movement (bang) has considerably shortened, and it has allowed injecting a perception moulding a narrative at an opportune time.”In the days before the election, messages circulated on social media that Hillary Clinton had died. And in some key battlegrounds, messages were targeted at Democrat voters claiming that the date of the election had changed.”<sup>11</sup>

Reach and acceptability of social media have given the advantage to peddle fakes with ease. Interconnectivity in social media and speed of transmission, which helps the explosion of fake news, also gives an impression that fake was a corroborated fact. This pernicious attribute creates a situation wherein recipients start forming opinions against the prevailing truth, which has been useful in moulding perceptions. Adversaries can also choose the appropriate time to spread falsehood as transmission on social media is instantaneous.”There are different motivations for the types of propaganda and ‘fake news’ we are seeing. Sometimes, it is a deliberate attempt to spread false information

or sow doubt in people’s minds as in Russian ‘disinformatsya tactics’.”<sup>12</sup>

Insertion of fake documents in dumps is yet another tactic of information warfare.”The US alt-right, along with bots, played a role in amplifying the #Macronleaks that took place just 48 hours before the second round of the French presidential elections. After Macron’s emails were hacked, fake documents were inserted into them, suggesting Macron had connections to offshore financial accounts. What is interesting to see here, is not only the coordination involved in both the leaking of fake and genuine documents and then the spreading of this information on Twitter but also the role of foreign actors, including the US alt-right in a French election.”<sup>13</sup> This also highlights the role of supercombinations. People espousing a particular world view could be roped in 5GW.

Bots are particularly useful in unleashing propaganda. “Another trending tool is the use of automated accounts or bots to shape the news agenda. These kinds of accounts play an important role in the amplification of false information and fake news. Coordinated activity by fake accounts can increase the likelihood of something trending on Twitter or can reduce the chance of legitimate news being found by internet users.”<sup>14</sup>

The networked supra combination has made it possible to launch clandestine warfare through sabotage, subversion, denial, and use of kinetic force after causing cognitive dissonance.

### **Sabotage: STUXNET Campaign**

STUXNET campaign was a seminal sabotage campaign with elements of 5GW that created cognitive despair at the tactical level besides a clear strategic message of remote disruption.

STUXNET computer worm was used presumably jointly by Israel and the USA to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program. The virulent

worm is reported to have infected nearly 20000 industrial computers in Iran, the majority of them in Natanzuranium enrichment facility.

The operation was so deceptive that it led “the Iranians to misattribute the causes of the centrifuge sabotage to accidents, engineering problems, and poor design, and to slow or shut down enrichment operations themselves as they investigated the centrifuge crashes.”<sup>15</sup>

The strategic goals of the campaign included “testing the ‘Obama Doctrine,’ which posits that adversaries can be effectively confronted through indirect methods. The operation also sought to impel Iran to slow or abandon its uranium enrichment operations by plaguing the operations with problems, and ultimately threatening Iran with repeated covert and overt attacks.”<sup>16</sup>

### **Crimean Campaign: Use of Kinetic and Non-kinetic Forces**

In November 2013, the decision of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych not to sign a trade agreement with the EU led to mass protests that were met with a violent government crackdown. Even before that, pro-Russian separatists began a concerted effort to discredit pro-European Ukrainians. Russian hacker groups were defacing and executing DDoS attacks on websites critical of the Yanukovich government’s relationship with Russia.

In 2014, unmarked soldiers seized a military airfield in and a civilian international airport. Concurrently, armed soldiers tampered with fiber optic cables, disabling the technical capacity to provide a connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine. Cell phones of Ukrainian parliamentarians were hacked, and the main Ukrainian government website was shut down for 72 hours after Russian troops entered Crimea. Several computers in the Ukrainian prime minister’s office were infected with

malicious software called Snake capable of extracting sensitive information.

As the date of the referendum approached, Russian hackers ramped up their campaign to discredit Ukrainian officials. This broader misinformation campaign sought to mobilize political support and discredit opponents. The day before the presidential election, Ukraine’s Security Service discovered a virus in the systems of the Central Election Commission designed to compromise data collected on the results of the vote.

Crimea was eventually incorporated in Russia as a federal subject.

The Crimean war is an example of unrestricted war under 5GW doctrine with the use of Kinetic and non-kinetic (digital) forces.

### **2016 Us Election: Perception Manipulation**

“In 2016, Russian operatives associated with the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) used social media to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread disinformation and societal division in the United States. Masquerading as Americans, these operatives used targeted advertisements, intentionally falsified news articles, self-generated content, and social media platform tools to interact with and attempt to deceive tens of millions of social media users in the United States. This campaign sought to polarize Americans based on societal, ideological, and racial differences, provoked real-world events, and was part of a foreign government’s covert support of Russia’s favoured candidate in the U.S. presidential election. The (Senet) Committee (on Intelligence) found that Russia’s targeting of the 2016 U.S. presidential election was part of a broader, sophisticated, and ongoing information warfare campaign designed to sow discord in American politics and society. Moreover, the IRA conducted a vastly more

complex and strategic assault on the United States than was initially understood.”<sup>17</sup>

The campaign was so extensive that even primaries for the presidential elections were manipulated. “The Committee found that the IRA targeted not only Hillary Clinton but also Republican candidates during the presidential primaries.”<sup>18</sup>

Russian action is an example of a shifting domain of 5GW to include the cognitive and social domains.

### **Terrorist Interest in 5gw**

“This war is evolving into 5GW. Make sure you are prepared”<sup>19</sup> is the exhortation of Md Khalil -al-Hakima.k.an Abu Jihad – al misri, head of Al Qaeda media, killed in Pakistan in 2008.

Terrorist organizations who want more people watching suffer than dead so that fear dominates the psyche of society would like to leverage tenets of 5GW to their advantage.

### **Cyber Intelligence and Cyber Counter Intelligence**

The complexity of 5GW has made cybersecurity paradigm, which is primarily a reactive compliance regime, ineffective. The utilization of cyberspace and weaponization of cyber tools demands a proactive intelligence to forewarn of threats at the strategic level and empower to mitigate the threat and threat vector at the tactical level.

### **Cyber threat Intelligence**

“Cyber threat intelligence is knowledge about adversaries and their motivations, intentions, and methods that are collected, analysed, and disseminated in ways that help security and business staff at all levels protect the critical assets of the enterprise.”<sup>20</sup>

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) follows the same process of collection, analysis,

dissemination. In the 5GW scenario, the mission of CTI gets modified to provide national security by protecting critical assets and securing information space from deliberate contamination. At the strategic level, CTI caters to the identification of specific adversaries.

The dark web is the field of play for Hacktivists, Cybercriminals, and Cyber Espionage activists, which form the supra combination in 5GW.

These underground entities,

- “i) exchange ideas about targets, tactics, tools, and other facets of cybercrime, cyber espionage, and hacktivism;
- ii) Share expertise on creating and using malware, exploits, spear-phishing campaigns, DDoS attacks, and other malicious tools and techniques;
- iii) Plan and coordinate ideologically and politically inspired attacks and campaigns;
- iv) Buy and sell exploit kits, weaponized exploits, obfuscation and evasion tools, and other cyber attack tools;
- v) Provide services to other threat actors, ranging from specialized tasks (fake website design, password cracking) to the outsourcing of infrastructure and complex activities (hackers for hire, rent-a-botnet, DDoS-as-a-service);
- vi) Buy and sell digital assets, including credit card and Social Security numbers, personal information, and login credentials. The media for these exchanges include online forums, email, instant messaging platforms, social media, and even full-featured online stores. While most of these venues are open to the public, some of the most important operate on an

invitation-only basis and are very hard to crack for outsiders.”<sup>21</sup>

While information regarding cyber events, malware signatures, file hashes, and other technical details could be obtained from open source, the activity of the underground requires a covert method of collection.

“Monitoring underground forums can also produce information on threat actors’ immediate plans. Some hackers announce their upcoming actions online, either to promote their ideology or to coordinate the activities of like-minded individuals and groups. Although cybercriminals and cyber espionage agents are more secretive than hackers, sometimes, it is possible to anticipate their actions by looking at the information they share. Also, analysing the malware and services they trade in underground marketplaces can disclose their intentions, targets, and techniques.”<sup>22</sup>

CTI analysis, too, like typical intelligence analysis, is aimed at deriving the meaning of the data after establishing its credibility.

### **Cyber Counter Intelligence (CCI)**

Counter Intelligence (CI), the necessity of the Cold war era, could be defined as neutralization of intelligence efforts of nation-states. In the context of 5GW, which thrives on supra combinations, the definition of Cyber Counter Intelligence (CCI) would require modification by replacement of phrase ‘efforts of nation-states’ with ‘efforts of organized entities.’ These organized entities would include cybercriminals, hackers, dark web operators, terrorist groups, acting with or without the support of nation-states. Both forms of counter intelligence have to protect from subversion, sabotage, and kinetic warfare.

The essential difference between CI and CCI is in defensive operation. CI tactics include the hardening of targets as a defensive measure for

an onslaught by hostile countries. Defensive operations have been proved to futile in the cyber domain, given a large number of exploitable vulnerabilities in cyber applications.

The requirement of the tactical shift from defensive to offensive operations distinguishes CCI from Cyber Security, which is based on the compliance model of restricting access to protected systems.

CCI would, therefore, have to transform itself to offensive or proactive cyber operation. Of the ten commandments of CI<sup>23</sup>, i) be offensive, ii) know your history, iii) own the street, iv) do not ignore analysis, and v) do not be parochial, are relevant to CCI.

#### ***i) Be offensive***

The passive defence model has failed in securing cyber entity because of intertwined platforms of transactions.”The perimeter-based security model is outdated and has unequivocally failed to secure businesses and enterprises across the planet. However, it is not because the basic concept of a secure edge is a failure. It is instead the proliferation of technology combined with the inter-connected nature of current infrastructures that make this approach to security so ineffective. The very connectivity that is a boon to mankind, enabling business and everyday life, is its own worst enemy. A failure within one perimeter eventually will lead to a failure in many, and on and on it goes. While the perimeter-based model of security has proven itself inefficient and a purveyor of failure, there are now issues far beyond those high walls that will afflict cyberspace for the coming decade.”<sup>24</sup> In such a scenario, the offence is the only defence.

#### ***ii) Know your history***

This commandment translates to knowing the incidents of cyber attacks and attackers, their modus Operandi, and mitigation measures.

Detailed background knowledge is essential for identifying the threat.

**iii) *Own the street***

Effective counterintelligence is dependent on the control of playfield. An unrestricted movement of adversaries would give an undue advantage to aggressors. In CI, surveillance is used to restrict access to the playfield. CCI operatives similarly would have to have their presence in all protocols in the cyber domain, including social media.

**iv) *Do not ignore analysis***

The analysis is vital for Intelligence for its extracts meaning for data or a combination of varied data. A proper analysis is a sine qua non of good Intelligence. Care must be taken to separate collectors from analyst, because combining the two may lead to a bias of perpetuating the collected fact.

**v) *Do not be parochial***

Cyber threats emanate from supra combination of cybercriminals, hacktivists, dark web operators, terrorist groups, and nation-states in various permutations. A counter-campaign also would be useful if it transcends organizational turf and rigid OPSEC, and has the flexibility of adopting entities as per the need. CCI is difficult, and can best be handled collectively.

**CCI Structure**

CCI is a multidisciplinary effort based on the principle of CI. It uses Deception and Denial as tools in the same manner as in CI. The wartime instruments, however, are used continuously in peacetime in CCI. Despite being an actor in the Cyber domain, CCI also has significant HUMINT applications.” Cyber CI is a conglomerate of several disciplines and skills. A typical operation, for example, might include analysts, cybersecurity specialists, HUMINT

specialists, cyber defence technical experts, language experts, ethical hackers, religious experts, and programmers.”<sup>25</sup>

An integrated multidisciplinary approach to CCI has been elaborated in the US National CI Strategy (2020-2022). The US government aims to “pursue a more integrated cyber counterintelligence posture to defend against hybrid attack methods that involve supply chain, cyber, technical means, and insider enabled attacks. This will require leveraging innovative technological advancements; recruiting, developing and retaining technical experts in the cyber, counterintelligence and security disciplines; and stronger partnerships among the federal, state and local governments, and the private sector.”<sup>26</sup>

CCI collection, analysis, and operational structure would require structural modifications to include various partners under one umbrella. This may need to insulate operational wing, with stricter OPSEC guidelines, from the other two to launch covert operations in the cyber domain.

CCI collection, analysis, and operational structure would require structural modifications to include various partners under a centralised Joint Task Force on Cyber Intelligence (JTFCI) where diverse partners synchronise their efforts. In the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center thirteen federal departments and agencies and sixteen private sector entities have regular, dedicated liaisons, while over 100 private sector entities collaborate with the Center on a routine basis<sup>27</sup>.

Analysis being separate from the collection, a multi-agency forum of intelligence organisations to provide a comprehensive analysis of Cyber threats. It could be modeled in a similar manner to the Multi-Agency Centre for Counter-Terrorism. The Multi-Agency Centre for Cyber Intelligence (MACCI) will have Counter

Intelligence experts. This Centre would be insulated from private sector participation and would be the recipient of inputs from JTFCI.

Based on the analytical product from MACCI, Cyber ops unit would carry out covert operations in the cyber domain, including surveillance of Dark Web and Social media, and also launch denial and deception operations against the adversaries. Cyber ops unit would feed relevant feedbacks to JTFCI for collection requirement and MACCI for refinement of analysis.

### Conclusion

In 5GW nation would not realize that she is at war till it is lost. Technology-enabled deceptive 5GW requires modification in existing countermeasures. Since the time between flash and bang is significantly reduced in warfare, there is no distinction between peacetime and wartime intelligence. The robust traditional Intelligence and counterintelligence processes can be modified to meet the requirement of cognitive war by making changes in organizational security requirements to leverage expertise without compromising the covert operation capacity. The Cyber Counterintelligence process would be distinct from the Cyber Security premise, which is the subset of the Cyber Counterintelligence.

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# Internal Security Scenario: An International Outlook

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## Abstract

The modern concept of a nation state is not possible without a strong foundation of internal security. The dimensions of internal security include armed rebellions, economic security, environmental security, and cyber security. We look at the formulation of concerns of internal security at an international level, especially of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France. Though internal security is conceptualized differently in various jurisdictions, the common thread remains adherence to the rule of law and securing peace and security of its citizens ensured through deft handling of internal and external destabilizing elements.

## Keywords

Internal Security, Scenario, outlook, Dimension concerned, threats, Rebellions, Political, Economic, Global environmental, perspective.

## Introduction

An important component of governance is upholding the rule of law and ensuring the safety and security of people. If a country fails in this endeavor, it loses its claim to be called a nation and becomes prone to disintegration and turmoil. There may be many reasons which could lead to such a situation including political unrest, economic instability, social breakdown, or violence along ethnic lines. Many times, the forces leading these attempts are within a country, however, there may be external powers who intend to exploit the local turmoil and may foster violence or other forms of instability within the host country. All these issues form a part of the internal security situation of a country.

There are various elucidations of the concept of internal security and it may mean different

things to different people. We may look at various characterizations of internal security including dictionary definitions and those proposed by various international conventions. For instance, the *Committee on Centre-State Relations*, Government of India has defined internal security as:

*“Security against threats faced by a country within its national borders, either caused by inner political turmoil, or provoked, prompted or proxied by an enemy country, perpetrated even by such groups that use a failed, failing or weak state, causing insurgency, terrorism or any other subversive acts that target innocent citizens, cause animosity between and amongst groups of citizens and communities intended to cause or causing violence, destroy or attempt to destroy public and private establishment”.*

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## Author's Intro:

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Thus, internal security refers to the ability of a state to secure to its citizens peaceful and harmonious existence and safety of their lives and property. Threats to internal security are many and they are different at various times and in different countries. There is no unity regarding the dimensions of internal security either. Several components are included in it by most observers. We shall also look at these components of internal security.

### **Definitions of Internal security**

The nature of internal security can be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept which involves multiple dimensions which have a direct impact on the lives, safety, and well-being of the citizens of a country. These dimensions may include large scale violence, terrorism, insurgency, financial strains, and natural and man-made disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods and storms.

To manage the internal security of a State is the responsibility of that State, but it cannot be dealt with by that State acting alone. Many threats to security, such as cyber-security or cross border terrorism—are global in nature, or often involve other countries. These kinds of threats have to be dealt with in conjunction with countries concerned.

Sometimes other terms are used to refer to the concept of internal security, for instance, low intensity conflict, national security, or operations other than war. There seems to be no clear definition of internal security in the law books. Article 1(2) of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions, uses the expression “situations of internal disturbances and tensions” but does not provide a clear definition. It states that the reference is to “riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature”.

A variety of definitions provide an indication of many usages of the term internal security. The concept still remains unclear, having originated from simpler definitions which initially

stressed the freedom from military threat and political compulsion. However, later it seems to have included other forms of non-military security also such as environmental or financial situations.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the first session of the 1971 Conference of Government Experts in Geneva has talked about internal security. It says that internal disturbances are situations in which there is no international armed conflict, but there is an internal struggle, characterized by a certain importance or period and which has some element of violence. This condition can be created where there is a revolt against the state. It can also be created when there is a struggle between some organized groups and the authorities in power. In these situations, there may not be open hostility but the state may have to array extensive police, or even armed forces to quell those disturbances.

Charles Maier, a history professor at Harvard University, defined national security by referring to the concept of national power: “National security... is best described as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing” (Romm, 1993).

Internal security therefore connotes a multitude of ideas and relates to the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its border.

### **Dimensions of Internal Security**

In view of these definitions, it may be practicable to list the various dimensions of internal security as armed rebellions, political security, economic security, environmental security and cyber security. Let us look at these dimensions one by one.

### ***Armed rebellions***

Many countries have faced the threat of armed rebellions by sections of local populations. These are typically low intensity warfare and frequently the rebels use guerilla warfare tactics. For instance, in Columbia, The Revolutionary Armed Forces-Peoples' Army (FARC) have raised a sustained armed campaign against the government. The group has used terrorism and military tactics to fight Columbian security forces. Similarly, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL) in El Salvador, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua followed the Maoist ideology and sought to fight the government forces with weapons. The Zapatista uprising in Mexico was also along similar lines.

### ***Political security***

The political aspect of security is an important part of internal security. Political security is closely connected to the ruling class whether it is a democracy or any other form of government. There may be large scale unrest if the policies of the ruling group are believed to be unfair or prejudicial. In this sense, political security is linked to the societal order. Various groups of political importance such as tribes, extreme left- or right-wing elements, some religious organizations, or those allied with a particular race, caste or language within a country may try to threaten the political security. Besides the groups operating inside a country, there may be threats to internal security from other nation states or groups of nation states such as ASEAN, or NATO. The forces outside the country may pose a threat to the internal security by their actions. The state has to deal with each of them with an appropriate response which may range from negotiations, diplomacy or low intensity warfare.

### ***Economic security***

The paradigm of economic security has changed over the years. While earlier the capture of nations by invaders would give them new resources and control over trade routes, today's

economy is characterized more by interdependence of world economies.

Historically, conquest of nations has made conquerors rich through loot, access to new resources and enlarged trade by controlling a conquered nations' economy. Today's complex system of international trade is characterized by multi-national agreements and mutual interdependence. Economic security today forms an important part of national security. The creation and protection of jobs which provide sustenance to people and fuel to the nation's economic progress vehicle are vital to internal security. In this regard, the developing world is still struggling to provide basic services to its citizens. Third world countries are less secure due to lack of employment for their citizens. For instance, Brazil's economy suffered a major recession which was linked to political crisis in the first half of 2016.

### ***Environmental security***

Environmental security deals with environmental issues which affect the internal security of a country. There could be global environmental problems such as climate change, or deforestation.

Climate change and other environments may affect livelihoods of people. For instance, there was a dispute between Chile and Peru about their fish populations. Fisheries are an instance of a resource that cannot be confined within borders of one country. A conflict before the International Court of Justice between the two countries about maritime borders and their associated fisheries is a case related to environmental security.

Environmental or resource problems could also threaten a nation's security. Such disagreements could range from sharp tension or total conflict. For instance, disputes over water scarcity in the Middle East could be an example. Similarly, illegal immigration into the United States may be caused partly by the failure of agriculture in the neighbouring country of Mexico. The civil

war and the consequent genocide in the African country Rwanda, triggered in part by the rise in population and decreasing availability of farmland, is an example of the extremity of consequence which is due to the issues of environmental security.

### **Cyber-security**

Recently, cybersecurity began to be viewed as a pressing national security issue. Electronic information systems are vital for maintaining a national security of any state. Possible unauthorized access to the critical governmental infrastructures by state and non-state entities can create a serious threat and have a negative impact on political, economic and military security of a given nation.

The United States initiated the Comprehensive National Cyber security Initiative (CNCI) in 2008. The effort was aimed at recognizing existing and emerging cyber security threats and finding out the weaknesses in the vast cyber network used by the country (Harrop & Matteson, 2015). President Obama issued a declaration that the “cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” and that “America’s economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cyber security.

### **Internal Security in India**

Threats to internal security of India have been in existence for quite some time. These threats have been highlighted in various publications and reports. For instance, the publication *Global Risks Atlas 2012*, lists societal resilience or governance and takes into consideration terrorism, conflict, resource security, economic security and considers aspects related to climate change. It lists India as a ‘high risk’ category on security. Several risk factors are identified in case of India, particularly terrorism and political violence.

The US publishes reports about terrorism for many countries of the world. In its ‘Country

Reports on Terrorism 2011’, India has been identified as ‘one of the world’s most terrorism-afflicted countries and one of the most persistently targeted countries by transnational terrorist groups (US Department of State, 2012). In the recent period, India has witnessed several terrorist incidents.

The nature and the scope of threats faced by India are varied and vast. The complex threats which India faces originate not only within the borders but some of their sources lie beyond our borders. Some of the activities of our neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, China, Bangladesh and Myanmar have been a cause of concern. The poor state of India’s internal security situation may be because of a weak criminal justice system which fails to adequately punish criminals. It may also be due to an unfavourable strategic environment.

### **International Perspective on Internal Security**

Countries have varying perspectives on internal security. This is to be expected because each country has its own set of circumstances which are unique to its geo-political situation. We will examine the concerns of internal security for three countries in this regard- United States, United Kingdom, and France.

#### **United States**

The phrase “national security” is more frequently used in the US in place of internal security. This terminology has been used since as early as the Constitutional Convention. The Americans believed that civilian control of the military was required and consequently, the army was put subordinate to the civil government.

The government structure handling national security issues has continually evolved in the US. The present set up has its origins in July, 1947, when U.S. President Harry S. Truman enacted the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. This Act created several institutions which were responsible for the

administration of national security related issues. One of the most important ones was the National Military Establishment (NME) which was later called the Department of Defense. The NSA also created the National Security Council whose foremost purpose was to synchronize and bring together various state actors associated with national security. The Central Intelligence Agency also has its beginnings associated with this Act.

The next pattern shift in administration happened after September, 2011, when the first major terrorist strike happened in the US. The Patriot Act was passed. There emerged in the US an argument about the restriction of individual rights and freedoms on the one hand and the fight for national security on the other. For instance, new laws proposed that the police did not require any warrant to search or conduct surveillance. There was substantial easing of warrant requirements for various purposes including intelligence surveillance. This was looked upon by many individuals as interference in the private space of people. Processes were filed in various courts and ultimately this question was considered by the Supreme Court of USA. The Court, in a significant judgment in August 2008, ruled that the new provisions were in congruence with the constitution and their validity was upheld. Specifically, the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) consideration of this question strengthened the constitutional validity of warrantless national-security surveillance (Kerr, 2014).

The United States uses numerous ways and methods to attain the objectives of national security. One of these is the use of diplomacy to achieve friendly relations with its friends. The US also creates pressure groups using which it can isolate its enemy countries. The US has implemented several plans which relate to executing civil defense and measures for emergency preparedness. Infrastructure has been created which deals with any kind of emergency, like electricity failure, earthquakes,

tsunamis or hurricanes. There is also a highly developed system of intelligence services which can deal with threats and espionage.

### *United Kingdom*

The mechanism for handling internal security in the UK consists of four branches; international counterterrorism, National Security Advice Centre (counter proliferation and counter espionage), Irish and domestic counter-terrorism and technical and surveillance operations.

The Security Service handles all these dimensions and is controlled by the Home Secretary within who is part of the British Cabinet. The service is led by a Director General who belongs to the British Civil Service. The Director General is supported by an internal security organisation, secretariat, legal advisory branch and information services branch. The British system provides for legislative as well as judicial oversight in the operations of the internal security apparatus. The legislative oversight is provided by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Members of Parliament, who are directly appointed by the Prime Minister. Judicial oversight of the service's conduct is provided by a body specially constituted for the purpose by the name of Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the Data Protection Act 1998, and various other items of legislation provide a comprehensive framework for the operation of the service. Adequate safeguards are provided in the operations part. For instance, information held by the service is exempted from revelation under section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

A significant effort of the British government's internal security administration was directed at controlling the problems relating to Northern Ireland and its constitutional status. The United Kingdom consists of four provinces or regions, namely England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Unionist and mostly Protestant

majority want to remain with the United Kingdom. However, nationalist the minority group consisting of Catholics wants to become part of the Republic of Ireland. The Irish Republican Army engaged in an armed struggle against the British for a long time to gain independence for Northern Ireland. Measures were taken against members of IRA such as the introduction of internment without trial in 1971. The IRA publicly announced an end to its armed campaign in July 2005 and asked its members to give up arms and pursue political programmes (Trumbore, 2016).

### **France**

France faces a number of internal security threats. One of the causes of these threats is the divide between immigrants and nonimmigrants. Immigrants as a community were found to be more economically disadvantaged as compared to the non-immigrants. A report by National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (NISES), the French national statistical agency, conducted a study in which it was found that in the unemployment rate for immigrants in France was 17.3%, whereas for non-immigrants it was 9.7% in 2013. Thus the immigrants face uncertainty and some of them have taken to arms. Some of the terrorist activities in France have been linked to these circumstances prevailing in France Mattelart & Hargreaves (2014).

France has set up the General Directorate for Internal Security (French: *Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure*, DGSI) which is the country's intelligence agency. DGSI performs many functions including counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, countering cybercrime and surveillance of potentially threatening groups, organizations, and social phenomena. The DGSI also gathers information about subversive activities and coordinates efforts to tackle them with help of various state organs.

France also takes part in the European security initiatives and coordinates efforts with its

neighbours (Kaunert, 2011). For instance, in August 2016, France and Germany announced a Franco German initiative under which three priority areas were identified. The first was to strengthen the controls at international borders. This would include giving equipment, technology and training to border guards. The second was to share important information between the two countries more effectively. A new project was emphasized which would allow criminal records to be automatically transmitted between police forces of six member states of Europe – Finland, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, France and Germany. This would be extended to other countries in Europe. The third effort was identified to tackle the issue of encryption. This is considered important because information networks of terrorist and subversive groups often use encrypted information and it is not easy to decode the messages. France would collaborate with Germany and other partners to make use of latest technology to disrupt these networks.

### **Conclusion**

Internal security, or national security as is increasingly being called across the world, essentially relates to ensuring safe and secure lives for citizens of a country. Maintaining the rule of law through effective governance is the key to a stable internal security situation. Many factors ranging from political unrest, economic instability, environmental challenges, cyber warfare, social breakdown, or violence along ethnic lines may be responsible for spreading disaffection among the population and threatening the unity and integrity of a nation.

The third world countries are at an increased risk of internal security issues arising out of armed rebellion, political security, and economic security, though other dimensions of internal security are also becoming important there. Environmental security and cyber security now threaten much of the world. United Nations has taken several initiatives to bring countries on a platform and recommended specific action to be taken in the shape of resolutions to tackle these challenges.

As the concept of nation states takes firmer ground with each passing decade, the institutional mechanisms to deal with internal security have grown both in numbers and in complexity. In this paper, we analyzed the components of internal security being handled through creation of specialized agencies in several countries, especially, the United States of America, United Kingdom, and France. The success of these efforts will ultimately depend on the degree of cooperation the internal security organizations get from the people of their countries and also from other actors important in their unique geopolitical situation.

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# Money Laundering by LWE-Importance of Action under PMLA (Prevention of Money Laundering Act)

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## Abstract

Contrary to their ideological propaganda, top leaders of LWE are illicitly enriching themselves by collection of levy, drug trafficking, etc. Investigation under PMLA has revealed that funds gathered through collection of levy and other illegal activities are not only used for maintaining the huge armed cadre & acquisition of arms, but have also been laundered for acquisition of personal assets.

While on one hand the top leaders of CPI (Maoist) have appealed and recruited young individuals to join the armed resistance, on the other hand their own children enjoy lavish life and engage in costly pursuits. Action under PMLA can choke the finances of the LWE besides enabling prosecution of the top leaders, their family members and other businessmen, who are involved in money laundering. The ideological double standards of the top leadership of CPI (Maoist) also gets exposed by financial investigation of their assets.

This requires coordinated effort on the part of different Intelligence and Investigating Agencies e.g. ED, Intelligence Bureau, STF, etc. Such concerted action has had a salutary effect on anti-naxal Operations in Bihar and needs to be emulated in other States.

## Keywords

LWE, Collection of levy, Drug trafficking, Proceeds of crime, Money Laundering, Placement, Layering, Integration, Structuring, Acquisition of assets, Cash, Benami properties, Bulk cash smuggling, PMLA, Enforcement Directorate, Joint action

Left wing Extremism is one of the biggest internal security threats. While security forces are doing their best to contain the challenge posed by LWE, it is increasingly being felt that there is a need to choke the funds available with LWE to weaken them. Anti-money laundering action is also important to expose the ideological hollowness of the top leadership which is leading a lavish lifestyle at the cost of lower cadre.

On the initiative of LWE Division of MHA, State Police forces have been requested to identify properties derived from collection of levy by LWE, source of funds and refer such cases to

Enforcement Directorate for taking action under PMLA.

This initiative has been extremely successful in Bihar. The STF of Bihar Police, assisted by SIB, collected intelligence regarding collection of levy by Maoists, properties acquired by them and contractors/businessmen involved in laundering of money. Such cases were then referred to Enforcement Directorate, Patna Zonal Office. The Enforcement Directorate further developed such leads and attached the properties of top Maoist leaders operating in Bihar-Jharkhand Region. The properties of following top leaders

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## Author's Intro:

\* SP, CBI, Jammu

of the CPI (Maoist) have been attached during the years 2018 & 2019: -

- Sandeep Yadav, In-charge of Madhya Zone of BJSAC (Bihar-Jharkhand Special Area Committee) of CPI (Maoist): - properties worth 86 Lakhs have been attached and prosecution complaint has been filed under PMLA against Sandeep Yadav, Rajanti Devi (wife of Sandeep Yadav), Dhanik Lal Mandal (brother of Sandeep Yadav), Gajendra Narayan (son in law of Sandeep Yadav), Gaurav Kumar and Rahul Kumar (Sons of Sandeep Yadav)
- Pradyumn Sharma, In-charge of Magadh Zone of BJSAC of CPI (Maoist): - properties worth Rs. 68 Lakhs have been attached and prosecution complaint under PMLA has been filed against Pradyumn Sharma, Pramod Sharma (brother of Pradyumn Sharma), Shanti Devi (Wife of Pramod Sharma), Barun Kumar, Tarun Kumar (sons of Pramod Sharma).
- Binay Yadav, member of Bihar Regional Committee of CPI (Maoist) :- properties worth Rs. 76.98 Lakhs have been attached and prosecution complaint under PMLA has been filed against Binay Yadav, Srimati Devi (wife of Binay Yadav), Prem Kumar (son in law) and Saryu Yadav (father of Prem Kumar).
- Musafir Sahni, Area Commander of Vaishali, Muzaffarpur Sub Zonal Committee and former Secretary of Bihar – UP Simant Regional Committee of CPI(Maoist) & Anil Ram (associate of Musafir Sahni) :- properties worth Rs. 54 lakhs have been attached.

The first such attachment order was issued against Sandeep Yadav, in charge of Madhya Zone of Bihar-Jharkhand Special Area Committee (BJSAC) of CPI (Maoist). This was appreciated by the Union Home Secretary. MHA has advised other states also to emulate the Bihar Model.

Investigation under PMLA, against the top leaders of CPI (Maoist) provided interesting insight regarding sources of funds and ways in which proceeds of crime have been laundered. In subsequent paras, the need for finance by LWE, their sources of finance, ways to launder illicit wealth acquired through collection of levy and impact of action under PMLA on Left Wing Extremism have been discussed.

#### **Need for Finance by LWE**

CPI (Maoist) and other LWE organizations maintain a huge cadre. These cadre are paid monthly amount ranging from Rs. 2000-20000. This requires huge resources.

LWE organizations require huge financial resources for acquisition of arms, ammunition, supplies, medicines etc.

Maoists also need money for propaganda purposes to support their front organizations and for legal expenses.

It has also been gathered that top leaders of CPI (Maoist) have invested huge amount of illegal money for acquisition of movable and immovable assets, and to support a lavish lifestyle of their family members.

#### **Sources of funds for LWE:**

##### *i. Collection of Levy*

Collection of levy is the biggest source of funds for LWE. There are various estimates of collection of levy by CPI (Maoist). According to such estimates, around Rs. 400-500 crores/annum are collected by CPI (Maoist) in Bihar-Jharkhand region alone. The estimates for the whole country are about Rs. 1500-2000 crores/annum.

Levy is collected by the CPI (Maoist) from Tendu Patta/Kattha contractors, businessmen, road construction companies, brick kiln operators and transporters. They also indulge in kidnapping for ransom and in some cases protection money is collected from government servants as well.

ii. Opium cultivation/Ganja cultivation and trafficking

Huge tracts of land in Maoist safe havens are being utilized by CPI (Maoist) for illegal cultivation of opium and ganja. This opium and ganja is then trafficked to different parts of the country with the help of drug trafficking syndicates.

In March 2018, paramilitary forces destroyed around 500 acres of illicit opium cultivation in Ranchi & Khunti districts of Jharkhand and Gaya district of Bihar.

As far as Ganja trafficking is concerned, hilly tracts of Odisha- Andhra border are being exploited by Maoists for cultivation of ganja. Very recently, the DRI has intercepted a truck ferrying two tonnes of ganja worth more than Rs. 3 crores, which had suspected naxal links. Mumbai police have also identified a naxal link to the well-entrenched ganja trafficking in the city. Similarly, Odisha Police have also made seizures of ganja with suspected Maoist connection.

iii. Funds from supporters/sympathizers

The over ground supporters/sympathizers including some NGOs collect funds for the CPI (Maoist).

iv. Siphoning off funds of govt schemes

In LWE affected districts, Maoists are siphoning of the funds provided for development schemes. Funds for development schemes flow directly to Panchayat heads and most of them in such districts, are either backed by Maoists or dominated by them.

**Money Laundering by LWE:**

CPI (Maoist) is generating proceeds of crime by indulging in collection of levy, trafficking of narcotics and other illegal activities.

It has been gathered that proceeds of crime have been laundered into movable and immovable assets.

Contractors/businessmen working in area of influence of CPI (Maoist) often assist CPI (Maoist) in money laundering.

During investigation under PMLA, it has been confirmed that family members of top leaders of CPI (Maoist) are leading a lavish lifestyle using money generated through proceeds of crime. For instance, son-in-law of Sandeep Yadav has made payment for a costly flat in Delhi from the proceeds of crime acquired by him. Pradyumn Sharma got his niece admitted in MBBS course to a private medical college, the annual fee of which is around Rs.25 lakhs. Huge funds have been laundered for acquisition of assets to hide the origin of source.

Investigation revealed that top Maoist leaders were involved in laundering of illicit wealth for personal use in sharp contrast to their ideological propaganda. Various means/techniques were employed by these leaders to hide the tainted origin of their assets. Some of the instances are discussed below.

**Some instances of Money Laundering:**


**i. Laundering of illicit cash through the bank accounts of son-in-law by Sandeep Yadav {Incharge of Madhya Zone of BJSAC of CPI (Maoist)}.**

During investigation under PMLA, it was found that Sandeep Yadav has laundered huge cash through the bank accounts of his son-in-law Gajendra Narayan.

It was found that huge cash was deposited (between 31.05.2016 and 08.06.2016 in account NO. 71110100077874 of Madhya Bihar Gramin Bank, Khiriyawan branch, Aurangabad, Bihar) of Gajendra Narayan. This huge amount was transferred from this account to HDFC Bank, Delhi account of Gajendra Narayan through cheques. FDs worth Rs. 8 Lacs were created

on 26.10.2016 from this account. These FDS were prematurely realized on 15.03.2017 and payment was made for booking of a flat in Dwarka, New Delhi. *This is a classic example*

*of illicit cash being placed in a bank account and being integrated with mainstream economy after layering.* This is depicted systematically in the following flow chart:



**ii. Illegal Levy Utilized of pay huge fee for admission into private medical college:**

During investigation under PMLA, it was found that Pradyumn Sharma (incharge of Magadh Zone of BJSAC) has got his niece admitted to a private medical college (Chettinad Hospital & Research Institute) on payment of Rs. 25 Lakhs. The payment was made to the college in the following manner:-


- 10 lakhs through DD by M/s Shri Ganesh Steels

- 4 Lakhs through by RTGS from the account of M/s Tarini& Company.
- 8 Lakhs from the bank account of one Birender Kumar.
- 1.6 Lakhs from the bank account of one Aman Kumar.
- 1.5 Lakhs in cash.

During investigation, it was found that *cash* was provided to the companies M/s Shri Ganesh Steels& M/s Tarini& Co.,before transfer of

money through DDs and RTGS. Similarly, Aman Kumar and Birender Kumar transferred funds after receipt of equivalent amount in *cash* from Barun Kumar (nephew of Pradyumn Sharma).

This shows that huge cash is being laundered and payment is deliberately being made through the bank accounts of third (unrelated) individuals/entities to avoid detection of actual source.



**iii. Acquisition of costly JCB Machine by Saryu Yadav (father of son-in-law of Binay Yadav) by laundering proceeds of crime acquired by Binay Yadav, Member of Bihar Regional Committee of CPI (Maoist).**

Investigation under PMLA revealed that Saryu Yadav purchased a second hand JCB in the month of December 2017 for a consideration of Rs. 16,65,000/-

The payment was made in the following manner:-


- Cash of Rs. 3.35 Lakhs
- Rs. 1.50 Lakhs – from the bank account of Umakant Singh
- Rs. 7 Lakhs- Loan from Chola Finance
- Rs. 2.5 Lakhs- From the bank account of Ravikant Singh
- Rs. 1 Lakh- from the bank account of Dhananjay Kumar
- Rs. 1.3 Lakhs- from the bank accounts of his son Prem Kumar

During investigation, it was found that Umakant Singh, Ravikant Singh and Dhananjay Kumar had transferred the amounts *after receipt of equivalent amounts in cash*. Further, prior to transfer of Rs. 1.3 Lakhs from the bank account of Prem Kumar, huge cash was deposited in these bank accounts by the wife of Binay Yadav. Moreover, *repayment of loan of Chola finance was done entirely in cash*.

Hence, it is evident that illicit cash was directly/indirectly used for the acquisition of this

JCB Machine. Investigation established that the source of this illicit cash was an illegal levy collected by Binay Yadav, top Maoist leader.

Thus, the ultimate source of acquisition of the said JCB is proceeds of crime acquired by Binay Yadav which was routed through his wife to the family members of Saryu Yadav to integrate the illicit cash into the main stream of economy, which is depicted as under:-



### **Other Techniques of Money Laundering by Left Wing Extremism (LWE):**

#### **i. Smurfing/Structuring:**

During investigation, it has been found that cash deposits have been deliberately structured (split into smaller transactions below 49,000) to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies. For instance, it was found that there were multiple deposits of less than 50,000 in the bank accounts of Gaurav Kumar and Rahul Kumar (both sons of Sandeep Yadav).

Similarly, cash deposits were made in the bank accounts of Chandeshwari Devi (wife of Musafir Sahni) only on two dates i.e., on 08.08.2011 and 30.12.2011, but it was done through structuring i.e. *deliberately splitting large financial transaction into a series of smaller transactions* to avoid scrutiny by regulators and law enforcement agencies.

#### **ii. Use of cash intensive businesses:**

During investigation, it has been found that family members of top Maoists have attempted to justify the source of illicit wealth by claiming income from cash intensive business such as sale of milk, transportation etc. For instance, Rajanti Devi (wife of Sandeep Yadav) has claimed income from sale of milk and Saryu Yadav (father of son in law of Binay Yadav) has claimed income from running of buses.

#### **iii. Use of third party cheques/third party transfers:**

Third party cheques/transfers are used for anonymity and to avoid tracing of actual source of funds. For instance, payment for admission to the medical college was made by Pradyumn Sharma by asking third parties to transfer the amount through RTGS or through Demand Draft.

#### **iv. Acquisition of Benami properties:**

Maoists have invested huge funds in the acquisition of properties in the name of unrelated persons by laundering proceeds of crime. For instance, Anil Ram (top Maoist of North Bihar) has purchased a truck in the name of his distant relative Dileep Ram and has purchased a bike in the name of Priya Ranjan Yadav.

#### **v. Bulk Cash Smuggling:**

During investigation it was found that Barun Kumar, nephew of Pradyumn Sharma, transported *huge cash* from Patna to Chennai. This cash was utilized for making payments for admission to medical college of his sister. Maoists indulge in bulk cash smuggling for transportation because putting cash in bank account will arouse suspicion.

Anil Ram carried Rs. 5.35 Lakhs *in cash* from Muzaffarpur Bihar to Hisar in Haryana for making payment for purchase of a truck. When he was apprehended by Bihar Police, he was in possession of Rs. 8.93 Lakhs in cash.

#### **vi. Real Estate:**

Huge funds were laundered by top leaders of CPI (Maoist) by investing in real estate. Huge plots of land and several flats have been purchased through illegal cash acquired through collection of levy. Real estate is a sector which can absorb huge amount of cash because of the involvement of unscrupulous players.

#### **vii. Use of Multiple Names:**

Top leaders of CPI (Maoist) deliberately use multiple names and these multiple names are utilized for registering properties so as to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies. For instance, Anil Ram used the fictitious name of 'Abhay' for concluding a deal for purchase of land in Delhi.

**viii. False ITRs:**

To justify huge properties and possession of illicit cash, family members of these leaders have filed false ITRs without any basis. Dhanik Lal Mandal, brother of Sandeep Yadav, was not filing any ITR but as soon as the enquiry was initiated under PMLA, he filed the ITRs for two years on a single day. The claims made in the ITRs have been found to be false and baseless.

**ix. Cash deposit during demonetization:**

There is evidence to suggest that huge cash was deposited during demonetization to launder proceeds of crime. Investigation established that Dhanik Lal Mandal, brother of Sandeep Yadav deposited Rs15 lacs, in cash, through the bank account of another individual.

**x. Conversion of illicit cash into gold**

In August 2017, Ranchi Police arrested the brother of Sudhakar, member of top level Central Committee of CPI (Maoist) and recovered Rs. 25.15 Lakhs in cash and over half a Kg of gold biscuits.

In 2015, a contractor was caught at Visakhapatnam with 2 Kg gold coins meant for Maoists. Gold is preferred as a huge amount of cash can be converted into much lesser in volume in gold, which can be stored in trenches in Maoist dens.

**Trends in Money Laundering by LWE:**

On the basis of investigation against top Maoists leader following trends have been observed:

- Heavy use of Cash
- Proceeds of crime are being parked, primarily outside the banking channels, with private contractors and businessmen.
- Proceeds of crime have been invested in the acquisition of huge assets in the name of family members.

- Contractors and businessmen are being employed for collection of levy as well as for laundering. These contractors and businessmen operate on the ground and move the illegal money freely under the guise of their business.

**Importance of action under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and why it is important to check the finances of Left Wing Extremism (LWE):**

- i. Action by ED in association with Bihar Police had salutary impact on the anti-naxal operations in Bihar and Jharkhand.

Wide publicity was given to the attachment proceedings, initiated under PMLA, against top Maoist leaders. This exposed the ideological double standards of the top leadership CPI (Maoist) leading to widespread dissatisfaction in the cadre. CPI (Maoist) is facing difficulty in getting new recruits and is not able to draw sympathy from the marginalized and poor sections of society.

- ii. Fearing action under PMLA, contractors and businessmen, are reluctant to offer levy and those colluding with CPI (Maoists) are liable to prosecution under PMLA.
- iii. PMLA investigation has unearthed the under ground network and sympathizers of CPI (Maoist).

Hence, action under PMLA is important to block the flow of funds and deprive CPI (Maoist) of arms, ammunition and logistics required to carry out armed resistance.

**Conclusion:**

Action under PMLA can curb the flow of funds to the CPI(Maoist). Attachment of ill-gotten properties of family members and their prosecution under stringent PMLA can have



demoralizing effect on the cadre. This will significantly weaken their armed struggle paving the way for successful on-ground operations by security forces. Bihar model of joint action by Special Task Force (STF), SIB and Enforcement Directorate is an ideal example of inter-agency cooperation. This model of cooperation needs to be emulated across the states and by all the agencies to tackle the threat of left wing extremism and other challenges. This model

shows that the agencies cooperating with one-another can share their resources, inputs and achieve much better results without duplication of efforts. This is the way to go for all the agencies.

***[The author has worked as Joint Director of Enforcement Directorate (Patna Zonal Office) and was involved in attachment of properties of top Maoist Leaders]***

# A Perspective Overview on Naxalism

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## Abstract

Naxalism has been imposing a strong internal security challenge and their capabilities to attack security forces along with getting support of people in a rural as well as urban area have virtually proved their synchronized power and capabilities to sustain the fight against states. They are using a powerful and dangerous tool of propaganda with a systematic and synchronised form of intended persuasions which influence the emotions, attitudes and opinions of specified target audiences. Naxals actively involved women, children and school children in the bloody dangerous revolution without caring for social norms and humanity. Their long lasting and silent warfare to demoralise security forces under the blankets of human rights violation and raising voice against any police action are going to be the latest trends. There should be no doubt about that Naxalites have deep connections with other militant groups working in India and based abroad. They are striving to destroy the fundamental structures of our country and hamper all types of developments and progress to establish brutal dictatorship under the cover Maoist ideology, which shows nothing but fulfilling their unrealistic goal. However, there is an urgent need for taking a holistic approach with full determinations to eliminate present and future threats from Naxals and ensure “EK Bharat Shreshtha Bharat”

## Key-words

*Naxal, Naxalites, Maoist, Chhattisgarh, Armed revolutionary, Janadalat, kangaroo Court, Journalist, Guerrilla, Central Reserve police Force, Propaganda, Tribal, Security force, IED, Challenge, Security, Police, Cadre, Balsnagams, Journalism, Threat,*

The word Naxal comes from the name of the small village Naxalbari, the place from where Naxalites adopted the revolutionary activities and armed violence in the year 1967 against zamindar or landlords, located in northern part of West Bengal. Naxalism originated as an armed peasant uprising against marginalization of the poor forest habitants and gradually against the lack of development and poverty at local level in rural parts of eastern India. Naxalbari was not the first peasant uprising in India.

However, it has gained momentum and superseded other previous movements despite only lasting for just fifty two days and smaller than previous uprisings, but left a powerful impact and set a milestone in the history of Indian Naxalism. Naxalite is a member of an armed revolutionary group advocating Maoist Communism and using terrorism.

Naxalism has been accepted as the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country and is a bigger challenge than terrorism

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## Author's Intro:

\* Commandant, CRPF.

or insurgency by our highest level of political leadership and government authorities. Their capabilities to attack security forces and getting support of people in rural as well as urban areas have virtually proved their synchronized power and capabilities to sustain the fight against states. Various reports have already given evidence that

Naxalites have deep connections with others militant groups working in India and based abroad. They are striving to destroy the fundamental structures of our country and to establish brutal dictatorship under the cover of Maoist ideology, which shows nothing but fulfilling their unrealistic goal.



Naxalism especially in South Chhattisgarh is most challenging for Government and most favourable state for Naxals to get the upper hand in their so called causes. Naxals' capability to attack in Chhattisgarh clearly indicates that they are logistically better organized, better trained, better motivated and better led in comparison with other affected states. Chhattisgarh

especially South Chhattisgarh is one of the most severely affected areas and a hot bed of Naxal violence dominated by tribals. Apart from frequent attacks, various new methods like attack from Sniper Rifles, small team actions, plantation of multiple IED are always showcased by Naxals. Encounters and Improvised explosive device blasts are common

phenomena. The topography of the area is fully suitable for Naxals growth and expansion. Facts cannot be ignored that Naxals have set up a parallel administrative structure as per their ideology and running their government in remote areas which are vulnerable because there is no further connectivity beyond this area and work as dead lock resulting in running their training camps as well as using it as a harbour, taking advantage of tough and dense forest where security forces visit rarely due to various security constraints. They have also been paying special attention to mobilizing and organizing women, children and school children in the bloody dangerous revolution they are waging without caring for social norms and humanity.

To resist and curb the menace of Naxals in Chhattisgarh, it needs to be viewed in different perspectives and special care needs to be taken based on the ground realities. The ground situation in the south Chhattisgarh suggests that the local population has been denied the benefits of overall political-economic-socio developments. Taking advantage of these dark situations, Naxals established a strong base in helping the Tribals and other villagers to resist the petty tyrannies of bureaucracy. Tribals are state indigenous tribal communities. They are outside the caste system and live mainly in remote, rural areas and villages. JAL, JANGLE, JAMIN are the issue of tribals, they want to protect it at any cost and defy the government orders including any developments works, if their interest is harmed specially their culture. Since tribals have been imbibed a high value and ethos of their culture based on collective use of resources, frontal organizations spread their views exploiting the sentiments in the media favorable to their causes and keep development issues at bay. Tribals still prefer to stick to their old traditions and follow it religiously. Naxals chose this area as a fertile breeding ground for inducting the exploited and neglected people including tribals in their cadres. This perception is the main reason for all-round distrust in the locals who look at any outsider as an exploiter.

It is ironical that several instances of exploitation of women of tribal communities by the Naxals have come to notice. Such instances primarily include sexual exploitation in Naxals camps, which have been disclosed through statements of several surrendered women Naxal cadres. This has been widely reported in the media also from time to time. Some surrendered male cadres have disclosed that they were forced by the senior leadership to undergo vasectomy operation as a precondition for marriage with women cadres. There are allegations that women cadres, who become pregnant, are forced to undergo abortion against their will. The surrendered women cadres have also disclosed that even if they get married to male cadres, they are not allowed to give birth to children since the senior leadership of the Naxals do not compromise fighting capability. In the same way, armed groups reportedly resorted to abduction and posed a threat to tribal parents for sending children, who subsequently underwent military training. On the other hand tribals are dominant in the area and Naxals, being foot soldiers, are playing an important component. There is no doubt Naxalite movement exists due to the misguided and brainwashed local youth who are made to believe that the only way to survive on ground is violent means.

Naxal attacks in south Chhattisgarh have also witnessed a frequent shift in modus operandi and strategy, exploring novel tactics against the background of changes taking place against them. Their revolutionary politics, a combination of information and political warfare with guerrilla tactics need to be addressed strongly with a specific blueprint. The absence of involvement of administration and deficit of trust, people support Naxals against security forces for fear of the unknown. Naxals don't even miss a single opportunity to kill those who are supposed to pass their information outside after conducting their so called "Janadalat (kangaroo Court)". People who are likely to hinder their ways are being brutally killed labelling them as informer. However, People

are realising the facts that they are being exploited between security forces and Naxals but they think better to keep silent and avoid any complications in absence of trust on

Government machinery. Lack of operational intelligence or its delayed receipt, due to lack of trust between police and people, is a major handicap.



Apart from police and military actions, Political issues, counter-propaganda with development issues required to be addressed with specific and target oriented missions. Special focus has to be on acceleration of political-socio-economic development of the backward areas to restore people's faith and confidence in the government machinery. It is only feasible when State has full determination to go ahead without a second thought. In this conflict situation, compromise of politicians could not be ruled out for their survivals in a democratic arena. Change in political leadership with confused mind is always able to disrupt state machinery efforts towards dealing with Naxalites approach. Political

leadership must be equally sensitive to the core issue of the Naxals movement. Situations become worst when help of Naxalites is sought during elections. It is evident from Andhra Pradesh, whenever State leadership is shown determination to curb Naxals, they have succeeded in their approach. Political activities are more important and conducive than Police and military actions. Lesson should be learnt from the past that policy of appeasement should not be adopted because Naxals used the opportunity to consolidate and strengthen their position during negotiation pretending to cooperate and willing to establish peace in favour of local society. Naxalism is not a meaningful

movement, but a destructive, unproductive, anti-development, anti-democratic aimless movement. If we go through the past, it was found, they never had united and often divided for petty gain based on leader's own desire and arrogance. Even now, in Chhattisgarh a spurt of surrendered Naxals revealing various types of exploitations of cadres and prevailing trend of resentment among them. Lower cadres are making Naxals ideology commercial and some sorts of extortion are common phenomena for cadres' personal consumptions.


Understanding the power of propaganda, Naxals are using a systematic and synchronised form of intended persuasions which influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions of specified target audiences. Propaganda as effective and powerful tool is being used for ideological, emotional, political or commercial purposes in their interest to make their movement successful. Propaganda also has the effect of polarizing an audience in support of them and emphasizing using propaganda rather than armed fighting. Naxals turn some small issues to large problems through manipulation of realities and propaganda. Their frontal organizations directly or indirectly keep on carrying out Naxals propaganda and sometimes succeeded in melting down actions against them. With the help of frontal organizations they create resentment among the masses against the government apparatus to raise disputes and disagreements without any solutions to the conflicts. Sources of all development factors like establishment of mining, manufacturing units are always treated with exploitation of tribals and create an adverse image of the state and even project a small police action which is required, as atrocities.

Naxals constantly emphasise their propaganda materials that the government ignores developments and unable to tackle social, economic and political issues to touch the sentiments of their strong base. The election boycott campaign is done by issuing press releases and distributing/pasting anti-election

pamphlets, posters and banners. As part of the propaganda tactics to disrupt the polls, they organize meetings, rallies, torchlight processions and cultural programmes to spread the message of poll boycott. Threatening and taking action against its own cadres and people indulging in electioneering are also used to get the desired result. Ideologues have kept the Naxals movement alive with support of the propaganda and are in many ways more dangerous than the cadres of the Guerrilla Army. The ideologues and supporters of the Naxalism in cities and towns have undertaken a concerted and systematic propaganda against the state to project it in a poor light and also malign it through disinformation. Their connections and links to some universities are giving a new edge to arms and it is really a matter of concern.

The significance of the political warfare is evident from the arrest of renowned activists, intellectuals. When arrests are made, a number of prominent people including celebrities appeal for release and announce retention as illegal. A lot of lobbies are made and action against them are being criticized. These events highlight the political support that Naxals are getting as a result of propaganda. The Naxalites have exploited the media in a planned and professional manner. Even Naxals have a deep root into media and get benefit with an efficient and strategic media management. The media is being utilized with a systematic, planned, and conscious manner to mould or influence the opinions of those who are not happy with the system. They are expert in the tactics of propagating agitating and acting to convert mass movement into armed struggle. After realizing the power of propaganda, they visualized that the movement needs a strong urban forum to give political orientation to widen their horizons of work in terms of enhancing a long-term capability and getting mass support to increase the strength.

To counter and fight against Naxals, there is an urgent need for planning, conceptualizing and carrying out propaganda operations with clarity



of goal. The state should proactively employ the media in perception management strategy. The mass media should be extensively used to highlight the futility of Naxals ideology, violence and loss of life and property. Developmental schemes of the government in the affected areas should be expedited with taking care of ensuring completion of pending projects based on qualities to restore people's faith and confidence in the government machinery even various roads

where dozens of security forces laid down their lives are completed without any quality and still require reconstructions in the interest of security of nation.

In south Chhattisgarh, issues of democracy and development are critical to resolve. Development process is only possible if areas would be dominated by police action which would also not be appreciated by the supporters of



Naxals because the developments lead to loss of their bases. They know that once developments start, control over the masses, and gaining so called supporters and sympathiser, will be difficult and they have to fight for survival because they know direct fighting is difficult without the support of locals.

Development projects are being carried out by contractors who work as a sandwich between administration and Naxals. Unofficially, they pay protection money and measure a source of funding to Naxals, resulting in low quality delivery. Completion of road constructions are a herculean task as contractors are always apprehensive about their project's security keeping in mind huge profits as they know hardly any better supervision would be done by official concerned. Bad, even sometimes worst quality of road constructions are delivered ignoring the hard and tremendous efforts of security forces which ensure security during work. Road security operations made by security forces are always vulnerable to attack as routine duties had already

taken several casualties of Jawans. To avoid frequent embarrassment of national security, it is also needed to look into the road construction management in a broad prospect in the interest of country with urgency to ensure timely completion of all development works.

The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is the lead agency nominated by the government to fight against Naxalism. However, CRPF is only meant to assist the state police forces and not to take the lead, when deployed in the state. Being arms of Central Government unfamiliar with the local terrain, language and customs are apparently left to defend for themselves. Conducting operations depend on support of the state police forces. Meagre deployment of local police, CRPF is holding the ground and being present everywhere always exposed to more risk. Security forces are of course the key component but can provide only supportive role in such type of situations where serious constraints on information and lack of any understanding with civil administration at ground



level exits. Security forces are sacrificing their lives in extraordinarily difficult operating fields where enemies are supported by both an insider and outsider in terms of arms, trainings, finance, and ideology for destabilisation of country. Naxalites are being supported in such a way which cannot be visualised without going through the modus operandi in detail. During guerrilla war fight cannot be done on its terms and conditions. Leads of state police with close coordination to central police only yield fruitful results in police and military actions. Both state police and central police have their own departmental constraints but need to honour each others' ethos and policy to make a synchronised strike effectively on the ground.

The conflict in Chhattisgarh state has irreparably damaged children's and youth lives. Naxals have engaged children in different capacities like Balsangam to get information, to fight in line of guerrilla that expose them to the risk of injury and death. More or less police, security forces are using them to counter Naxal tactics. The escalation of the conflict since mid-2005 has also caused massive displacement, that resulted in the destruction of dozens of schools, and severely impacted children's access to education. The conflict has also prevented many children in affected areas from continuing their education. Government run Potacabin Schools are also becoming shelter of Balsangams which are also going to create further nuisance, if not corrected timely. The government has taken some measures to develop affected districts to prevent young people from joining the insurgency but still not adequate. Even surrendered Naxals also need rehabilitation in a better way to help restore normalcy. Their slight aversion the system and returning will be creating more problems in a security operation aspect.

Women participation in Naxals cadres have been estimated to be as high as 40%-45% and most of them fighting along with their male counterparts in ambushes, getting information, conducting recruitment against the security forces. If we go through the counting of Naxal's

dead body, recoveries of women are substantial after encounters. Some of them join because they are influenced by their family members who are Naxals, others in need of protecting themselves for various reasons. Women are believed to have more potential, diverse and personal motivation to take up arms, which makes it all the more difficult to tap their entry. Elimination of the female cadres by means of encouraging surrender and rehabilitation in a good way along with providing better prospects can reduce their entry and would be conducive to anti-Naxals strategies.

Proactive strategies to use a planned way by fixing the responsibilities with authority concerned should be mandatory. The Government of India has adopted a holistic and positive approach to addressing the Naxals insurgency. This approach is built around simultaneous implementation of a security agenda, developmental activities and promotion of good governance. The national policy and action plan to address LWE problem was formulated by the MHA in 2014. Under the plan, the Central Government has been implementing various developmental schemes in coordination with state governments. But considering the facts that state is still far from normal and its problems are by-products of political, social, economic mismanagement and lack of governance. The requirement of time is to evolve more effectively to frame counter strategic programme against security threats in a proactive manner. The obvious solution to this problem lies in a fundamental fact that development cannot be done without the cooperation of the people concerned. Development policies under proper monitoring mechanism need to be adapted for the welfare of the rural masses that have been ignored for too long. Decentralization of the administration from top to bottom with strong implementation and monitoring systems are important steps to be taken by the State Government. State government is required to work in consonance with the Union Government with all sensitivity



and by understanding the factual threats. Local Police should be encouraged to take the lead in all operations, taking into confidence of the Central Security forces.

Government needs to tackle the deviation of the youth being controlled by Naxals and also bring back those valuable human resources already deviated from the mainstream of society. To ensure peace and to curb Naxals threats, would not be possible only by the forces but would also need participation of all the stake holders like, panchayat leaders, journalists, human right activists, contractors, local teachers, doctors, tribal's leader who play a contributory role in prevention of such threats in pursuing peace in the interest of country. Involving the local historians who are aware of tribal cultures, in framing policy could be an elevated move. An effort should be also made to make the youth realise about their potential to get a better tomorrow under the given circumstances. Roping in all above with clear intentions definitely yield fruitful results in all spheres.

Journalism or press is the fourth pillar of democracy. In the state, journalists are undergoing identity crises as they are not recognised till they receive accreditation. The stringers, news-agents or hawkers are the backbone of journalism in the state who send stories from remote areas. They are most vulnerable as they don't have any formal appointment with any newspaper. Especially a majority of grass roots journalists are neither employees of the publication nor do they get an authority letter or ID card from the media house they work for. However they play a major role in both Naxals and local administration. They also have links with urban media and urban Naxals. Their inputs help those who are anti-government and create a lot of embarrassment to the government and put pressure on security forces to hamper operations. Some of them have also helped the administration to rescue the hostage and were killed by Naxals alleged as a police informer. Even some of them have faced

trial for being Naxals links. Their constructive thought can play a major role in curbing a threat including human rights issues. Inclusions of journalists who are familiar with the terrain and habits of the population who recognise the appropriate means of communication with the brainwashed tribals and villagers could make a significant difference.

However, keeping in view the previous police actions on behalf of the government and further in return for various strokes in the form of attacks by enemy, it is understood that Naxals are capable of regaining ground from zero in Chhattisgarh on their deep rooted base. They are well organized in terms of logistic, training, guerrilla tactics along with revolutionary politics. Brain washing against interest of children and women and their involvement in this bloody warfare makes more vulnerable to tribal society. Trust deficit between administration and all stake holders are adding fuel to the fire. After going through the prevailing situations, political activities are more important and conducive than police and military actions. Of course various development initiatives by Central as well as State governments are gaining ground but need to be proactive and synchronised in all spheres of challenges being faced. Modifications with proper and tough managements are required to be adopted based on past experiences. Policy of appeasement should not be adopted because Naxals used the opportunity to consolidate and strengthen their positions. The requirement of time is to evolve more effectively to frame counter strategic programmes against security threats in a proactive manner. System with special, specific approach with strong monitoring mechanism along with confidence building measures by security forces should be run. Constant strikes in terms of police action, development and propaganda in view of long terms perspective are also mandatory to win over this menace. Recent threat regarding UAV and sniper training which have attracted the media attention should also be kept in mind.

# Internal Security Enemies within us: A Community Policing Perspective

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## Abstract

Unlike the external security threats, internal security threats emerge within the borders of the nation and it is often difficult to identify and it causes serious damage to society. As external threats emerge from outside, it can be identified and mitigated in most of the time. However, internal security poses more challenges to law enforcement and policymakers as it arises within the community which needs to be protected. Apart from paramilitary and armed forces, the state police are the first responders in case of the internal security breach. As the threat evolves from the community, the participation of the community has a major role in protecting the community from the internal security threats. So, the nexus of police and the community will serve the purpose of internal security on a large scale. Hence, the application of community policing concepts will help police and other agencies to address the internal security issues at a broader perspective. This paper focuses on various internal security threats to India and how community policing principles can be applied to address internal security.

## Keywords

Internal Security, Community Policing, Partnership, Problem-solving

## Introduction

India is one of the world's largest democracies and one of the fastest-growing economies with diverse cultures, religions, language and ethnic groups. As it is growing as a global power, threats within and outside the nation multiplied. In the current scenario, the nation has been encountering threats from numerous sources. The majority of the threats are assumed to be a result of internal weakness. In addition, threats from external entities are emanated from internal shortcomings which convey that the borderline between internal and external security domains has been blurred. As India is growing as a global

power, the internal security challenges the country and it has to deal with evitable changes from traditional to the modern arena. The internal security of a nation serves as a catalyst for the growth of a powerful nation. Internal security breaches are viewed as inadequacy and inefficiency of the nation and its planning strategy. It also paves the way for a decline in the growth of a nation in all means. National Security Advisor has mentioned about the internal security challenges and role of police in developing a proper strategy to counter the internal security threats. While addressing the police officials he encourages them to make themselves equipped and master the technology

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## Author's Intro:

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to combat threats. Strong and efficient internal security management is essential to identify and eliminate threats. Other than traditional policing the force must be trained to have knowledge and skills to handle internal security threats. The new challenges in the form of cybercrime, counterfeit currency and white-collar crimes have added a new dimension to the internal security, which necessitated the intervention of new strategy in the field of internal security (Akshat,2009). Comparing to the military and paramilitary services deployed for internal security, police were the only force that have a direct contact with civilians who also plays a major role in tackling the threats. Hence it is the primary duty of the police to make the civilians aware and develop reporting behavior among them. Therefore, it is understandable that the internal security of the nation is not only the responsibility of police or any other law enforcement agency but also the equal responsibility of civilians.

India's policing and internal security system is very much uneven and often coordinated unsuccessfully. Grounds for these circumstances are described as, the poor coordination and inappropriate understanding between the state and central governments. Because police are a state subject and most of the responsibilities of police are vested in state governments which limit the authority of the central government (Staniland,2009). When it comes to the matter of internal security, other than any law enforcement agency police were the first state authority to come in contact with the situation. Most of the state police force has been trained only to maintain law and order and carry out an investigation which makes the force weak when they have to encounter internal security breaches. Hence it is crucial to train and equip them to tackle the situation. Another significant aspect which needs attention is the public police coordination or community policing. More than

police local people are more aware of a security breach and suspicious activities going on in their locality. If the public is able to pass vital information regarding the suspicious activity timely police could develop a strategy to counter the threat. For that, there must be a mutual understanding between the police and the public. The effective community-driven approach of the police shows the efficiency of the policing. The community-driven approach could be viewed as an initial step to safeguard the nation from all the threats.

Kautilya wrote in Arthashastra, that, a state or nation could be at risk from four different kinds of threats i.e. internal, external, externally aided internal and internally aided external. While considering the internal security scenario of India it is a mix of all shades of threats (Prakash, 2013). Internal security is defined as the process of keeping peace and safety within a state or nation. Internal security consists of several aspects such as domestic peace, rule of law, public safety, peaceful co-existence and communal harmony. Mahendra and Vinay (2018) state that, internal security is a subset of national security which is concerned with threats and challenges that emerges from within the borders of a country and have the potential to threaten public order and national security. Arase (2018) coins "*Strengthening Internal Security Frameworks and Community Policing in Nigeria*" and described internal security within the context of protection of values, critical human and infrastructural assets, territorial integrity and lives and property of the citizens from the threat. Hobbes (1651) in his theory of "*Social Contract*" discusses the underlying principle of internal security in which the civilians give up some individual liberty in exchange for common security. The concept of the social contract reflects a similar idea of community policing whereas the public and police work together to curb threats in society. Therefore, the current

paper outlines the internal security threats our nation faces and to what extent the intervention of community policing could combat the internal security threats.

### **External Security and Internal Security**

External security refers to the threat that a country or nation faces to its identity, economy components, stability, borders, and its population, in particular, the feel of the people, their mental and physical health as well as social life, technological and industrial infrastructure (Siddhartha, 2016). Whereas internal security can be defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from its external enemies. According to the experts on national security, the borderline between the internal and external security is converged. External security source consists of both state and non- state actors, in cooperation with anti-national within India have made the situation more complex (Manoharan, 2012). Thus, the demarcation line between external and internal security is very blurring and there should co-ordinated networking between central and state governments to tackle the issues.

### **Internal Security Architecture**

The internal Security architecture of India consists of a variety of central investigative, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In addition, the liasoning between the central and state agencies strengthens the internal and external borders of the country. Addressing the internal security threats India adopts two-tier combating mechanism, i.e. collaboration of Indian military and police organizations. The Ministry of Home Affairs includes the Intelligence Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, Indian Police Service and National Investigation Agency. Research and Analysis Wing and Central Bureau of Investigation are under the control of the Prime Minister. The military is primarily concerned with external

threats and also provides intelligence to curb domestic terrorism. Newly formed National Security Guard operating under the wing of the Central Government has been expert in handling hostage situations and terrorist attacks (Staniland, 2009). Central Government has raised seven Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs). These forces are deployed along with state police force to maintain law and order in the country. Among all CPMFs Central Reserved Police Force is the most important, which is entitled with duties of management of law and order, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism all over India. Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Police Force and Seema Suraksha Bal are basically meant for border security, these forces also play a role in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in conflict areas like Northeast, especially in the Maoist affected areas and Kashmir. Intelligence Bureau, the main intelligence agency of India is responsible for the internal security and intelligence of India. Agencies such as the Central Economic Bureau, Director General of Military Intelligence also perform the duties to curb terrorism (Mahendra & Vinay, 2018). National Security Council, chaired by Prime Minister and few cabinet ministers to discuss the matters related to the national security. Strategic Policy Group headed by cabinet secretary is dealing with a policy analysis of national security. National Security Advisor oversees all the security mechanisms and advises Prime Minister was regarded as the national security affairs.

### **Legal Frame Work for Internal Security**

India's legal framework for internal security has not been restricted to one or two laws. Since independence, India has been enacted law's to safeguard the nation from all the potential threats internally. The forthcoming section gives an overview of the major laws in regard to the internal security of India.

The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act has been enacted by the parliament of India to prevent all unlawful activities throughout the country in the year 1967. The act has been amended in the year of 2019 and renamed as The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act. It has the power to declare the organization as “unlawful” and scrutinize the members to a certain extent. Obtaining bail for a person arrested under this Act could be considered as a difficult procedure. As it has the power to keep the arrestee in six months in custody even without filing a charge sheet.

Prevention of Terrorism Act was enacted by the joint sessions of the parliament of India in 2002. The Act emphasises the anti-terrorist operation and it stood up to strengthen the mechanism to curb terrorist activities in India. It has been enacted in the wake of the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001 and considering threats from terrorists. Like UAPA, POTA has also few dangerous measures to deal with terrorists such as detaining the accused of 180 days in custody without filing the charge sheet, the presumption of guilt and summary trials and the absence of trials. This act has been repealed by the Central government in 2004.

The Terrorist and the Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act commonly known as TADA has been enacted by the parliament of India in 1987 for counter-terrorist activities. The act has been framed due to the growing terrorist activities in Punjab and to safeguard the other parts of the nation from its harmful effects. The legal validity of the law ends in 1995 because of the popularity of abuse under this law.

National Security Act has been drafted in 1980 during the administration of the Indira Gandhi government by the Parliament of India. The provisions of the law provide government, the power to hold an individual if he or she being a threat to national security and law and order of

the country. The law provides central and state governments with holding the individual in custody for 12 months and also 10 days even without being informed of the reason for the detention. The detained person is not supposed to meet their lawyer during this period.

Maintenance of Internal Security Act has been passed by the parliament of India in 1971 during the regime of Indira Gandhi government. The law upholds the preventive detention power i.e. detention from the occurrence of activities posing a threat to the nation, search and seizure with the warrant, wiretapping at the breakdown of law and order. MISA has used against political opponents; trade unions and civil society groups challenged the government. It was repealed in 1977.

Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act was enacted in 1958 by the Parliament of India. AFSPA gives armed forces the power to maintain public order in the disturbed areas. The Act came into force as a result of increased violence in the north-eastern part of India. Armed forces have the authority to prohibit the gathering of five or more people in the disturbed areas, after giving warning they can use force or open fire if the gathered people cause a threat to law and order. Initially, the law was drafted only for Hyderabad later it extended to seven north-eastern states in India in 1972.

Preventive Detention Act was passed in 1950 by the central government. It has been viewed as a temporary measure to deal with the violence stemming after the partition of India. This law provides the government to detain a person for up to one year without pressing any charge. The legal validity of the law ended in 1969.

The above-discussed law provides some special powers to different agencies of the government and often enables them to proactively address the internal and external threats. However, the effectiveness of these laws can be enhanced

through certain small initiatives that have been discussed in the following sections.

### **Internal Security and Challenges**

Since independence, India has suffered a series of types and levels of internal security which affects the stability of the nation. These threats have challenged the country from different dimensions. However, India has overcome the past incidents of threats and drafting strategies to strike the ongoing and future incidents of threats regarding the internal security of the nation. A few of the challenges India faces are discussed in the forthcoming section.

India is extensively accepted as a nation which is affected by terrorism, in terms of causalities, duration of challenges, type of terrorism and its causes (Swaminathan, 2008). Act of terrorism is observed as a threat to the internal as well as external security of the nation. It poses a challenge to the security and stability of the nation. Terrorism has been spread over the length and breadth of the nation. The terrorist repeatedly attacks the Political capital (Delhi), economical capital (Mumbai), technological capital (Bangalore) aiming for the complete devastation of peace and stability of the nation (Prakash, 2013). Sanjay (2019) says that analyzing the past trends of violent terrorist attacks Delhi has been always vulnerable to attacks. Among all other Indian states, Jammu and Kashmir have witnessed large scale violence due to terrorism and its impacts. The internal and external entities have a significant role in the unrest situation in the state.

Naxalism has emerged as a potential threat to the internal security of the nation. The intention of Naxals to structure a Compact Revolutionary Zone Red Corridor from Pashupati in Nepal to Thirupathi in Andhra Pradesh is considered as a serious threat to the Internal Security (Akshat, 2009). Naxal conflict in India began way

back in 1967 with the protest of peasants in the Naxalbari district of West Bengal. But the strong state government was able to control the outbreaks of the movement in the late 1960s and 1970s. It again rejuvenated in the mid of 1980s. In the current scenario, it is identified as one of the serious internal security threats India has by the policymakers. The roots of Naxalism have been spread into seventeen states in India which fuel its gravity. The spread of Naxal movements in India has close relations with the illegal mining in Chandigarh and Jharkhand which results in enormous earnings for Naxal cadres. Another reason for the expansion of Naxalism is the incapability of the government to provide avenues for the deprived sections of society (Namarata, 2013).

Further, the new formation challenges like the cyber and information war are one of the modern forms of security threats. Accessibility and availability of cyberspace to the citizen made everything at their finger tips. Technological growth in the cyber world has connected the people from different parts of the country as well as the world which made the communication channel easier. Presently almost all government and private institutions are digitalized; hence any kind of threat to the digitalized data can freeze the proper functioning of the institution. Cyber community spreading fake news and ideology could be able to shape the opinion and attitude of the people negatively, which in turn paves the way for an unrest situation in the country. Cyber and information war is considered as the fastest growing threat to internal security (Narender, 2019)

India is a country with diversity in culture, language, religion, and ethnicity. At the same time, it is considered as both the strength and weakness of the nation. In the current scenario, numerous socio-economic and religious conflicts exist between Indian societies. Politicians on the other hand, take advantage of this vulnerable



situation for their benefits like vote banking. Politicians would separate the society based on the caste and canvass the people for believing in their ideologies and support. Upholding the ideology of caste and reservation based on the caste finally leads to caste wars which in turn imbalance the harmony of the community (Prakash, 2013).

### **Community Policing and its relevance to Internal Security**

Traditional policing was largely focused on solving and preventing crimes that have an immediate impact on the community and citizen's quality of life (Docobo, 2005). Whereas the emerging trends and challenges in internal security require the law enforcement agencies to adopt different strategies to address those challenges. Further, police alone are not the sole guardian of law and order in the current scenario, the participation of the community and other agencies are vital to ensure the safety and security in the community (Gaffigan, Ward, Rosenblatt, & Ray, 1994). The above discussed internal security challenges affect the community's sense of security in many other ways. As the issues and challenges of internal security emerge within the community and impact the community, the involvement community will serving great purpose in addressing these issues to a great extent. Hence, adopting community policing concepts will help the law agencies to identify and address the internal security threats to large extent. Community policing refers to "*a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime*" (Community policing: Defined, 2013). The given definition as more points that community police attempt to proactively address the issues

pertaining to public safety and social disorder. In other words, Community policing is a bridge that facilitates communities and law enforcement agencies to communicate, collaborate and work hand-in-hand to create a peaceful and safer society. The internal security threats often lead to social disorder and disturb public safety. Hence, the small directional shift or emphasis given through community policing towards internal security issues will produce the expected outcomes. The community policing addresses the issues of public safety and social disorder by emphasizing three core elements such as community partnership, organizational transformation and problem-solving. The forthcoming section explains these three concepts and their application in internal security.

### **Concepts of Community Policing**

#### **Community Partnership**

The primary goal of the community partnership is to establish and maintain mutual trust in the community (Gaffigan et al., 1994). The community partnership means a collaborative partnership among law enforcement agencies, individuals and organizations to develop solutions to problems and build cooperation in the police. Partnering with the community includes actively collaborating with other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, community groups, individuals and media. The collaborating mainly denotes assistance with each other when necessary, specifically with regard to information sharing. Unlike, traditional policing, community policing is more transparent with sharing information on prevailing crime and social disorder problems and police operation with the community (Community policing: Defined, 2013). Such, transparency pays the way for trust-building and effective collaboration between the community and the public. The confidence in the police and other law enforcement agencies will make the public

interact, approach when needed and share valuable information.

### **Problem Solving**

Problem-solving refers to eliminating and preventing crime and other problems in society by analyzing the characteristics of the problem (*Community policing: Defined*, 2013). The problem solving is aimed to identify the underlying causes of the specific problem and makes an effort to eliminate it (Docobo, 2005). It is notable that problem-solving is a crime and issue-specific. So, it is considered as one of the important concepts of community policing. Problem-solving works with a conceptual model known as SARA (scanning, analysis, responses and assessment). Scanning refers to identifying the problem, analysis denotes knowing more about the problem, responses involve developing solutions to reduce the number of incidents and extent of the problem and the assessment refers to evaluating the outcome of the responses (*Community policing: Defined*, 2013).

### **Organization Transformation**

The community policing needs organizational support from law enforcement agencies to incorporate community policing concepts into policing. There comes a need for organizational

transform from traditional policing to community-oriented policing (Docobo, 2005). Organizational transformation refers to the alignment of organizational structure and information system to support community partnership and proactive policing (*Community policing: Defined*, 2013). The organizational transformation includes adopting community policing concepts in policies, procedures, training programme and other activities of policing (Docobo, 2005). Further, the organizational transformation decentralizes the decision making in police hierarchy and enables field-level officer to take instant decisions which increase the response time of the police in addressing specific issues. Such decisions are made with the consultation of the community, hence produces the desired outcome.

### **Community Policing Initiatives in India**

The policing in the major countries has started incorporating community policing principals with traditional policing. Similarly, many of the Indian states have introduced community policing initiatives. The objective and methods of implementing differs from every state. The following table provides a brief idea about the few of the major community policing initiatives in India and their objectives.

| <b>Sl.No</b> | <b>State</b> | <b>Community Policing Initiatives</b> | <b>Objectives</b>                                                                                                                                                                 |
|--------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1            | Tamil Nadu   | Friends of Police                     | To make public participation in Assistance in traffic, Crime Prevention, Information Collection, Assistance in Law and Order Maintenance, Involvement in Prohibition Work         |
| 2            | Assam        | PRAAHAR                               | To address the social problem To bring police and Community Closer To change the attitude of the policeman at the police stations towards the Public To make them People Friendly |

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|   |                |             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|---|----------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 3 | Andhra Pradesh | MAITHRI     | The mission of Maithri is that “The mission of Maithri was to render courteous, compassionate and caring responsive police personnel and increase public confidence in the police with respect to maintenance of peace and order and a feeling of safety”                                                                                                                                                        |
| 4 | Kerala         | Janamaithri | Aims to effectively bridge the gap between police and public through the participation of citizens in matters of crime prevention, intelligence sharing and prioritizing policing areas at the level of police beats. Designated, well-trained male and female beat officers directly interact with each and every family and citizen in their beat and develop familiarity with the happenings in the locality. |

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Source: (Manavpreet, 2013)

Apart from the above-mentioned community policing initiatives, other states also adopted a community policing model at states and district levels. The baseline of the objectives remains common i.e. to prevent crime and social disorder with community participation. However, this paper argues that existing initiatives are not focusing much on internal security. Thus, there is a need for change in community policing initiatives with more focus on internal security issues. As the internal security threats increase day by day, the capacity of the police and other related agencies should be enhanced to address these threats effectively. Hence, the cooperation of the community to agencies will increase the effectiveness of agencies to deal with such matters. The following section discusses the application of community policing concepts in internal security.

### **Application of Community Policing Concepts in Internal Security**

The community policing has been proved to be effective in many parts of the world (Jayachandran, 2016; Seo, 2016; Lortz, 2017; Mackenzie & Henry, 2009). The application of

community policing concepts has a wide range of scope from petty crime to issues like terrorism and internal security. The previous section explains the various internal security challenges and the concepts of community policing. Community policing is mainly focused on reducing crime and social disorder. However, the concepts of community policing can be used to address the internal security challenges that have been discussed above with the greater emphasis on internal security. In the case of internal security threats, trust plays a major role as information sharing and reporting suspicious activities largely depend on the trust of the community on law enforcement. Through the effective partnership, the community as informed about the prevailing issues and problems in the community. The partnership also makes the community aware about the signs of threat and makes the people approach the police and share information. Such information will help to a large extent to address the threats proactively. Though there is existing police-public contact the intensity of communication between police and the public should be more considering the numerous internal security issues

and challenges. The partnership formed through community policing concepts will also help in identifying the possible internal threats and vulnerability. As the partnership between the police and the community, there should be effective communication between the police and the inter-governmental agencies which are important for collecting and exchanging information, identifying threats and sharing resources (Docobo, 2005). Importantly, the effective partnership lapse in information sharing can be avoided between the intergovernmental agencies and the community. Further, the problem-solving mechanism of community policing helps in identifying internal focussing on security threats and challenges. The issue-specific nature of problem-solving helps in focusing a single issue, so it can be dealt with effectively. As discussed earlier, problem-solving also involves finding a solution through the SARA methods, which will help the police both to identify the issues and challenges related to internal security with the collaboration of the community.

### Conclusion

In order to achieve effective partnership and problem-solving, the agencies should make the organizational setup which is more flexible to the public. Police personnel should be trained in building trust and partnership in the community. The traditional policing of inter-agencies collaboration should be transformed into inter-agencies and community collaboration. Such, collaboration will help in addressing the internal security threat and challenges to a greater extent. The security threats such as Naxalism, communal riots, religious riots and other issues mainly arise from the community. Hence, the public should be made aware of the internal threats that the country has been dealing with and trained on how to identify threats and to report to the police. It is the role of government agencies to come up with

programmes this helps the member of the community to understand the potential internal security threats, to understand their role in protecting the community and other related issues. The ultimate goal is to make the community as the eyes and ears of the police which can be achieved only through better community participation. Community participation could multiply the strength of government agencies to deal with security and information or other support provided by them are an important resource in supporting the efforts of the agencies to prevent crime and social disorders. Thus, integrating community policing concepts to address these issues will increase the internal security of the nation. As an initial step, the image of the police among the community should be enhanced to build trust among people on police sensitizing people on the importance of cordial police-public relationship will result in controlling internal security threats in the community.

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# Understanding De-radicalisation and Possible Interventions: A Systematic Review

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## Abstract

This paper presents an understanding of the concept of de-radicalisation and how it can be applied to the welfare of prisoners, the same way it has dealt with violent extremism. De-radicalisation, as the word suggests, is the anti-image of radicalisation. Over the last few decades there has been a gradual shift in the method of treating prisoners. More than punishment, the system needs to concentrate on the reformation of the prisoners. The motive is to prevent prisoners from turning more violent, especially when they come out of the prisons to start a new life. The purpose should be to change the ideological beliefs of the prisoners. It is extremely important to introduce new interventions inside the prison settings for de-radicalisation to effectively work. This paper presents a review of important scholarly works that have been previously done on de-radicalisation. Through the writings of various authors, we will understand the definition of de-radicalisation, why it is important in rehabilitation of offenders and how it can be applied to creating psychological intervention programmes. The main purpose of this paper is to have a broad perspective of the countries which have already introduced de-radicalisation in their correctional settings and also understand the various interventions available for de-radicalisation. The paper begins with the basic conceptualisation of de-radicalization and its importance in treating violent extremism. The literature review has been categorised under three main themes: understanding de-radicalization and its application in correctional settings, a brief account of applying de-radicalisation in various countries, and interventions as examples inspired from the idea of de-radicalisation. In the discussion it portrays the need for such programmes in India as well and in that process it talks about the Samarth programme that has started in Sabarmati Central prisons, Gujarat.

## Keywords

Reformation, Understanding, de-radicalisation, welfare, Prisoners, interventions, Motive, Extremist Barriers, Therapeutic

## Introduction

Violent extremism is a significant threat to worldwide security. The global idea of the phenomenon is reflected in its unselective character. Capitals from Oslo to Cairo, Riyadh to Kuala Lumpur, and London to Washington

have needed to bargain with the outcomes. No district, or even nation, can profess to be completely unsusceptible to the issue (El-Said, 2012).

Over the last ten years or so, radicalization, mainly radicalization prompting violence, has

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developed as a central need for national and global security concerns, and an expanding field of research (Rahimi and Graumans, n.d.). Silke (2008) argued that more books were distributed regarding the matter of radicalization prompting terrorism in five years following the September 11, 2001 assaults than in fifty previous years combined. The utilization of the term ‘radicalization’ in the English-language press dramatically increased somewhere in the range of 2005 and 2006 (Sedgwick, 2010). Articles in scholastic diaries and state-and association supported reports on the point have additionally observed a surprising increment that doesn’t have all the earmarks of slowing down (Rahimi and Graumans, n.d.).

It is important to understand the concept of radicalisation before dealing with de-radicalisation. ‘Radicalism’ and ‘radicalization’ have a lot more extensive importance, with regard to current studies and policy making, radicalization in general mean a pathway to psychological warfare, steady slide into fanaticism, fundamentalism or, and mostly, a development towards legitimizing violence and also engaging in it personally (Maskaliunaite, 2015). The term extremism is very often related to radicalisation. The most basic concern when it comes to radicalisation is the fact that people turn to violence (Maskaliunaite, 2015).

In the course of the last ten years, the attention on violent extremism has developed quickly over different sectors, for example, criminology (Simi, Sporer, and Bubolz, 2016); sociology (Blee, 1996; Simi and Futrell, 2015), psychology (Kruglanski and Orehek, 2011), organizational psychology (Ligon, Simi, Harms and Harris, 2015); political science (Asal, Gill, Horgan and Rethemeyer, 2015); and IT innovation (Derrick, Sporer, Church and Ligon, Forthcoming).

De-radicalizing offenders—which requires changing their attitude and ideological beliefs—is exceedingly troublesome, and separation is

likely a realistic outcome. Current jihadist de-radicalization programmes commonly just work with soft core; militant jihadists, while as a rule holding little sway over hardcore individuals.

No thorough assessments of any of these projects are accessible yet in the open literature and claims that their adequacy should be treated with caution (Ranstorp 2011). Currently there is an increasing interest in de-radicalizing terrorists. However de-radicalizing prisoners which requires changing their mindsets and ideological beliefs is extremely difficult (Silke 2011).

In the United States, there have been efforts to prevent radicalization. De-radicalization and reintegration programmes should be extended to foreign fighter returnees, which should also be screened by a professional psychologist. The main goal of such programmes is to encourage and teach independent thought and critical analysis abilities and encourage the ability to question collective assumptions. An ideal de-radicalization programmes teaches individuals to function as independent and productive members of society. This further helps offenders to resist re-radicalization after their release from the programme (Long 2018).

There are various indicators identified by criminology research on criminal rehabilitation such as self-determination, freedom, autonomy and personal growth. These factors measure an individual’s likelihood to return to criminal activity. De-radicalization improves security, strengthen the society and combat radicalization (Long 2018).

Prisoner de-radicalization programmes focus on community integration of former convicted extremists. These programmes are necessary because in prisons, offenders come across the like-minded people. To prevent radicalization, it is imperative for such programmes to begin early so as to stop the cycle of extremists and focus

on their rehabilitation. Such programmes should also focus on non-violent offenders to help them be a part of society again (Cronnin, 2019).

### **Objectives**

Considering the background, the present paper will have the following objectives to cover:

1. To have a broad perspective on de-radicalisation across the globe
2. To understand different interventions available for de-radicalization

### **Review of Literature**

#### **De-radicalisation and its application in correctional settings**

The following section defines de-radicalisation and the way it can be applied in the contemporary correctional settings with the aim of correcting the prisoners.

##### *Understanding de-radicalisation*

De-radicalisation is defined as “the process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values” (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. xiii). De-radicalization suggests that the individual has dismissed the ideological belief system, and in this way, never again holds fast to the belief systems that described a specific gathering. Therefore, deradicalization ought to be seen as different from withdrawal since it proposes a change in the person’s worldview.

De-radicalization suggests the individual has dismissed the ideological conviction framework, and hence, never again holds fast to the philosophies that described a specific group. As such, deradicalization ought to be seen as different from disengagement since it recommends a change in the person’s world’s view. Along these lines, deradicalization includes a change in conviction; while, disengagement is

defined as change in behavior (Windisch et al., 2016).

Deradicalisation and disengagement programmes in different countries show that with adequate resources, financing and long-term commitment to progress, positive outcomes in de-radicalization and separating violent extremists and radicalized individuals can be accomplished (Bell, 2015).

De-radicalisation may incorporate the denouncement of violence as a strategic demonstration embraced as a reaction to state coercive activities or different motivators, yet not as an ideological or political delegitimation of violence (Silke, 2011); delegitimising brutality without giving up radical mentalities, which is characterized as disengagement by Tore and Horgan (2008); de-radicalising demeanors and practices dependent on moderate Islamic translation to meet political finishes (Ashour 2009); or, extensively relinquishing religion and receiving a restricting philosophy or living with no specific strict and political direction and alliance. Then again, self-de-radicalisation due to “limited experience” may likewise prompt recidivism or re-engagement with violence, when for instance, de-radicalised individuals are not perceived and their opportunity to express their new non-violent religious views is additionally abused by the government (Dunne and Williamson, 2014).

Most writing on de-radicalisation centers around surveying the viability of state-led restoration programmes, the objectives of which are generally prisoners blamed for identifying with, or commitment to psychological oppression (Seifert, 2010; Tore and Horgan, 2008; Nesser, 2010; Venhaus, 2010; Sukabdi, 2015; Schmid, 2013). Despite proof showing that philosophy, or the religion of Islam, isn’t the most significant factor in radicalisation (Kundnani, 2015; Tore and Horgan, 2008), most government



interventions aimed at deradicalisation are supported by a summed up supposition that Muslim radicals are essentially determined by a fanatic belief system that legitimizes savagery. In this way, the state needs to satisfy its good obligation to rehabilitate, or correct, the moral constitution of its citizens' identity by changing fanatic Islamic ideological convictions and practices to make them compatible with the state's ethical standards (Aggarwal, 2013; Elshimi, 2015; Clubb, 2015).

Following the 9/11 attacks, numerous de-radicalisation, separation and recovery programmes were set up around the world. While a large portion of these projects were built up at first in the Middle East, in later years Western countries, for example, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Britain have gone with the same pattern by either extending the existing deradicalisation and disengagement programmes (aimed at far left and right wing extremists) to incorporate strict radicalism, or by creating explicit projects coordinated on those associated with terrorism or religious extremism (Bell, 2015).

#### **A brief account of applying de-radicalisation in various countries**

Countries apart from India have adopted the de-radicalisation model, motivated to treat prisoners in a manner that stands in contrast to radicalisation. This section discusses the countries who have adopted the model and the successful nature of it.

#### ***Adoption of de-radicalisation model in various countries***

Countries like the United Kingdom, Egypt, Malaysia, Tunisia, Yemen, Indonesia and Denmark have implemented such programmes of de-radicalisation, whose most distinctive feature is an emphasis on non-coercive measures to win 'hearts and minds' in countering violent extremism. The following section will talk

about the various countries where the programme has been adopted and how it has been effective.

#### **United Kingdom**

De-radicalisation has increasingly become very common in the UK as a method for handling the threat attached to religiously inspired violence/extremism (Elshimi, 2015). Very recently, for example, Britishers battling in Middle Eastern clashes, and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, have revived the preoccupation of policymakers with the radicalisation of British Muslims. In fact, the work of Prevent Strategy in UK counterterrorism post-2011 has essentially been recalibrated towards a greater focus on de-radicalisation interventions, which is seen by policy makers to be a progressively streamlined and compelling method for managing radicalized/extremist individuals. Furthermore, yet, Elshimi (2015) argues that in spite of more significant consideration paid to de-radicalisation, the talk on de-radicalisation is portrayed by the nonappearance of point by point research, little or no empirical evidence for policy development, and confusion surrounding its conceptual framework (Elshimi, 2015).

#### **Egypt**

In the mid and late 1990s, Egypt turned into the primary nation to seek after a 'delicate' way to deal with countering violent extremism. It is the place prison based deradicalisation procedures, in light of discussion and exchange with violent extremists, were created inside the very famous Scorpion Cell of Cairo's Tora Prison (El-Said, 2012). Other Muslim-majority countries later went for the similar methods. El-Buckley (2013) draws on the Egyptian involvement in the de-radicalisation of Islamist activist groups to guarantee that catching instead of taking out specific kinds of pioneers can substantially affect endeavors to change feebly dedicated foot-soldiers of terrorist organisations and non-violent

sympathisers, which ought to be at the core of all long haul counter-terrorism procedures. The capability of pioneers to become envoys of disengagement and de-radicalisation must be considered before conveying the request for liquidation.

### **Malaysia**

The experts in Malaysia likewise presented a de-radicalisation programme for captured socialist extremists, planned for reshaping their viewpoint, including spiritual counselling. Moreover, they offered help to their families to check hatred against the state and marginalisation in the public arena (El-Said, 2012).

### **Tunisia**

Muhanna-Matar (2017) proposes that a compelling sort of de-radicalisation that is bound to roll out the ideal change conceivable is one in which there is a slow alteration of certain dispositions and practices without forsaking the entire supporting Salafi (of Tunisia) belief system. The study shows that there is a solid plausibility for more radicals to self-deradicalise by considering their specific experience of commitment with radicalism, without essentially relinquishing the entire Salafi belief system (Muhanna-Matar, 2017). Foucault noted that freedom is a precondition for self-problematisation by which the human subject experiences diverse prevailing discourses and the relations of intensity they infer, and has a chance to consider, and to gain from, the result of activities and encounters attempted (Foucault 1994). However, this experience may not prompt a total dismissal of the old worth framework and the character it sets up. Or maybe it works dependent on, and inside, it (Franek 2006).'

### **Yemen**

The Yemeni de-radicalisation programme was the main built up to counter Islamic extremism.

Established in 2002, the Yemeni "Committee for Dialogue" programme shows how rough radicals can be de-radicalised and gives key exercises in program plan and conduct. Based on the premise that psychological warfare is based on an establishment of mind and that any sort of scholarly thought can be vanquished itself by mind, the Committee for Dialogue stressed dialogue and debate and urged members to challenge the "authenticity of the Yemeni government, the reasonability of executing non-Muslims, and the suitable [use] of jihad" (Bell, 2015).

### **Indonesia**

In terms of deradicalization, Istiqomah's (2011) study portrays that in performing deradicalization in prisons, the specialists in Indonesia provide trust, moral inclusion, impetuses, and the main strategy is to get in touch with the detainee's family. When exploring the present-day practice of de-radicalization in Indonesia, 90% members from blended classes think about that most de-radicalizations structured with political intentions are not exactly compelling. The projects need various upgrades as they are led in a brief timeframe, less bolstered by learned assets, and saw as 'hit-and-run' projects. Besides, all members clarify that most religious terror activists regard the term 'de-radicalization' bothering as it contains naming, therefore no jihadist needs to join transparently when it is mingled (Sukabdi, 2015).

### **Denmark**

The Danish government has executed a task that is focused on the individuals who uphold extreme ideologies (threat that returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) pose to Denmark's security) or are at an early stage of radicalisation. The 'De-radicalisation – Targeted Intervention' venture plans to assist youth in leaving extremist environments and prevent them from engaging in radicalism. Tools are created to provide these

adolescents the important social help and counsel that will keep them away from radical circles. The programme includes two methodologies: (i) mentor support; and (ii) exit talks. The mentor support approach alludes to the advancement of strategies for individual mentorship of youngsters who show indications of radicalisation. The exit talks approach alludes to preventive talks focused on people who are evaluated to be radicalized or the individuals who have acknowledged violence as a real way to accomplish their personal and political objectives (Hassan, 2019).

### **Interventions**

This section discusses the various examples of interventions and programmes that follow the main idea of de-radicalisation in treating extremists.

#### ***Possible interventions for de-radicalisation***

Policies created for averting (further) radicalisation or aimed at de-radicalisation are required to be 'evidence based'. This recommends that evaluators ought to apply thorough empirical methodology and measurement techniques. In any case, it is sometimes not clear as to what this evidence should comprise and how it ought to be accumulated (Feddes and Galluci, 2015). A case of an intervention concentrating on both conceivably radicalizing and radicalized people is the De-radicalisation Targeted Intervention venture by the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (Korf, 2012; COWI, 2014). The Danish methodology is portrayed by attention on to young people who are viewed as defenseless against radicalism and extremist individuals. People viewed as possibly radicalizing are portrayed as demonstrating an interest for or compassion for extremist situations, form of actions, and/or ideologies, and the individuals who are viewed as engaged with extremist conditions (Feddes and Galluci, 2015).

Feddes and Galluci (2015) discussed a suitable case of an intervention concentrating on the community which is called the violent extremism prevention programme by the Muslim Council of Wales. This programme incorporates awareness raising of radicalisation in the community, training of community members and English lessons for Imams (Braga and Weisburd, 2012). A focus group that was a piece of the CRIME study by Griffioen-Young, Lousberg, Dyeve, and Goetz (2010) brought up that loved ones like friends and family could fill in as a protective factors as indicated by experts (Feddes and Galluci, 2015).

Another example, a case of interventions concentrating on first-line experts is the Philippine government's de-radicalisation efforts where prison personnel are trained in recognizing radicalisation by creating awareness about radicalisation threat (Jones & Morales, 2012). Saudi de-radicalisation programme is another one which aims to de-radicalise convicted extremists in prison and provides long-term support for participants in the programme as well as their relatives (Boucek, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).

Feddes and Galluci (2015) believe that these examples are good approaches to assessing de-radicalisation programmes while firmly encouraging conduct of solid empirical studies in conditions that permit it. A theory based approach supplemented with suitable strategies and instruments for measuring impact will help build up a more grounded reason for future arrangement and projects aimed at prevention and de-radicalisation (Feddes and Galluci, 2015).

The Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) is a pilot intervention provided by Corrective Services New South Wales aimed at jail prisoners who have a conviction for terrorism or have been recognized as in danger of radicalisation. PRISM is conveyed by a group of united health staff and a Religious Support

Officer who works with different partners and experts (Cherney, 2018).

Research has been conducted to elaborate on de-radicalization of Islamic teachings in Senior High School in Masamba, South Sulawesi (Rustan et al., 2018). The rise of radicalism issue has compromised the integration of the country. Along these lines, it needs a major job of instruction particularly Islam religious education in averting the comprehension of radical religious lessons, keeping up the character of loving peace and nationalism values. The results of the study conducted by Rustan et al. (2018) show that de-radicalization in Islamic education confronted a few hindrances in accomplishing appraisal standard. However, Islamic instruction in educational programme 2013 can cultivate students' character of religious, tolerant, democratic, and peace-love. As an effort of preventing, de-radicalization was done ahead of schedule through Islamic education. The act of de-radicalization was done by teachers in a form of presenting and implementing strict qualities, resilience, and patriotism in learning process by coordination with schedule, teaching materials, and exercise plan.

Koehler (2019) perceives that inadequately planned projects are a misuse of resources as well as increase the danger of violence. By concentrating on the Indonesian de-radicalisation programme Koehler (2015) clarifies that with a developing interest for a successful de-radicalisation programme, there lies the significance of trusted models and strategies to reinforce existing programme infrastructure. By assessing recommendations and approaches offered by researchers in the field, Koehler (2015) shows that although numerous thoughts and models have been advanced, there have been restricted efforts to execute them. Koehler (2015) additionally takes note of the fact that a successful de-radicalisation programme is structural integrity. In spite of the fact that staff

who are well aware of extremist ideologies, risk assessment, and the psychology of radicalisation are important, Koehler (2015) underlines that in order to be generally productive to the radicalized individual, "a strong and well-established programme plan with the highest structural integrity possible" must be provided.

### Discussion

This section deals with the importance of de-radicalisation in dealing with violent extremism. It also follows the background of successful de-radicalization programmes worldwide and presents to the readers an overview of the Samarth programme that has been initiated in all Central prisons, Gujarat, for offenders of all categories. .

In 2013, the "Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders" expressed that the nature of any jail based recovery programme for violent extremists is, among other factors, subject to the level of training received by the faculty. Moreover, the European Union Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) has additionally centered around the topic of preparing practitioners, which is viewed as "important in any effort to prevent and counter radicalisation." (Koehler and Fiebig, 2019, p. 47)

One needs to think about whether to offer amnesty or not while dealing with de-radicalizing violent extremists. It is important to think through it. If people are kept in prison, they get radicalized. With amnesty, the victims aren't happy, but it is very important to find an exit path (Speckhard, n.d.). Speckhard (n.d) also argues that it is critical to address the traumas and psychological vulnerabilities that make one more prone to being selected for jihad, motivations – particularly to guarantee they won't reconnect in collective violence – after prison and reorient their feeling of self-adequacy. There is an ardent need to think about strategies

for Internet, communities and military (screening, education and support) for deradicalization (Speckhard, n.d.).

Horgan et al. (2016) suggests that one should seriously contemplate the role that physical separation from the group plays in the process of disengagement, regardless of whether it is involuntary via imprisonment or a de-radicalization programme or intentional. Prison is frequently seen as a space for radicalization, however Horgan et al. (2016) outlines that when it gives physical separation from the group it can likewise assume a significant role in disengagement and de-radicalization. Since de-radicalization programmes have never been assessed for viability, it is necessary for the field to search for experimental proof in the current research writing to give a strong establishment to those activities (Koehler and Fiebig, 2019).

A Therapeutic programme Samarth : Breaking barriers programme has been introduced in all Central prisons, Gujarat, for offenders of all categories developed by Reena Sharma 2017, (Sharma, R. (2019)

Samarth: Breaking Barriers Programme is a therapeutic intervention based on Forensic CBT and Positive Criminology. It is a novel concept and is India's first of a kind Therapeutic rehabilitation intervention established inside all central prisons of Gujarat. Based on Forensic CBT (Cognitive Behaviour Therapy) and on the philosophy of positive criminology for offenders, the intervention program assesses the treatment readiness of inmates and gives personally designed Therapeutic intervention programmes to address their criminogenic needs to commit a crime. This focuses on providing skills and therapeutic tools which will enable them to solve their problems using more prosocial methods and work with them on their reintegration in the society. The goal of this intervention is to enhance the emotional competency of the

participants, also personally designed to educate and reinforce.

Samarth focuses on criminal thinking patterns, prosocial choices, beliefs and such topics which are also crucial for De-radicalization targeting specific behaviours links to extremist's beliefs and which are identified as at the risk of radicalization. Although, a lot of efforts are work in progress as deradicalisation is the method to work with this population is different from the traditional correctional intervention, such as violent or sex offender programmes do. This will require to focus on the psychological, social, theological and ideological needs of radicalized offenders that aims to redirect them away from extremism and help them transition out of custody. This is achieved through individually tailored intervention plans, the content of which can vary given the needs of offenders. As no one offender is alike and hence no two intervention plans are the same. A more comprehensive psychology- based framework would make de-radicalization programmes more effective.

### **Conclusion**

The present paper has made an effort to systematically review the existing literature on de-radicalisation and make a point through it. The point is that prisoners in correctional settings, (specially the ones attached to violent extremism and who hold extremist ideologies) to be de-radicalised instead of radicalization. special emphasis must be laid on in all religions and categories, groups. Another emphasis must be made on what the young minds are learning. Besides this in prison, it must be an effort on the part of the administrative system to show the path of mainstream beliefs to the prisoners, so that they do not latch on to the extremist beliefs. In this way they will be assisted in facing society as a changed individual who is willing to embrace the new lifestyle. In many correctional settings

worldwide, the de-radicalization intervention programme has been made part of reformation of the prisoners. India should also adopt similar models. An attempt has been made through the Samarth: Breaking Barriers program in Central Prisons of Gujarat for all types of offenders and future goals is to work with the selected groups for de-radicalisation

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# Drones – A Perspective on Internal Security

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## Abstract

After Cellphone technology boom, the next big technological proliferation that is having immense potential to impact internal security in a significant way is undisputedly the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or, what is popularly recognised as Drones. A result of tremendous advancements in Satellite based Navigation, RF communication, very large scale integration (VLSI) technologies in the recent past and a combination of multidisciplinary scientific paradigms like Avionics, electronics and Telemetric, Drones have surely caught most honed internal security experts off guard. Presumably, Indian internal security apparatus is no exception and hence it is pertinent to explore vulnerabilities, to identify defence approaches, or, to least acquire a clear understanding of the technology scenario upto the last man standing.

## Keywords

Drone, Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), Anti-Drone Technology, Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)

## Introduction

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) or Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPA), popularly known as Drones, is an unmanned, remotely operated, often an autonomous flying object with tremendous scope for application specific customisation. A Drone typically consists of onboard computers (Processors), GPS/GNSS based navigation modules, RF Communication module, onboard sensors, batteries together with a number of light weight motors-rotor combinations integrated over an ultra lightweight airframe, and most importantly, a payload specific to the purpose of flight.

## 2. Classification of Drones

The size, shape and configurations of UAS are only limited by imagination. However, formally drones are classified in India in terms of weight, in categories as represented below:

- **Nano:** Less than or equal to 250 grams (.55 pounds)
- **Micro:** From 250 grams (.55 pounds) to 2kg (4.4 pounds)
- **Small:** From 2kg (4.4 pounds) to 25kg (55 pounds)
- **Medium:** From 25kg (55 pounds) to 150kg (330 pounds)
- **Large:** Greater than 150kg (330 pounds)

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Such classification plays a pivotal role in terms of regulations and flexibility under existing policies with respect to UAS operability.<sup>[1]</sup>

### 3. The Threat Spectrum

The spectrum of security threat associated with drones is as broad as its application spectrum. Broadly, such threats can be classified into following categories:

**Defective Drone:** It may so happen that a drone becomes uncontrollable due to any among a host of fail points, which may include any or a combination of battery failure, navigational malfunction, disruption in communication, mechanical error and physical damage. Despite presence of limited fail-safe mechanisms and redundancy, a catastrophic failure might still lead to uncontrollable instability and non-sustenance of flight, however, devoid of any hostile intentions of pilot or any pilot error.

According to a report published by Washington Post published in June 2014, since 2001, more than 400 US army Drones have suffered catastrophic crashes. In one incident worth mentioning, in November 2008, the remote pilot lost control of a US Predator Drone that crashed into a U.S. base in Afghanistan itself. In another incident in September 2009, an armed US Reaper drone, with a 66-foot wingspan, flew on the loose across Afghanistan after its pilot lost control of the aircraft and allegedly, U.S. fighter jets had to shoot it down near Tajikistan. In June 2012, a Navy RQ-4 surveillance drone crashed into Maryland's Eastern Shore, igniting a wildfire.<sup>[2]</sup>

**Pilot ignorance/ Pilot error:** This covers the scenario where crucial mistakes or miscalculations are made by the Remote Pilot (RP)/Drone operator, particularly in terms of navigation, endurance etc, and are more prevalent in Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flight scenarios. However, the pilot has no malicious intentions as such.

As a case in this point, it may be mentioned that in January 2010, a US Predator carrying a Hellfire missile crashed near Kandahar because the pilot, operating in BVLOS mode, did not realize that the aircraft was being flown upside-down. Similarly, in the same year another armed Predator crashed after the pilot pushing the wrong button on his joystick, the plane went into a spin.<sup>[3]</sup>

**Mischief-Mongers:** This categorizes the scenario where the Remote Pilot (RP)/Drone operator intentionally crashes the drone or creates some security apprehensive situation, mostly, to draw attention or create ruckus, not to the level that it can be associated with serious internal security risk or act of terrorism.

During 19 to 21 December 2018, around thousand of flights were cancelled at one of the busiest airports of the world, Gatwick Airport, London, England, due to drone movement near runway. Reportedly 140,000 passengers were affected.<sup>[4]</sup>

A group of climate activists in UK attempted flying commercial amateur drones close to Heathrow Airport to protest and create awareness against carbon emissions due to busy airport and government's decision to operationalize a third runway at Heathrow.

**Rogue Drone/Drone Attack:** Such category includes intentionally orchestrated attacks using Drone, consciously chosen as an attack vector. The attack scenario may range from pin pointed assassination of target persons to destruction of an entire facility of importance.

Use of assembled and weaponized drones has become an integral part of attack strategy of ISIS operatives in Iraq and Syria. For example, during the battle near Mosul, the Islamic State killed tens of Iraqi soldiers by dropping grenades from a swarm of drones attacking at the same time.<sup>[5]</sup>

#### 4. Threats to Internal Security

Owing to extreme configurability, drone may pose serious security concerns to national security in numerous ways. However, the threat vectors associated with the Drones may broadly be classified into following categories:

**Surveillance:** The primary and most natural application of Drones is aerial surveillance. Equipped with most advanced high resolution, light weight digital optical sensors, it opens up an unprecedented avenue of aerial photography for amateur photo enthusiast and surveillance fraternity alike. Drones are regularly known to be operated for detailed surveillance of hostile/ enemy territories by state actors as well as terrorist groups.

Pre Air strike surveillance sorties of drones have become an indispensable ritual for most advanced air combat units. The availability of light weight optical sensors allows integration of multi genre optical sensors like high resolution cameras, IR Sensors and Thermal imagers, to sophisticated users, opening up a new horizon in an all-weather surveillance capability.

However, the pain point from Internal security standpoint is, that the technology is stupidly simple for any non-state actor to carry out surveillance of vital national installations, even using out of the box cheap commercial drones with inbuilt high resolution image sensors.

**Smuggling:** Due to stealth operability capability, drones can be configured for smuggling of prohibited items as payload for delivery to predefined Point of Interest (POI). Most appropriate application scenarios include International Borders (IB), Airports, Prisons and other protected/prohibited facilities.

Detection of drones being used for smuggling across any long porous border is a Technological nightmare for even most technologically advanced countries having invested heavily in

anti-drone technology. As per Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), US, drones have become a platform of choice for transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in the recent times, to smuggle small amounts of drugs into the U.S. completely evading border walls or inspections at legal points of entry. As a case in the point, in August, 2017 DEA caught hold of a remotely-controlled aircraft coming over the border fence carrying 13 pounds of contraband- methamphetamine.<sup>[6]</sup>

**Assassination:** Tiniest of drones powered by artificial intelligence and Face recognition technology, can be configured with miniature ballistic /explosive weapons to orchestrate assassination with surgical precision.

The failed assassination attempt against the Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on August 4, 2018, using Drone mounted with one kilogram of C-4 plastic explosive, at a highly secured military event in Caracas, may be cited as first such a high profile assassination attempt.<sup>[7]</sup>

**Drone Attacks:** UAS of sufficient size and in required number can obliterate any gigantic facility of strategic importance or even airfield. Attack on Aramco Oil Refinery is a case in this point.

For example, Houthi attack on 10 January 2019, carried out using a sophisticated Qasef-2K model drone, killed six people including Maj. Gen. Mohammad Saleh Tamah, the head of Yemeni Intelligence, chief of staff and wounded at least 25 military personnel during a military parade in the Lahij Governorate near the southern port city of Aden.<sup>[8]</sup>

#### 5. Configurability

It will not be an over statement to call drone the Chameleon of Aviation technology kingdom. The extremely generic nature of the platform allows application specific customisation, only limited

by imagination, in minimum possible time. The main components of a drone include propellers, electronic motors, Electronic Speed Controller (ESC), Flight controller module, RF Communication module, GPS Module, batteries and payload of choice which may vary from camera to explosive, all mounted over a light weight airframe.

The maximum altitude, speed and endurance, all can be reconfigured by trivial load balancing calculations among payload weight and number/weight/endurance of mounted batteries.

## **6. The force multiplier – Artificial Intelligence**

With onboard Navigation module (GPS/GNSS etc.), RPAs are relatively autonomous by design, with requirement of minor interventions by remote pilots for performing tasks at Point of Interests (POIs). However, enormous advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technologies, and its marriage with Drone Tech has opened up new avenues in fully autonomous UAS flights. Armed with onboard AI algorithms together with navigation module, drones can take off, fly to designated point with impeccable accuracy in metres and carry out tasks with surgical precision ranging from offloading of play load to taking out targets with real time positive target identification. Integration of AI on drone platforms, apart from imparting capability to carry out real time and in place decision making, allows to cut the umbilical cord between UAS and remote pilot i.e. Drone-Remote Pilot RF communication link, the only potent source of RF signature detection, thereby making detection of the bird extremely difficult and tracking of the handler impossible.

## **7. Drone Threat – International Scenario:**

Unmanned aerial systems industry is growing exponentially worldwide with formalisation of new commercial applications every day. As per ResearchAndMarkets.com, one of the largest

global market research portals, currently, there are around one million drones registered in US with FAA alone, with numbers increasing day by day. Consequently, most advanced countries are already reasonably invested in offensive as well as C-UAS Tech.<sup>[9]</sup>

So far as offensive drone capability is concerned, if open domain information is to be believed, nations leading the race include **United States, Russia and Israel followed by emerging powers like China and Iran.**

However, as far as Counter UAS Tech is concerned, the Drone attack on heavily defended state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, is a watershed moment for antidrone strategists, which exposed the total futility of current drone defence outlook against an intelligently crafted drone attack.

The C-UAS industry is grown exponentially in recent years. As per 2018 report of “Center for the Study of the Drone” at Bard College, there exist over 230 identified C-UAS solutions produced by 155 manufacturers in 33 countries.

## **8. Drone Threat – Indian Perspective**

India, with few unfriendly neighbouring states, has rightly augmented its defence capabilities with inclusion of offensive drone technology in a timely manner together with that for surveillance and effective disaster management. However, it will not be exaggeration of facts to mention that C-UAS outlook is in its very nascent state.

The range limitations of RF detection technology for Low-Slow-Small (LSS) flying emitter like drone together with Geography of India itself, i.e. long porous borders of India, present a unique advantage for adversaries for drone based offensive. As per MHA reports, India has land borders of total 15,106 km including that of 3,488km and 3,323km across China and Pakistan

alone respectively. Technically it is improbable to have a practicable deployment of anti-drone tech all across the border.<sup>[10]</sup>

Post Punjab Drone incident in September 2019, possibility of smuggling, surveillance and even attack using drones has come out of realm of imagination of farsighted defence strategists to hard reality of the day.

In September 2019, A large consignment of AK-47 assault rifles and grenades were dropped in Amritsar in Punjab by drones by as many as eight detected sorties. Subsequently, a number of such sightings were reported in October 2019, including prominent reporting like spotting of suspected Pakistani drones flying in two villages in the Indian territory along the India-Pakistan border in Tendiwala and Hussainiwala area in Punjab followed by in subsequent days. Also as per media reports, so far two such drones had been recovered — one in reasonably good condition and the second in burnt condition in Jhabal town in Tarn Taran district.<sup>[11]</sup>

The alarming part of the incident is that as per Intelligence reports referenced by open media, perpetrators behind the activity are no smuggling cartel but State actors as part of the coordinated tactic.<sup>[12]</sup>

## 9. Challenges in Drone Defence:

Any heterogeneous security threat vectors come with a unique set of challenges in terms of Defence technology against the same, and, Drone Technology is no exception. Mainly following identified challenge limits the effectiveness of any C-UAS solution:

**Small RCS:** Due to extensive use of carbon fibre materials in Airframes UAVs have miniscule Radar Cross-section, hardly detectable by conventional RADARs.

Also, for similar reasons and low flying altitudes, differentiation of drones from natural flying animals like birds etc. becomes extremely

difficult and optimisation of RADAR systems for smaller RCS detection results in barrage of false alarms.

**Auto Navigation:** The detection of UAV largely depended on detection of Drone-Remote Pilot RF link. However, with augmentation of GPN based self/auto navigation feature in almost every drone has made detection of an active Drone-Remote Pilot RF link improbable luxury. Operationally configured drones are compulsorily fitted with a number of Navigation modules with even satellite redundancy making complete exercise of drone, from launch to return home, autonomous and negating the possibility of pilot tracking even in the eventuality of drone detection.

**Stealth Technologies:** Attack or offensive UAVs are designed with stealth as priority design requirement. RADAR non-detectability is taken care of in each aspect of drone design from form factor for resemblance to bird radar signature to use of stealth material like carbon fibre materials in Airframes and use of Silicon based batteries instead of Li-Ion battery packs.

**Collateral Damage:** Post detection of the drone, even taking down the drone by “Hard kill” measures do not completely rule out the threat. With advent of weaponized drones, it is pertinent to imagine a scenario where a UAV with explosive payload is taken down by offensive measures, particularly near a high density area, particularly, airports. The collateral ground damage may suffice to turn attack into a success.

## 10. Drone- Privacy Concerns:

Apart from physical security concerns, there is another growing apprehension from proliferation of drones that is gaining much of traction, Privacy threat, to be precise. Apart from photo / videographic restriction for vital government installations, internationally there exists hardly any regulation to specifically protect privacy of

citizens in general. Even Federal Aviation Administration regulations of most privacy conscious country like USA, do not specifically address the issue of flight over residential areas.

Also, it may be mentioned that general privacy concerns from drones also largely depends on credibility of the Drone user. For instance, a study conducted on public perceptions of drones related privacy concerns, by professors of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU), surprisingly revealed they were less concerned about commercial drone users, like construction and real estate companies, or even hobbyist, but, more concerned about drones owned by the government, military or law enforcement. Also, gender plays a significant role in privacy concerns with females having more privacy apprehension about drones, for fear of being videotaped <sup>[13]</sup>

### **11. Drone – Some Positive use cases:**

Every technology exists for a reason and Drone Tech is also no exception. Professional application of drone technology with required safeguards and regulation in place, may pave avenues for new opportunities as well as bring tremendous efficiency in conventional activities. As a case in this point, UP Police effectively used drones for Kumbh Mela 2019 for aerial surveillance and as well as for better crowd management<sup>[14]</sup>. Also, Surveillance operations by CRPF using Israeli-made Heron, in otherwise difficult to penetrate jungle terrain, is considered to be the most apt instance of use of drone for augmentation of national security in a positive way<sup>[15]</sup>. However, positive use cases of drones are not limited to policing fields but in varied commercial application ranging from agricultural surveys to sports telecasting.

### **12. Drones and Disaster Management:**

Drones can have a multi facet application in effective disaster management, ranging from locating survivors in need of help, to rapid

provision of Emergency Infrastructures and Supplies. Presumably, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in number of occasions reiterated that UAVs, by virtue of provision of high-resolution, real-time images of even the inaccessible locations, which can then be used to produce accurate hazard maps, may play a significant role in reduction of disaster/Rescue related risks <sup>[16]</sup>.

### **13. Antidrone Technologies and limitations:**

The Counter UAS exercise is composed of different stages of detection/protection i.e. Detection, Direction Finding, Drone identification, Drone tracking, Pilot tracking and finally Threat mitigation. There exist many technologies and multiple approaches for threat detection as well as mitigation as discussed below:

#### **Drones and Enforcement Agencies/police**

The devices like drones of flexible sizes offer many advantages to the enforcement agencies in their field level operations for the public order management and control of crime. Some of the notable advantages that can be availed of by the police are mentioned below-

- (a) Deployment of drones in riot prone/affected areas to detect collection of rioters, stones, arms, ammunition and explosive projectiles like indigenous missile launchers fitted with powerful slings to rain the opponents with patrol bombs or preventing the police from reaching the affected sites for effective intervention to control the riot. They can also detect the rioters in narrow lanes or other not very easily visible to the police;
- (b) Deployment of drones during large sized social, political and religious congregations spread over relatively

wider area, not amenable to the centralized CCTV surveillance, for well timed public order related interventions with a view to averting imminent disasters caused by stampede;

- (c) To be used as an integral part of CCTV surveillance with the added advantage of portability and mobility to capture timely footage of happenings on ground requiring urgent corrective intervention from the public order machinery; etc

#### **Drone Detection:**

- **RADAR:** The primary instrument for any aerial target detection is RADAR. However, for conventional RADARs, it is extremely difficult to detect low flying, slow and small RCS based aerial targets like drones. Moreover, RADAR based detection is highly prone to false alarms. Albeit, new RADAR technologies are being developed, like advanced phased array and Holographic RADARS, to specifically address the threat in hand.
- **Micro Doppler RADAR:** Such RADARs instead of detecting the RCS of the drone, attempts to identify rotor movements of the drone for effective differentiation against birds. However, range of such RADARs is limited to 1 to 2 km leaving very little reaction time.
- **RF Detection:** One of the primary approaches for drone detection and identification is to intercept the Drone-Remote Pilot RF Communication link and analyze the RF signatures to identify the drone type.

However, advent of GPS/INS based auto-navigation techniques and use of Non-ISM/

Non-conventional frequencies by custom drones limits the effectiveness of such approach.

- **Visual/Electro-optical sensors:** Such approach involves use of ultra high resolution image sensors invisible as well Infra Red spectrums together with other opto-electrical sensors, to sight and identify drones against heterogeneous background
- **Acoustic Signatures:** The distinctive pattern of sound being emanated from drones owing to propeller movement can be detected by acoustic sensors of sufficient sensitivity and even identified by crosschecking against acoustic signature databases. However, such technology is limited by range of only upto 1km and also susceptibility to surrounding noise.

#### **Drone Mitigation- SoftKill:**

- **RF Jammers:** Such approach attempts to Jam the Drone-Remote Pilot RF Communication link, there by either rendering the drone incapable of receiving instructions and land on spot or activating return home functionality to help save the target.

Similar to RF detection, use of GPS/INS based auto-navigation techniques limits its effectiveness.

- **GPS/GNSS Jammers:** Such approach instead of Jamming only the Drone-Remote Pilot RF link, attempts to jam GPS signals to make the drone lose its positional awareness either to hover without stability / get drifted away from target or force land.

Advanced operationally configured drones nowadays come with Inertial Navigation System (INS) in addition to GNSS and can still take down large targets with reasonable accuracy.

### Drone Mitigation- Hardkill:

This is an extreme measure to be resorted to under exceptional circumstances of imminent threat which involve physical destruction of the drone, when all softkill techniques have already failed to neutralise the threat.

There exist, variety of methods to completely destroy the hardware like Laser Guns, High Power Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Guns and Kinetic interdiction platforms which involve off-the-air physical capture of the drone.

### 14. Policies and Enforcement in Indian context:

As far as policies related to RPA/UAVs in India is concerned, the guiding document is **Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR)** Section 3 (Air Transport Series X Part I Issue I) Dated 27 August, 2018, issued by DGCA and effective from 01st December, 2018. The document deals in detail, the requirements for Operation of Civil Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAs).<sup>[17]</sup> The CAR, also called Drone Regulations 1.0, while Drone Regulations 2.0 is under drafting, has following important regulations:

- All RPAS except nano and those owned by NTRO, ARC and Central Intelligence Agencies are to be registered and issued with Unique Identification Number (UIN)
- Unmanned Aircraft Operator Permit (UAOP) shall be required for RPA operators except for nano RPAS operating below 50 ft., micro RPAS operating below 200 ft., and those owned by NTRO, ARC and Central Intelligence Agencies.
- Defined “No Drone Zones” around airports; near international border, Vijay Chowk in Delhi; State Secretariat Complex in State Capitals, strategic locations/vital and military installations; etc.
- All drones (except Nano category) must be registered and issued a Unique

Identification Number (UIN) through Digital Sky Platform.

- A permit is required for commercial drone operations, except Nano category flown below 50 feet and Micro category flown below 200 feet.
- Drones cannot be flown above the altitude of 400 feet vertically.
- No Permission, No Takeoff Policy (NPNT) which mandates that before every single flight, drone pilots are required to request permission to fly, through Digital Sky Platform, and take off only after positive permission.
- Requirement of built-in drone safety features like Software no-fly Zones, GPS, Return to Home (RTH) functionality and anti-collision lights etc.
- All drone operators will register their drone and request permission to fly for each flight through India’s Digital Sky Platform.

The enforcement actions are involved as follows:

- (a) Suspension/ cancellation of UIN/ UAOP in case of violation of regulatory provisions.
- (b) Actions as per relevant Sections of the Aircraft Act 1934, or Aircraft Rules, or any statutory provisions.
- (c) Penalties as per applicable IPCs (such as 287, 336, 337, 338, or any relevant section of IPC).

### 15. Recommendations

**Tight No fly zones:** Considering the possibility of collateral damage even after the eventuality hard kill near vulnerable installations and small reaction time with any C-UAS, the “prevention is better than cure” approach is best suited for vital installations including airports. There is a



tendency to use symmetrical shapes like circle or rectangles to define designated No-Fly Zones. However, such shapes may not do adequate justice to actual no fly requirements, either leaving some actual required only area out of coverage or unnecessarily engaging irrelevant areas. For example, in case of aerodromes, asymmetrical coverage is required to cover the airfield and flight approach corridors. The same approach is progressively being adopted in default inbuilt software defined No-Fly Geofencing of popular drone manufacturers like DJI. The Fig-1 shows use of symmetric No-Fly zones to that of asymmetric No-Fly zones defined in DJI Geofencing Version 1 and latest version 2 respectively.<sup>[18]</sup>



**Fig. 1: DJI Geofence v1.0 and v2.0**

**Restriction of BVLOS flights:** Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights refers to flight of UAVs where the drone moves beyond visual range of the Remote Pilot. BVLOS Capabilities allow drone technology to implement most exciting applications. However, it comes with a host of security apprehensions and limited ability of pilot to perceive the threat and take corrective action. Hence, it may be suggested that till tight policies are formulated and drone detection / C-UAS systems attain required maturity, BVLOS operations should be prohibited except for responsible organisations having requisite mechanism in place or government users.

### **Import regulations:**

Easy availability of drones in the hands of novice or amateur users, either through online marketplaces or in domestic markets is one primary reason for drone related threats, particularly in terms of threats pilot ignorance/ pilot error. Hence, availability of drones should be strongly regulated by LEAs in local markets and online forums, together with stringent import controls, except for Nano Drones. In this context it may also be mentioned that along with regulation on fully assembled drones, the same approach should be followed for drone components and ‘Do It Yourself’ (DIY) kits as assembling such drones is extremely easy at the user end and perhaps more dangerous owing to absence of inbuilt geo-fencing and altitude restrictions generally in place of devices of reputed manufacturers.

### **Human Resource Development:**

Being a nascent technology area in our country, there is general paucity of credible and professional drone pilot training facility. Also, keeping in view the varied spectrum of application, “one size fits all” approach in training is also not expected to serve much purpose. Hence, Govt. approved modular training programme is required to be designed with flexible and limited training requirement for Line of sight Pilots with NPNT compliance, whereas, BVLOS pilots may be subjected to more stringent training and compliance requirements. This will go a long way towards minimising the risk by preventing the security scenarios attributing to “Clueless and Careless” category of drone users, which constitutes a lion portion of untoward incidents world over. Conventional Flight training institutes of repute like “Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Uran Akademi (IGRUA)”, already having much of the wherewithal in flight training and air regulation, have a significant role to play in this regard in terms of collaborating for Drone Pilot training as well.

**Reporting:** There is no formal reporting mechanism for general public for reporting of drone sightings. Also, conventional crime reporting mechanisms will not be suitable for such incidents as such conventional reporting chain lacks expertise to initiate a reaction and situational awareness to distinguish between approved exercise and rogue flight, meanwhile, losing precious little reaction time available. In absence of any dedicated channel exclusively for drone incident reporting, the only resort is Indian Air Force (IAF) run 24 hours Aerial incidence reporting helpline i.e. 155280

Also, well coordinated people awareness campaign should be taken up to sensitize common public as well as the last man standing in the security apparatus.

#### **Drone Defence - Role of the last man standing:**

Since it is well understood that a comprehensive nationwide drone detection shield is unconceivable in near future, the anti-drone strategy will always comprise human element for both detection and neutralisation of drone based threats. Hence, reasonable amount of training and familiarisation of field personnel of law enforcement and border guarding forces is extremely important. A condensed module on drone related security implications should be made an integral part of training curriculum. Additionally, existing workforce of such forces may be sensitised by security briefings and workshops.

Field level officers need to be apprised of SOPs issued by MHA with regard to “Unconventional Aerial threat”. Also, it may be suggested that since such SOPs are generic in nature, deployment specific local SOPs may be formulated at unit level to negate any ambiguity owing to general nature of SOPs, thereby ensuring quick proactive intervention.

With regard to neutralisation of the threat, personnel of armed forces of relevant deployment may be imparted with limited training of effective use of conventional weapons against unconventional aerial targets.

#### **Intelligence based deployment:**

It is abundantly understood that deployment of Anti-Drone technology all across the hostile international borders running in thousands of kilometres is not practically feasible in the near future. Hence, Intelligence report based prudent distribution of all available C-UAS systems to cover vital installations, identified hotspots and vulnerable corridors. It may also be suggested that there have to be collective efforts from intelligence apparatus of Central intelligence agencies as well as defence forces and border guarding forces.

#### **Capacity Building in Drone forensics:**

One significant aspect of drone defence is identification and location of the perpetrator, to prevent the repeated offence. However, with the advent of autonomous navigation features, thereby avoiding the requirement of persistent RF link with the remote pilot, pilot tracking has become extremely impracticable. However, the neutralised and recovered drone itself can prove to be a treasure trove source of information with regard to pilot attributes as well as planned intentions, provided necessary depth in drone forensic analysis is available. Unfortunately, this is one of the most lagging areas of capability as far as LEAs are concerned. Specialised training may be imparted to Cyber forensic community for specific capability development in Drone forensics.

#### **16. The ray of hope- Drones are not invincible**

Despite a long list of technical challenges in terms of Drone detection and threat mitigation,

preventive approaches are also catching up to up the ante against the drone threats.

For example, after December 2018, Gatwick Airport drone incidence, major airports of UK like Heathrow and Gatwick invested hugely in anti-drone tech.<sup>[19]</sup> Thankfully, Heathrow airport is successful in resisting subsequent similar attempts to stall the airport using drones by climate activist group Heathrow Pause, when their drones failed to operate near the airport.

Again, reportedly, on 6 January 2018, Russian forces countered a UAV swarm attack involving 13 armed, fixed-wing drones on the Hmeimim base, the first of a kind in the history of drone warfare. As per Russia's MoD reports, the Airdefence and electronic warfare systems deployed at Russia's Hmeymim air base in Syria have shot down or disabled over 100 drones used in attempted terrorist drone attacks on the military facility over the past two years.<sup>[20]</sup>

### Conclusion

Threat or no threat to security, drone technology is here to stay and rather grow. Exponential growth in commercial application of drones in foreseeable future is going to make identification and neutralisation of rogue drones increasingly difficult. Moreover, by a simple nudge at the joystick, the role of a drone can be transformed from a toy for amusement to a lethal weapon, based on intent of the user. Hence, Law enforcement and security fraternity is left with no other option but to devise effective counter measures and deploy the same in an efficient manner. A comprehensive national strategy involving all the stakeholder agencies, with acquisition of latest C-UAS technology, development of Indigenous technology, water tight policy formulation and enforcement and most importantly, development of specialised Human resource for antidrone surveillance / monitoring and kill operations are the need of the hour

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
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